Under the Agnipath scheme, a soldier is required to serve for four years. At the end of four years, 25% of the Agniveers are to be retained and the remaining discharged with a grant of Rs 11 lakh given to each. This feature of retaining only 25% of them is likely to discourage competent youth from joining the army.
The average vacancies of regular soldiers due to their retirement is 60,000 per year. Thus, at the start of the fifth year, the vacancy will be 65,000 plus 45,000 making a total of 1,05,000. The vacancy for recruitment from the ninth year onwards would be around 1,35,000 per year. Thus on the 12the year the strength of the Agniveers in the four-year tenure will be 5,40,750. This figure works out to be a little more than half the strength of soldiers in the army.
Out of this number, nearly 50% would have come to the conclusion that they would not make the grade to be counted among the 25% to be retained. The remaining 50% would be involved in cut-throat competition to be amongst the 25% to be retained. All this will militate against what is called regimental spirit and camaraderie, the features of fundamental importance in soldiering during war. Also, by then technology would have made deep inroads into a range of new weapons systems, which will require handling by seasoned and well-qualified soldiers.
Indian army soldiers during the 1965 and 1971 wars as well as the Kargil operations put up a sterling performance. Therefore, to replace such experienced soldiers with Agniveers does not appear to be justified and could be a disaster in-the-making. A well-operating system calls for a change only if some flaws surface in it and a better one is available.
During the late seventies and early eighties, a view was projected that the existing systems of selection of officers called for a change. Instead of rushing in to make a decision, the Army headquarters ordered a study of the existing systems of recruitment and officers selection, under the chairmanship of the Central Army Commander. I was designated as the Chairman of the sub-committee to look into the officers’ selection system, while Maj Gen GS Katoch was sub-chairman of the committee for the recruitment of soldiers.
My committee visited three selection boards. I sat through the interviews of the candidates by the commandants of the selection boards. We also looked at the working of the group testing officer (GTO)and the performance of the candidates as well as the psychological tests. We also examined hundreds of annual confidential reports of officers with the Military Secretary branch at the Army Headquarters. Thereafter, I interacted with the Commandant, Indian Military Academy, while my team did the same with company and platoon commanders as well as with some of the cadets.
Finally, a questionnaire covering officer-like qualities, honesty and integrity, leadership qualities, professional competence as well as the performance of their officers during battle was forwarded to nearly 200 officers of all arms who had commanded units during the 1965 and 1971 wars. To eliminate subjectivity, these commanding officers were not to mention the name of the units in their response to the questionnaire.
At the end, the examination of annual confidential reports, the interaction with the selection boards, the IMA and response from the unit commanders was thoroughly examined. The conclusion from these was that the existing system did not require any change. A presentation of our finding and conclusion was made to the Chief of the Army Staff at Army Headquarters, who approved the recommendations of the committee and ordered no change in the existing system of officer selection. The point to bear in mind is that no system which has in the past delivered to one’s entire satisfaction need be changed. Change for the sake of change can lead to serious disadvantage. The urge to bring about change in a well-established system, which has delivered extremely well in the past, with an untried one with obvious drawbacks, can lead to failures.
The mind behind this change to Agnipath scheme and the reasons for introducing it are not known. However, it is believed that the issue for the worry was the pension bill of soldiers which was considered rather heavy. This pension bill appears large because the allocation for defence is a meagre less than 2% of GDP. It may be of interest to know that China’s allocation for defence is 3% of GDP and its GDP is five times that of India. Our soldier retires after 15 years of service. Consequently, his pension is much less compared to those who have served for a much longer period. The pension bill of states’ police and central police organisations (CPO) is higher since they serve for a longer period and their pension is also more than that of a soldier. There are over four dozen central services whose officers get pay under the non-functional financial upgradation (NFFU) for jobs (appointments) they do not do. Consequently, their pension too is substantially much more than they would have got without NFFU. An IAS officer posted at Shillong gets an allowance of Rs 45,000 due to the uncongenial climate at that location. On the other hand, an army officer posted in Ladakh or Siachen glacier where temperatures drop down to -40% and below gets much less amount for living under such conditions. Some MPs and MLAs get five to seven pensions.
It is only the meagre pension of a soldier that seems to be a point of worry for this government. India’s security environments are least assuring. Any degradation or drop in our national security capability should be unacceptable. The Agnipath scheme will definitely bring down the military’s performance and could be a disaster in-the-making.
