Much has been said about how a rocket force is the need of the hour, especially after the US-Iran conflict, where it proved to be an effective deterrent. With the appointment of a new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as well as progress towards setting up theatre commands, it is an opportune moment to discuss the merits of a rocket force in our context. It is all the more in sharp focus after Pakistan has also announced setting up one post Operation Sindoor.
Let us be clear, in the Indian context, the rocket force is being viewed as one which will handle conventional long-range ballistic missile capability. Each service already has integral weapons capable of ranges of over 450 km, which will soon increase significantly.
Currently, ballistic missile capability has largely been restricted to the strategic domain, handled by the Strategic Force Command under the national leadership. So the question is “Does it make sense to set up another force for conventional extended range targeting capability?” The logic given for raising a new rocket force is that India does not have credible capability to hit Chinese economic centres and targets of value, whereas China can target our heartland, should it choose to do so.
Without going into too many technicalities, it would be prudent to understand what are the pros and cons of using conventional ballistic missiles for long-range targeting. Ballistic missiles, even modern ones, are not accurate enough to do precise targeting, relying largely on satellite navigation/ inertial guidance for terminal accuracy. Typically, 30-50m accuracy, considering all variables (including jamming), would be a reasonable expectation over 2,000-3,000 km range. To offset this lack of precision, they carry a larger warhead, which often leads to larger collateral damage and indiscriminate destruction.
Therefore, the deployment of ballistic missiles is considered a huge step up on the escalatory ladder and would require careful calibration. Thus, its use during the initial phases of any armed conflict is questionable. The trajectory of such weapons is also predictable, giving adequate warning to the adversary, making it easier to engage. We also need to bear in mind that the only difference between a conventional ballistic missile and a nuclear one is the warhead. So, its indiscriminate deployment in our neighbourhood brings a real risk of transcending into a nuclear exchange, even if it is accidental. Considering the highly escalatory nature of the weapon system, a separate Command and Control structure will definitely be required to prevent its accidental use or to calibrate its utilisation. The number of batteries required, the challenges of mobility of such a large weapon system and the infrastructure costs for storage, manpower, maintenance and training will be substantial. To summarise, we will be saddled with a huge stockpile of conventional ballistic weapons, which will have practically no role to play in limited conflicts, but will entail huge establishment costs that will continue to bleed us economically forever.
However, this does not mean that we cannot have long-range strike capability to deter our adversaries, should they choose to target our economic heartland.
Soon, we will have air-launched weapons which would have ranges exceeding 800 km. Cruise missiles with ranges of 1,500 km have already been developed. Supersonic and even subsonic cruise missiles have greater accuracy than ballistic missiles. This is not merely theoretical; it has been proven time and again in real combat conditions. Given their smaller warhead and greater precision, their deployment is not as escalatory; therefore, in combat, their use is much more likely. In the American operations, both in Afghanistan and Iran, a large number of Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired in the initial stages of the conflict.
Therefore, the willingness to use such weapons is also a great deterrent for the adversary. We should be looking at making our ships and submarines, which have the freedom to operate in international waters 12 nautical miles off any coast, acquire similar capabilities. The combination of maritime and aerial platforms pretty much puts all important targets of our adversaries within our crosshairs. There are many advantages to this type of an approach. Our ships and aerial platforms can be easily integrated with such weapons within reasonable costs. Equally important, these platforms have other roles too, therefore, they will not sit idle in combat or even in peacetime.
Thus, there is greater cost benefit in this approach. No new Command and Control structures are required, as they can easily be plugged into our existing targeting mechanism of the Navy and the Air Force. No additional cadre is required, thereby not draining revenue resources. These platforms, both aerial and sea-based are highly mobile, thereby increasing operational flexibility, reach and the element of surprise.
Thus, the development of long-range cruise missiles and their deployment from fighter aircraft and ships is a more precise, less escalatory and more cost-effective way of having the same capability. The good part is that we are well on our way to achieving it. Trying to set up a conventional ballistic missile force for long-range targeting would be operationally imprudent and saddle us with a huge establishment cost of questionable value.
We should not conflate the perceived success of the Iranian Rocket Force as being militarily effective. While it did achieve some success, it was as much to do with a poor defensive posture in terms of limited air defence measures and lack of dispersion at the targeted bases. Ballistic missile development should be kept only for the strategic domain.
The writer is former Vice Chief of Air Staff
