BN and Perikatan can top up each other’s votes: Can they jointly govern in the morning after? A categorical no — Phar Kim Beng

JULY 31 — Politics rewards those who win elections. Governance rewards those who can survive after victory. Can BN and PN govern together? They can't.

BN states pro cinema, PN ones, especially Kelantan, have none. No cinemas. The latter does not trust any business conducted in closed doors, even if it is a movie, in the dark.

BN is pro and PN is against. And Kelantan is where PAS claims it as its proverbial replica of good government. Even though it is the state with tremendous range of social problems from the teenage years of their residents onwards.

The distinction between BN and PAS-led PN is important. That's because Malaysian politics is increasingly obsessed with electoral engineering—while paying less attention to governing capacity.

Negeri Sembilan has become the latest testing ground for this dilemma.

The electoral understanding between Barisan Nasional (BN) and Perikatan Nasional (PN) is politically rational.

Both recognise that splitting the anti-Pakatan Harapan vote benefits only their common opponent.

By coordinating candidates instead of competing directly, they can "top up" each other's vote banks, particularly in Malay-majority constituencies.

The formula has obvious attractions. It worked sufficiently well in Johor to encourage another attempt in Negeri Sembilan. Should it prove successful again, there will undoubtedly be pressure to replicate it in Melaka and perhaps beyond.

Winning elections, however, is only the first chapter of government. The more difficult question begins the morning after victory.

Can BN and PN actually govern together?

The answer is far less straightforward than their electoral cooperation suggests.

For decades, Umno and PAS were not merely political competitors. They defined themselves by opposing one another. Each accused the other of betraying Malay interests, Islamic principles or national leadership. Their rivalry was not temporary but institutional, extending from Parliament to villages, mosques and party branches.

Such political memories do not disappear simply because electoral mathematics changes.

Even today, senior leaders within both coalitions continue to disagree publicly on fundamental issues. They have different economic priorities, different leadership cultures and different visions of Malaysia's future.

These differences have merely been suspended for electoral convenience.

Suspension is not resolution.

Should BN and PN secure power together, unresolved disagreements would immediately re-emerge in the allocation of executive positions.

Who becomes Menteri Besar?

Who controls finance?
Who oversees land, religious affairs, state-linked companies and government procurement?

Every coalition negotiation eventually reaches these questions because political authority is exercised through institutions rather than campaign speeches.

The challenge extends beyond personalities.

BN has traditionally governed through relatively centralised administrative institutions built over decades. PAS, as PN's dominant political force in Peninsular Malaysia, often approaches governance through a different ideological lens, placing stronger emphasis on religious administration and social regulation.

Reconciling these governing philosophies is considerably more difficult than agreeing not to contest the same constituency.

The problem becomes even more pronounced at the federal level.

Malaysia's economy depends heavily on investor confidence, policy predictability and institutional stability. Businesses make investment decisions over years rather than election cycles. Investors naturally ask whether a coalition can maintain coherent policies after taking office.

Electoral cooperation does not automatically produce policy coherence.

Different approaches to industrial policy, education, foreign investment, fiscal management and federal-state relations could generate uncertainty if not carefully reconciled.

This is where history becomes instructive.

Around the world, many coalitions have won elections only to discover that governing requires far greater compromise than campaigning.

Campaigns simplify choices.

Governments multiply them.

Every budget, every appointment, every policy announcement and every legislative proposal requires agreement. What appears united on the campaign trail can become deeply divided once administrative responsibilities begin.

Malaysia has witnessed such tensions before.

Coalitions built primarily around defeating a common opponent often struggle once that opponent no longer provides the principal source of unity.

Victory removes the adhesive that held disparate political actors together.

The question then becomes whether shared governance can replace shared opposition.

That remains uncertain.

Another issue deserves equal attention.

The increasing normalisation of tactical alliances risks encouraging politics to become permanently transactional. Parties may begin to view elections less as contests over competing visions for Malaysia and more as exercises in maximising electoral arithmetic through temporary arrangements.

Democracy functions best when voters understand not only who seeks office but also how they intend to govern once elected.

An alliance should therefore be evaluated not merely by whether it can win seats but whether it possesses a coherent governing programme.

The electorate deserves answers before polling day rather than after government is formed.

How will disagreements be resolved?

What policies enjoy genuine consensus?

Which issues remain fundamentally incompatible?

Without clear answers, electoral cooperation risks producing governmental instability rather than effective administration.

None of this suggests that coalitions cannot evolve.

Politics inevitably requires compromise.

Former rivals can become effective governing partners if they establish transparent principles, institutional mechanisms for dispute resolution and mutual respect for constitutional governance.

Many democracies have demonstrated precisely that.

But such success depends on more than winning elections.

It depends upon building trust capable of surviving success itself.

Negeri Sembilan therefore represents something larger than a state election.

It is becoming a laboratory for testing whether electoral cooperation can mature into sustainable governance.

If BN and PN succeed electorally, Malaysians will quickly move beyond asking whether they can win together.

The far more consequential question will dominate the morning after.

Can they govern together without paralysing administration, unsettling markets or allowing internal contradictions to overwhelm public policy?

History suggests that winning together is often easier than governing together.

Malaysia's voters should therefore judge every coalition by two standards rather than one.

The first is whether it can assemble enough votes to form government.

The second—and ultimately more important—is whether it possesses the institutional discipline, policy coherence and political maturity to govern effectively after the celebrations have ended.

Elections determine who occupies office.

Governance determines whether that office serves the nation well.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and a director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.