The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) now confronts the devastating fallout from the joint United States-Israel military aggression against Iran, launched on Feb 28.
Although Southeast Asia lies thousands of kilometres from the Middle Eastern theatre, the 11-member bloc is grappling with severe political, economic and security repercussions. The crisis starkly exposes Asean’s structural dependence on external powers and the institutional impotence of regional cooperation in an era when great-power conflict is reshaping the global order.
The following paragraphs will examine Asean’s collective paralysis and the divergent pressures tearing at individual member states, revealing an organisation trapped between economic desperation and diplomatic irrelevance.
Asean’s institutional response: timid diplomacy and faint-hearted evasion
Asean’s official reaction has been a masterclass in vacillation. In a joint statement dated March 4, its foreign ministers voiced “concern” over “the escalation of conflict in the Middle East following the attacks initiated by Israel and the United States against Iran”, as well as Iran’s retaliatory strikes.
The ministers urged “utmost self-restraint” and appealed for a diplomatic resolution. Notably, the statement identified Washington and Tel Aviv as the aggressors, implicitly rejecting American claims of pre-emptive action against imminent threats.
The ministers invoked international law and the United Nations (UN) Charter, demanding respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, drawing on the mantras enshrined in the Asean Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and other foundational documents that shape bilateral ties, despite recent military friction between Thailand and Cambodia.
At a special meeting on March 13 under the Philippine chairmanship, Asean reiterated its call for an “immediate cessation of hostilities”.
Yet its statements deliberately obscured culpability. Despite widespread recognition that the US-Israel strike constituted unprovoked aggression aimed at regime change, the organisation refused explicit condemnation. This diplomatic timidity neutered Asean’s appeals and signalled a tacit accommodation with the aggressors.
The organisation’s cautious and, some would argue, hypocritical rhetoric grossly understates the economic catastrophe now threatening Southeast Asia’s export-dependent economies.
Factors muzzling Asean
Multiple forces conspire to silence Asean, particularly when it is confronted by serious issues such as the South China Sea dispute or the genocide in Gaza.
Foremost among these is economic desperation. With inflation surging and supply chains fracturing, governments are prioritising domestic survival over foreign policy principles that might alienate crucial partners.
The imperative to shield populations from soaring prices and shortages shackles any impulse toward diplomatic boldness.
Asean’s own internal divisions compound its weakness. The region remains mired in unresolved conflicts: Myanmar’s collapsed peace process, South China Sea tensions, Cambodia-Thailand border friction, southern Thai and Philippine insurgencies, and Indonesia’s Papuan conflict.
These festering wounds destroy Asean’s credibility when it preaches restraint to others abroad. Furthermore, power asymmetry crushes autonomy.
Despite ritualistic invocations of “Asean centrality”, Southeast Asian states wield negligible influence over Washington, Beijing, Moscow or New Delhi.
Asean’s genuine strength has always lain in managing diversity through dialogue, not in power projection. Yet as global polarisation intensifies, pressures to choose sides are eroding this hard-won autonomy. Members risk becoming mere spectators while great powers dictate their fates.
Today’s international system increasingly mirrors Cold War conditions: the weaponisation of finance, coercive sanctions diplomacy, fragmented trade and pervasive information warfare. Alignment imprisons strategic flexibility; autonomy preserves it.
Asean already functions as a de facto non-aligned bloc, hedging between rivals while maintaining open relations with all. The challenge now is summoning the institutional confidence to defend this position against mounting external pressure.
Economic devastation and existential threats
The economic consequences of the US-Israel attack constitute Asean’s most urgent existential threat. The conflict has shattered global energy supply chains, crippling the oil and liquefied natural gas flows that underpin Southeast Asia’s export-driven growth model.
Data from the Asean Centre for Energy reveals a brutal dependency: over half of Asean’s crude oil imports originate from the Middle East – principally the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
The Philippines imports 95-98 per cent of its petroleum from the region, Vietnam 80-85 per cent, Thailand 55-75 per cent, and Singapore 50-70 per cent. These figures expose a catastrophic structural vulnerability.
Supply disruptions threaten to plunge Southeast Asian economies into recession, stoking inflation, food price spikes, currency collapses and stunted growth. Financial markets have convulsed.
On March 3, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) suspended trading after an eight per cent plunge; though trading resumed, the SET Index closed 5.6 per cent down – its worst performance since March 2020 – before shedding another 9.4 per cent in the wake of the strikes.
The Philippines faces particular devastation given its dependence on Gulf oil and the absence of fuel subsidies to buffer global price shocks.
Thailand has banned crude oil and petroleum exports to protect domestic supply, while Myanmar’s military junta has imposed fuel rationing for private vehicles, citing global market chaos.
Should oil prices hit US$120-200 per barrel, Asean’s export-oriented development model faces collapse, with devastating social and political consequences.
Institutional damage control
Recognising the impending disaster, Asean institutions have scrambled to mitigate the economic fallout.
At the 32nd Asean Economic Ministers’ Retreat in Taguig, Philippines, on March 13, ministers acknowledged that the conflict had intensified energy market volatility and disrupted maritime supply routes.
These ruptures have exploded freight, insurance and logistics costs while fuelling inflation across energy, food and other essential goods. Ministers warned that sustained geopolitical instability could cripple an already battered global economy.
Proposed responses include enhanced energy consumption management, diversification of supply sources, accelerated renewable energy deployment and strengthened regional energy cooperation.
Existing mechanisms – the Asean Framework Agreement on Petroleum Security, the Asean Power Grid and the Trans-Asean Gas Pipeline – were highlighted as critical infrastructure.
Under the Petroleum Security agreement, members commit to providing emergency supplies equivalent to 10 per cent of a crisis-stricken state’s normal domestic requirements.
Beyond energy, ministers emphasised the need to protect food supply chains and maintain open regional markets.
They reaffirmed their commitment to economic integration, policy coordination and trade facilitation to cushion the bloc against external shocks.
Divergent national responses
Individual Asean states have crafted positions that reflect their distinct strategic interests and domestic pressures.
Malaysia emerged as the most vociferous critic, condemning the attacks as a flagrant violation of international law and sovereignty. This stance reflects Kuala Lumpur’s traditional diplomatic multilateralism and its acute sensitivity to Muslim-majority public opinion.
Singapore adopted a posture of cautious concern. In its Feb 28 statement, the government lamented the failure of negotiations preceding the attacks and condemned retaliatory strikes on civilian infrastructure. This position reflects Singapore’s stark vulnerability as a trading hub dependent on stable maritime routes and predictable commerce.
Indonesia expressed alarm at the collapse of US-Iran negotiations and offered its services as a mediator. President Prabowo Subianto indicated his willingness to travel to Tehran, while Foreign Minister Sugiono insisted that dialogue remains the sole path to de-escalation.
This initiative projects Indonesia’s regional leadership aspirations and responds to domestic opinion within the world’s largest Muslim population.
Other members – Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Timor-Leste – issued anodyne statements urging restraint while scrupulously avoiding criticism of any party to the conflict.
Humanitarian crisis: abandoning Asean workers
The conflict has triggered grave humanitarian concerns regarding Southeast Asian migrant workers trapped in the Middle East.
The Philippines maintains over two million citizens in the region, predominantly in Gulf Cooperation Council states. Indonesia deploys approximately 600,000 nationals, and Thailand around 80,000.
Asean has reaffirmed its commitment to emergency assistance under the Asean Declaration on Guidelines for Consular Assistance.
The March 13 special meeting stressed the need for coordinated protection and potential evacuation. The Philippines, as Asean Chair, demanded swift, practical measures to safeguard nationals in conflict zones. This humanitarian imperative adds urgency to Asean’s diplomatic engagement.
Geopolitical fallout
Beyond the immediate economic carnage, the conflict raises profound strategic questions for Southeast Asia. The normalisation of unilateral military force as an instrument of statecraft threatens to legitimise extra-legal intervention.
For a region scarred by unresolved sovereignty disputes, such precedents carry deeply destabilising implications. The conflict may also reshape regional perceptions of the United States and Israel.
While Southeast Asia’s predominantly Sunni populations lack ideological affinity with Iran’s Shia regime, public sentiment could nevertheless turn sharply against Washington and Tel Aviv, complicating American partnership-building efforts.
The Philippines’ dual role as Asean Chair and a South China Sea claimant further complicates regional diplomacy. Manila must balance its neutral convening responsibilities against its deepening security cooperation with the United States.
Asean’s strategic cage
Asean confronts an impossible strategic and security dilemma.
The organisation possesses zero capacity to influence the war’s trajectory, yet its members will suffer severe economic and political consequences should hostilities persist. This exposes a fundamental institutional limitation.
While Asean effectively maintains peace and cooperation within Southeast Asia, it lacks the tools to address external crises. Contemporary security challenges centre on supply chain control, energy resources, food systems, digital infrastructure and information networks.
Neither great-power alignment nor strict neutrality guarantees resilience. Alignment sacrifices autonomy; strategic flexibility preserves engagement options. Asean’s enduring value lies in making itself indispensable rather than aligned.
By maintaining balanced relations with all major powers while strengthening internal resilience, the organisation can retain its diplomatic relevance. Non-alignment represents not ideological purity but a pragmatic survival strategy in a contested international order.
Ultimately, Asean must choose: remain a passive venue for global power politics or evolve into an active strategic actor capable of shaping its own security environment.
This decision will determine regional stability in the so-called “Asian Century”. History punishes premature bloc alignment; it rewards those who render themselves strategically indispensable.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not represent that of Twentytwo13.