The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has arrested the then Area Head of the Government Banking Group at IDFC First Bank, Shamim Dar, along with a former branch manager of AU Small Finance Bank, Charanjeet Singh Randhawa, for allegedly facilitating fraudulent transactions from the accounts of Haryana government departments.
On Tuesday, a Panchkula court sent both Dar and Randhawa to three-day CBI custody.
The CBI investigation has established that the opening of the government accounts at IDFC First Bank, Sector 32, Chandigarh, was a sourcing-and-conversion exercise driven by the Government Banking Group (GBG) team, of which Shamim Dar was a member.
He was the account-opening approver for multiple Haryana government accounts with IDFC First Bank, including, Municipal Council, Kalka, Municipal Corporation, Panchkula, Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, Haryana State Pollution Control Board (HSPCB), HPGCL (Haryana Power Generation Corporation Limited) Employees’ Pension Fund Trust and also State Project Director, Haryana School Shiksha Pariyojna Parishad (HSSPP).
“In the banker’s certification column of AOFs (Account Opening Forms) of these Govt. Accounts, Shamim Dar personally affixed the certifications that he had ‘met the customer at his communication address,’ ‘seen the original KYC documents’ and that ‘the customer has signed in my presence (CSIMP).’ These certifications that lent legitimacy to accounts that were thereafter operated through forged instruments,” CBI told the court.
The CBI said that in several account-opening forms, which Dar approved, the recorded mobile number did not belong to any government officer but to persons under the control of the accused persons.
In the case of the HSPCB, the recorded mobile number belonged to Abhishek Singla, a co-accused in the case, and also the brother-in-law of the then relationship manager of IDFC First Bank, Abhay Kumar. All SMS alerts for the 47 fraudulent debits aggregating Rs 187.26 crore were delivered to Singla.
“The fraudulent contact mobile numbers are present on the same instruments that Shamim Dar certified as genuine. His certification-that he had met the customer, seen the originals and witnessed the signing is, on its own terms, an attestation as to the correctness of the customer particulars on the AOF (account opening form), the contact mobile number among them,” said the CBI.
In the second account of HSPCB too, Singla’s mobile number was mentioned. In HSSPP’s case, he recommended a forged debit of Rs 2.49 crore for approval, describing it as a ‘vendor payment’ to obtain higher-level approval for a fraudulent transaction.
He also carried out a telephonic approval role in the Rs 10 crore cancelled-cheque debit from the HSAMB account. He communicated with an authorised signatory. He also furnished the material that enabled a backdated change of authorised signatory in a key account.
There were 14 fraudulent transactions from the account of the Director, Panchayat, MMGAY 2.0, to M/s Swastik Desh Projects, a shell entity floated by the accused, in AU Small Finance Bank. Each transaction was effected on forged debit notes or cheques bearing the forged signature of DK Behera, Director General, Panchayat.
Mohali branch manager at AU Small Finance Bank, Charanjeet Randhawa, is implicated in 10 of the 14 debits, having approved fraud amounting to Rs 47.51 crore from this account, said the CBI. In three of them, he acted as an authoriser and, in eight, performed or recorded the mandatory call-back confirmation with the customer.
The call-back confirmation is the mandatory in high-value debit. The mobile number on which these confirmations were obtained was not in use by any genuine signatory of the Department but was being operated by co-accused Naresh Kumar, whose voice has been identified in the Bank’s call recordings, said the CBI.
A fraudulent debit transaction of Rs 25 crore took place on December 29, 2025, involving a cheque from HPGCL Pension Funds Trust. It was Randhawa who acted as an authoriser and gave the call confirmation, which does not appear in the Call Detail Record of the authorised signatory. The money was transferred to a shell company, M/s Swastik Desh Projects.
