WHEN Southeast Asian leaders meet in Manila this November, they will face a choice. They can repeat calls for peace and stability in the South China Sea, or turn those words into practical cooperation and a push to finish the long-delayed Code of Conduct. The difference matters to fishermen, seafarers, coastal communities, and every country that depends on safe passage through these waters.
The Philippines should lead with purpose: protect maritime rights, reduce the risk of dangerous encounters, and make coercion harder to impose on any one country. This is a regional agenda rooted in common interests. China’s coercive conduct in the West Philippine Sea makes the need immediate. Asean members do not share identical security concerns or identical ties with Beijing. They can still agree that no country should be pressured into surrendering lawful rights, and that the rules of the sea must apply consistently to all.
Cooperation must begin with the agencies that meet each other at sea. The Philippine and Vietnamese coast guards already have an agreement, a joint committee and a hotline. They should put these arrangements to work through regular exchanges, operational exercises and clear procedures for safe vessel approaches. They can train together in search and rescue and test their hotlines. Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei should be invited to develop compatible procedures, with Singapore contributing its experience in maritime information sharing.
Asean already has venues for this work, including the Asean Maritime Forum. The summit can task the forum with a year-round work plan spanning coast guard coordination and marine scientific research. Joint research and shared monitoring of reefs, fisheries, pollution and climate risks can produce common baselines for marine environmental security. Leaders can assign agencies, identify equipment and training gaps, and require regular progress reports. This would make cooperation visible between summits.
Neighbors need not agree on every boundary or adopt the same view of China. What matters is sharing reliable information and acting on common risks. A regional picture of vessel movements, built from coast guard reports, satellite imagery and lawful sources, would help governments verify incidents before they become competing claims. Common reporting standards would preserve evidence, identify patterns, and make public explanations more credible.
Coast guards should also work together on search and rescue, medical evacuation, fisheries enforcement, piracy, trafficking and marine pollution. These are practical tasks with public value. Joint patrols can be developed where governments agree they are appropriate, especially in their own maritime zones and on shared non-traditional risks. Coordinated patrols and exercises in disputed areas require care, since even well-intended actions can be misread. The aim should be persistent, lawful presence and better communication, with restraint that keeps tensions from rising.
The Philippines can make it easier for Asean to speak with one voice. Before negotiations with China, member states should hold internal consultations and agree on a common text. The claimants have reason to coordinate, while non-claimant members should be brought into the discussion early. External partners such as Japan, Australia, India and the United States can assist with training, equipment and maritime awareness through Asean-led arrangements. Their support should reinforce the region’s capacity and preserve Asean’s control of its agenda.
The Code of Conduct is the summit’s most visible test. Asean and China adopted the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 2002, but that declaration is nonbinding and has not prevented repeated confrontations. Formal negotiations on a code began in 2018. They have accelerated, with monthly meetings this year, yet negotiators are still working through the code’s legal character, geographic scope, relationship to the 2002 declaration and the meaning of self-restraint. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has said the parties have made progress, while acknowledging he cannot confidently predict an agreement before the chairship passes to Singapore.
The COC should be legally binding, grounded in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), and written to protect the rights of states under that convention, including third parties. It should regulate behavior without deciding sovereignty or maritime boundaries. The 2016 arbitral award in the Philippines’ case against China must not be weakened or displaced by a regional political agreement. A code is useful because states can agree on safe conduct while continuing to disagree about ownership and jurisdiction.
The document should define restraint in observable terms. It should prohibit dangerous maneuvers, ramming, water cannon attacks, lasers directed at vessels, and obstruction of lawful resupply or navigation. It should cover government vessels, maritime militia, and other vessels acting on a government’s behalf, regardless of their markings. It should require incident hotlines, timely reporting, procedures for investigation and consultation, and regular review of compliance. A promise to exercise restraint is meaningful only if governments can determine what conduct violates it and what follows a breach.
The November summit should give negotiators a short, public timetable and the political backing to settle the remaining text by year’s end. Before leaders meet, the Philippine chair should shuttle among Asean capitals, seek agreement on a clean negotiating text, and press China to resolve outstanding provisions. At the summit, leaders should direct frequent working sessions through December, require progress reports, and secure Singapore’s commitment to carry negotiations into 2027 if necessary. The deadline should be real, not another date that quietly passes.
If consensus on the full COC remains out of reach, leaders should say so plainly and adopt an interim package of risk-reduction measures under the existing framework: functioning hotlines, safe-encounter rules, search-and-rescue coordination and a fixed calendar for negotiations. This would not replace the code. It would protect lives while talks continue and give the public something concrete by which to judge progress.
The Philippines cannot secure its maritime rights by itself. Asean cannot protect its credibility through declarations alone. Cooperation among neighbors can improve awareness, strengthen diplomatic leverage, and reduce the danger that an incident at sea escalates. A substantive COC would add rules and accountability. The summit in Manila should make clear that the region wants peaceful relations with China and will defend international law as the basis for them.
Disclosure: The author is a professor at the University of the Philippines Los Baños and vice chairman of the board of PTV Network.
