US President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing in May and the ambiguous signalling about whether the Trump administration continues to commit to Taiwan’s defence have dominated debates over cross-Strait relations. Meanwhile, after paying a visit to China in April, the main Taiwanese opposition party Kuomintang’s (KMT) chairwoman, Cheng Li-wun, visited the US from June 1 to 16. Yet, questions remain over the fate of cross-Strait relations.
During Cheng’s visit, China announced ten-point policy package including trade facilitation targeting farmers and businesses in Taiwan even as it sent a “special maritime traffic law-enforcement operation" to the east of Taiwan. What do these contradictory signals mean for cross-Strait relations and China’s policies?
Structural Issues
Thawing relations with the US provides China a political space over Taiwan amid economic pressures at home and a greater focus on domestic politics in the run-up to the 21st National Congress of the ruling Communist Party in 2027. Beijing projected its stern warning to Trump as a sign of its strength in dealing with the US over Taiwan, and the KMT chairwoman’s visit as a sign of its ability to engage with mainstream political forces and people within Taiwanese society who seek unification.
China also eased up on its extremely belligerent rhetoric and aggressive military pressure over the last few months. It again signalled that, aside from the long-term goal of unification, for the time being, China was content to maintain the status quo, i.e., deterring a de jure declaration of independence and external players from engaging with the island.
However, this calculation runs counter to Taiwan’s structural reality and domestic politics. While the US has delayed arms sales to Taiwan for the time being amid its attention on the Gulf region, deterring China on Taiwan remains a key node of its regional strategy. In other words, a momentary thaw in US-China relations – evident from Trump’s visit to China – will not overcome this structural reality. While confrontation with China is not desirable for Taiwan, the PRC’s idea of “unification" is also not palatable to the vast majority on the island.
How Much Pressure?
For China, it is not about whether to put pressure on Taiwan. Rather, the real dilemma is how much pressure is enough and by what means. Despite the KMT chair’s pitch for reconciliation, her party can only go so far because the issues of independence and unification are very politically sensitive on the island.
While both the KMT and Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) use the rhetoric of “one China" and “independence", respectively, to placate their core constituencies, they must also cater to the vast majority of voters who seek the status quo.
For China, if it employs aggressive pressure through military drills and propaganda, it alienates the vast majority of fence-sitters and, indirectly strengthens the DPP’s support base and raises risks of confrontation with the US and its allies. If it goes slow, it strengthens the constituencies in Taiwan seeking independence and risks a reputational cost by being perceived as weak internationally.
Thus, while China engages in both military threats and cognitive warfare to weaken Taiwan’s status quo mindset in its favour, it has fallen into a spiral of occasional aggressive military threats and more accommodative positions involving economic inducements targeting key constituencies, such as farmers and businesses, and propaganda. However, this strategy has proved to be ineffective in deterring both the US and Taiwan.
Future Trajectories
Taiwan is heading into crucial local elections in November 2026, which will test the political strength of major players before the presidential elections at the end of 2028. Similarly, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has begun selecting local delegates in preparation for its 21st National Party Congress set to take place towards the end of next year.
For major players in Taiwan, bending towards the status quo is desirable in order to win elections even while they target each other over engaging with the PRC in the run-up to the upcoming elections. China, meanwhile, will continue to make efforts to shape public opinion against the DPP.
Taiwan may receive greater attention from the US after tensions in the Gulf region ease in the near future. Despite delays on arms sales after Trump’s visit to Beijing – perceived by many in Taiwan and outside as a concession to China – the US cannot afford to be perceived as weak, and letting Taiwan fend for itself is not a strategically sound policy. To do so would embolden Beijing not only over Taiwan but also in the Western Pacific.
Xi Jinping faces a difficult political challenge – how to avoid tensions while addressing economic troubles at home in a crucial year before he most likely seeks a fourth term as the top leader of the CPC. Trump’s tendency to shift policy positions complicates China’s calculations over Taiwan. It cannot rely on short-term American concessions, such as delaying arms sales to the island and nor can such promises change the structural reality of the US’s long-term strategic investment in Taiwan and regional security architecture. In fact, after Cheng Li-wun’s visit, the president of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan – its parliament – and senior KMT leader Han Kuo-yu followed up with his own visit to the US, underlining the US’ continued high-level engagement with the island.
Chinese expectations of the US heeding its warning over military support to the island may be short-lived, reducing any political space for Xi Jinping at home in the year ahead. While neither side wants a bloody confrontation, Beijing’s compulsion to show commitment and resolve for unification on the one hand and Washington’s structural investments in Taiwan on the other may lead to rising US-China tensions in the Straits in the near future.