The first of these is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court explained the doctrine in the following terms in San Miguel Properties v. Perez, GR 166836 (Sept. 4, 2013):
“The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts, although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.
“To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is proper.”
By virtue of an express grant of exclusive constitutional power, the Senate has the power — and the obligation — to rule on the construal of “two-thirds of all its members.”
Then, the Rules of the Senate in impeachment trials clearly vest jurisdiction to decide incidental matters in the Senate:
“VI. The President of the Senate or the Chief Justice when presiding on the trial may rule on all questions of evidence including, but not limited to, questions of materiality, relevancy, competency or admissibility of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the Senate, unless a Member of the Senate shall ask that a formal vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the Senate for decision after one contrary view is expressed; or the Presiding Officer may at his/her option, in the first instance, submit any such question to a vote of the Members of the Senate. The motion for a vote and the contrary opinion shall not take more than two (2) minutes each, with a one-minute rebuttal allowed for the proponent of the motion. The provisions of the Rules of the Senate and the revised Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily whenever applicable.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This is consistent with the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Bureau of Customs v. Devanadera, GR 193253 (Sept. 8, 2015) that had the Court enunciate the doctrine that a court has the jurisdiction to resolve all matters incidental to the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Taught the Court:
“The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.
“Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.” (Emphasis supplied.)
From the literal provision, alone, the thesis that sixteen (16) is an absolute, immutable number necessary to convict is patently wrong. The very first sentence of the sub-section reads:
“The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.”
The premise, therefore, for the ultimate sentence — “No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all Members of the Senate.” — is that those who vote are those who tried the case. In fact, this is clearly presupposed by the Rules of the Senate themselves. Rule XXI ordains how the Senate is to vote when rendering a verdict:
“The Presiding Officer shall first state the question. Thereafter, each Senator, as his/her name is called, shall rise in his/her place and answer: guilty or not guilty. The vote of the President of the Senate on each article of impeachment, when acting as the presiding officer, shall be last taken after all the Senators have stated their votes. If he/she so wishes, a Senator may explain his/her vote for not more than two (2) minutes.”
What is clearly presumed, therefore, is that the senator voting is in the session hall of the Senate and takes part in the deliberations thereof. That a senator has the opportunity “to explain his or her vote” leaves no doubt about this. There can be nothing to explain if the senator concerned was never part of the deliberations.
A cardinal rule of legal hermeneutics — whether it be statutory or constitutional construction — is the avoidance of absurd results by reason of the construal. Hence, Microsoft Corporation v. Manansala, GR 166391 (Oct. 1, 2015) reiterated the well-accepted rule of “construction to avoid absurdity”:
“The CA erred in its reading and interpretation of Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 49. Under the rules on syntax, the conjunctive word “and” denotes a “joinder or union” of words, phrases, or clause; it is different from the disjunctive word “or” that signals disassociation or independence. However, a more important rule of statutory construction dictates that laws should be construed in a manner that avoids absurdity or unreasonableness. As the Court pointed out in Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Inc. v. Lingad:
Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequence. That is a principle that goes back to In re Allen decided on Oct. 29, 1903, where it was held that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. That is a strong argument against its adoption. The words of Justice Laurel are particularly apt. Thus: “The fact that the construction placed upon the statute by the appellants would lead to an absurdity is another argument for rejecting it x x x.”
To be concluded on Sept. 16, 2026
rannie_aquino@sanbeda.edu.ph
rannie_aquino@csu.edu.ph
