The Punjab and Haryana High Court has ruled that courts must not be prevented from considering evidence necessary to arrive at the truth and render a just decision. The Bench held that the power to permit additional evidence during the course of trial could not be curtailed by adopting a hyper-technical approach.
Justice Manisha Batra observed that the object of Section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) was to enable courts to arrive at the truth and render a just decision. The provision empowered courts to permit production of additional oral or documentary evidence whenever such evidence was considered necessary for the just adjudication of a case.
The assertion came as Justice Manisha Batra upheld an order passed by Ludhiana Judicial Magistrate First Class, allowing the complainant in a cheque dishonour case to examine his firm’s accountant and produce additional business records, including invoices, ledger account, GST registration certificate, GST returns, balance sheet and audit report.
The Bench, during the course of hearing, was told that a complainant instituted proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act alleging that the petitioner had issued a cheque dated October 12, 2022, for Rs 10 lakh, which was dishonoured on November 11, 2022, with the remark “account closed.” A legal notice dated December 7, 2022, was served upon the petitioner, who replied to the notice but failed to make payment, following which the complaint was filed.
During trial, the complainant was cross-examined on April 29 and August 28, 2025. During cross-examination, he admitted that invoices, bills, GST registration certificate, GST returns, ledger account, balance sheet and books of account had been in his possession even before filing the complaint but had not been produced before the court. He further admitted that, except for the account statement already exhibited, no document had been placed on record to establish the alleged outstanding liability.
Thereafter, the complainant moved an application seeking permission to examine the firm’s accountant and produce the additional documents. The petitioner opposed the application, contending that it was an attempt to fill lacunae in the complainant’s case after the defence had already been disclosed during cross-examination.
The trial court, vide order impugned dated April 6 this year allowed the application after holding that the proposed evidence was necessary for a just decision of the case and that the accused would have an opportunity to cross-examine the additional witness. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the petition seeking quashing of the impugned order.
Appearing for the respondent-complainant, advocate Viren Sibal, along with counsel Tisha Kalra, argued that the accountant had already been cited in the list of witnesses at the time of institution of the complaint. His examination, along with the relevant business records, was necessary for the just adjudication of the complaint arising out of commercial transactions.
Justice Batra observed that Section 348 of the BNSS conferred wide powers upon the court to summon witnesses or permit additional evidence whenever it is necessary for a just decision. “The intention of the Legislature is to empower and enable the court to come to a correct finding and for that reason, the court would be fully justified in permitting production of evidence, whether documentary or oral, where the court feels that the same is necessary for the just decision of the case. No fetters can be put in exercise of these powers of the court. The cause of justice is paramount and no impediment has, therefore, been intentionally put on the Court by the Legislature to exercise the powers under this provision,” the court observed.
Referring to the Supreme Court decisions, the Bench reiterated that the purpose of the provision was to enable the court to arrive at the truth and prevent failure of justice even where the prosecution or the defence had failed to produce material evidence earlier.
Applying the principles, the High Court held that the additional evidence sought to be produced pertained to the very transaction forming the subject matter of the complaint and consisted of business records relevant to the just adjudication of the controversy. The Bench also noted that the proposed witness, the accountant of the complainant’s firm, had admittedly been cited in the list of witnesses at the time of institution of the complaint.
Rejecting the argument that the complainant was being permitted to fill gaps in his case, Justice Batra observed: “Merely because certain documents were not produced at an earlier stage would not preclude the Court from permitting their production if the Court is satisfied that such evidence is essential for a just decision of the case. The power under Section 348 of BNSS is meant to advance the cause of justice and cannot be curtailed by adopting a hyper-technical approach.”
The Bench further held that the petitioner could not be said to have suffered any prejudice as he would have full opportunity to cross-examine the additional witness and rebut the documents sought to be brought on record.
Before parting with the matter, Justice Batra asserted: “Unless the order is shown to be arbitrary, perverse or resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice, no interference is warranted. In the present case, the learned trial Court has assigned cogent reasons while allowing the application and has exercised the jurisdiction vested in it in accordance with settled principles of law. This Court does not find that the impugned order suffers from any jurisdictional error or material irregularity warranting interference.”
Finding no merit in the petition, Justice Batra dismissed the plea while clarifying that nothing contained in the order should be construed as an expression on the merits of the cheque dishonour complaint, which would be decided independently by the trial court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties.
