Can we move beyond optics in our talks with China?

WorldPolitics
20 Feb 2026 • 12:07 AM MYT
The Manila Times
The Manila Times

One of the longest-running English broadsheets in the Philippines

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WITHOUT choosing one party over the other, but keeping our ties with both China and the United States equidistant, our relationship with the competing economic superpowers should be moving forward, if not like that of Singapore, at least like that of Vietnam. Singapore, which has become the favored destination of foreign investments and travelers in a troubled world, will not be easy to replicate, but we could perhaps copy Vietnam. I have raised this question for years, but I think it has become more urgent than ever.

In 1988, the Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed, leaving 64 (some reports say 77) Vietnamese soldiers dead. But today, the two countries have managed to stabilize their relationship and become strong economic partners. Vietnam has also managed to develop a vibrant relationship with the US, whom it defeated in the last Vietnam War. Meanwhile, China and the Philippines have produced a continuing word war at the level of the coast guard, without producing any actual casualties. They have begun a diplomatic dialogue to de-escalate the tension, but the optics should now lead to a shift in substance.

Since 1989, workshops have been held in Bali, Bandung and Yogyakarta on “Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea.” In these workshops, representatives of Asean, Vietnam, Laos, China and Taiwan have agreed that countries with conflicting claims on the Spratlys should institutionalize dialogue among themselves and avoid taking any unilateral action that could disturb the peace or complicate the situation in the South China Sea.

The same theme ran through the meetings of Asean. In July 1992 in Manila, six foreign ministers issued the Asean Declaration on the South China Sea in which they said that conflicting sovereignty and jurisdictional issues on the Spratlys should be resolved by peaceful means, without resort to force. At the same time, they invited the claimants to explore the possibility of cooperating with each other in maritime navigation and communication, protecting the marine environment, search and rescue, antidrug and anti-piracy activities.

On Oct. 29-30, again in Manila, the 10th Asean-EC Ministerial Conference endorsed the Asean Declaration of July 1992 and called on the regional powers to work out peaceful solutions to those issues. The conference expressed the hope “that further talks among the concerned parties to explore possibilities of joint cooperation in the South China Sea could be held at an appropriate date.”

All this showed the rising global concern over conflicting claims on the Spratlys. Countries with overlapping claims are usually countries with irreconcilable interests. They are likely to clash before they cooperate. In order for them not to, they must believe in a cause higher than their naked self-interests. They must realize that they all have an irreducible, irrevocable and equal share in bearing the burden, and reaping the bounty, of peace and progress. Unless they do, there will be no peace.

What is this conflict on the Spratlys, and how have we become part of it? There is a paucity of authoritative data on the subject. Geodetic survey and mapping activities have been rendered difficult by the situation obtaining in the area. No single figure is quoted to show how many islands comprise the island group. Vietnam Commentary, a Singapore-based publication specializing in Vietnam affairs, puts it at 33 islands and more than 400 mostly barren islets and atolls, while other sources, including those quoted by diplomatic officials, put it at 53 islands and more than 230 islets, atolls, reefs, and cays and rocks, of which only 180 have names. None of them are known by only one name: they have Chinese names to the Chinese, Vietnamese names to the Vietnamese, Malaysian names to the Malaysians, Filipino names to the Filipinos.

The Spratlys (Nan-she Chun Dao, in Chinese) lie nearly halfway between the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea, along the vital shipping routes that carry the trade of East Asia and the Far East to Africa, the Middle East and Europe, through the Straits of Malacca, and link the Indian Ocean to Vladivostok. Two of the world’s largest and busiest ports — Singapore and Hong Kong — lie close to their southern and northern approaches. The islands are thought to sit on top of rich deposits of manganese, phosphates, guano and minerals. Beneath their shoals and shelves lie billions of barrels of oil and gas, waiting to be extracted for commercial purposes. Bird sanctuaries abound all over the islands. The waters that wash the islands contain at least 14 million metric tons of unexploited fishery resources, according to some expert estimates.

In 1918, Japan began quarrying the Spratlys for phosphate. In 1927, Japanese fishermen began using them as a base of operations. During the war, they provided bunkering service to Japanese warships. Japan gave up the Spratlys to the victorious Allies in the San Francisco Treaty of 1951.

China claims that the Spratlys have been part of its history for at least 2,000 years. As far as Manila knows, China began asserting its claim only in 1976. In 1984, China incorporated the Spratlys into the Hainan administrative region, and formally placed them under the jurisdiction of Hainan province in 1988. In 1992, China’s National Assembly passed a law claiming all of the islands as part of its territory, and reserving the right to use military force to enforce its claim.

The Philippine claim to the Spratlys derives from Filipino explorer Tomas Cloma’s “discovery” in 1947 of Kalayaan (Freedomland), a chain of uninhabited islands, islets, shoals, reefs, cays and rocks far beyond Palawan in the South China Sea. Cloma took possession of his discovery in 1956, but ceded his rights to the Philippine government under President Ferdinand Marcos Sr., who issued two presidential decrees in 1978, incorporating Kalayaan into the national territory. In 1968, Philippine troops established themselves on five of the islands; in 1975, the government built a 1,800-meter runway at Pag-asa, the biggest of the islands; and in May 1988, 147 Filipino voters elected the first Filipino barangay captain on the island in the person of Alawi, a Muslim Filipino.

Our territorial conflict with China has created more noise than the clash between the Chinese and Vietnamese navies that had left 64 (or 77) Vietnamese soldiers dead. But it has not produced a single fatality that could provoke a real armed conflict. Both countries have tried and managed to avoid any fatalities. This is achievement enough. From here they can go forward. In a previous column, I have suggested a number of steps which the parties could take to advance the peace. The first move though is to decide to shift from mere optics to some substantive agreements.

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