THE May 14-15 summit in Beijing between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his US counterpart Donald Trump was a landmark geopolitical event, whose impact will reverberate across the Asian region and the world for years to come. This is an inflection point, and one is not using the term lightly. It is perhaps for this reason that there is a reluctance not only in the US and the West but also in our own region to grasp the full significance of just what happened in those two days of early spring in the Chinese capital.
One, this summit marks the acknowledgement of a bipolar equation among proximate powers. Xi framed the new strategic framework in these unusually categorical terms: “I have agreed with President Trump on a new vision of building a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability.”
Xi went on to define the four pillars of this strategic stability: cooperation as mainstay, competition within limits, manageable differences, and expectable peace. He said this would guide the relationship for the next three years and beyond.
The term “strategic stability”, which belongs to the bipolar Cold War years, defined the US-Soviet relationship. Its very use now suggests that we are in a similar historical period of a G-2 dominating the world.
At first the US side ignored this formulation in its initial readout. However, the White House readout of May 14 endorsed it: “President Trump and President Xi Jinping agreed that the US and China should build a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of fairness and reciprocity.”
The additional phrase “on the basis of fairness and reciprocity” is missing from the Chinese readout and may have been added by American diplomats as a hedging exercise. But the strategic framework stands and reflects US acknowledgement that it is dealing with a peer power. This is a major shift and a plus for China.
If there were doubts about whether the US truly appreciated the significance of the shift, the US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Marco Rubio, laid them to rest in a subsequent media interview: “One of the things that Chinese emphasise, which we agree (emphasis mine), is strategic stability in our relationship, a constructive relationship, but also one that establishes strategic stability so that we don’t have misunderstandings that can lead to broader conflict.”
This immediately puts a limit on what the US can and will do to defend the interests of allies and partners alike. Would the overarching objective of maintaining strategic stability put limits on US defence of the latter? For India, the question would be whether the US Indo-Pacific strategy will soon become a casualty of this new paradigm. If the Chinese declare that the “Quad” is incompatible with “strategic stability,” what will be the US response?
The Chinese side was extremely forceful on the question of Taiwan. Xi even invoked the Thucydides Trap to warn that if this issue was not handled properly, it could lead to conflict — that is, undermine strategic stability. The Chinese Foreign Ministry readout said: “The Taiwan question is the most important issue in China-US relations. If it is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability. Otherwise, the two countries will have clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy. Taiwan independence and cross-strait peace are as irreconcilable as fire and water. Safeguarding peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is the biggest common denominator between China and the US. The US side must exercise extra caution in handling the Taiwan question.”
One has not seen a formulation as categorical and harsh as this in previous summits. The entire relationship is being predicated on this issue. It reflects a Chinese perception that in the changed geopolitical equation, China can press forward its advantage on Taiwan. Trump’s commitment to Taiwan has been lukewarm at best. He has often considered it as yet another bargaining chip to extract concessions from China and not as a keystone in US Indo-Pacific strategy. There was no reference to Taiwan in the US readout, which means that the Chinese statement went unchallenged.
Subsequent remarks by Trump and Rubio were ominous. Trump said he was holding back on the approval of a $14-billion arms package for Taiwan for the time being and described it as a “bargaining chip.” Later, he said he did not want to fight a war “9,000 miles away”.
When Rubio was asked whether the commitment to Taiwan’s defence remained unchanged, he said, “US policy on the issue of Taiwan is unchanged as of today and as of the meeting that we had today. It was raised. They always raise it on their side. We always make clear our position and we move on to other topics.”
There are two things to note here. One, Rubio suggests that the position on Taiwan stands for now but implies that it could change. Two, he reduces the conversation on Taiwan to a ritualistic and rhetorical exchange, devoid of any strategic content. That is a mistake. It misreads the political and emotional charge that the Chinese have invested in the issue.
The two leaders have agreed to meet again in September, when Xi will pay a return visit to Washington. Trump is unpredictable, but he is now locked in a dynamic that would be difficult to reverse.
The structural confrontation between the US and China will continue, but the nature of the equation has changed. The Chinese believe that they can assert their interests with a boldness born out of the symmetric leverage vis-à-vis America. This will inevitably affect its relations with other countries, especially those in Asia. India will confront a less accommodating China and a greater predilection on its part to double down on its alliance with Pakistan.
One should note that Trump is not reported to have raised the issue of China supplying components to Iran’s missile and drone arsenal and assisting with targeting information that led to attacks on US bases in the Gulf during the Iran war. Strategic stability has its limits.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is already in Beijing for another consequential summit. The strategic space around the US is narrowing and this is inevitably leading to a distancing of both allies and partners from Washington. We should be extremely alert and avoid ending up as a bargaining chip in the new superpower game.
