The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that criminal proceedings do not abate merely because the complainant has died and legal representatives are untraceable. Observing that “cost of liberty must be proportionate”, the bench has also held courts cannot keep a person “in the clutches of the criminal system” once compensation in a private monetary dispute has been fully paid.
Justice Anoop Chitkara held that the adversarial system was only procedural in nature and not a constitutional mandate in itself, while making it clear that constitutional courts could not remain passive where prolonged incarceration became disproportionate to the monetary liability involved.
Justice Chitkara was hearing a criminal revision petition filed by a convict challenging his conviction and sentence in a cheques bounce case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The conviction recorded by the trial court had already been upheld by the Sessions Court.
The counsel for the petitioner informed the court during the course of hearing that the entire compensation amount awarded by the trial court had already been deposited and that the petitioner was restricting his prayer only to reduction of sentence to the period already undergone.
It was further submitted that the complainant had died and the petitioner had no information regarding the whereabouts of the legal representatives. Recording the submission, Justice Chitkara observed that the petitioner was no longer challenging the conviction on merits and had already deposited the entire compensation amount. As such, the court was not required to examine the correctness of the conviction itself.
The court then examined the legal effect of the complainant’s death during pendency of revision proceedings. Referring to Section 279 of the BNSS, Justice Chitkara observed that summons cases might result in acquittal upon non-appearance or death of the complainant at the trial stage, but the provision did not extend to cases where the accused had already been convicted by the trial court and the conviction affirmed by the appellate court.
“So, what happens when a complainant-respondent dies during the appellate or revision stage, and their legal representatives cannot be traced? Does the adversarial system get defeated for want of an adversary? The answer is No,” Justice Chitkara observed.
The bench further held that the adversarial model reflected only the procedural nature of the legal system and was not itself a constitutional mandate. “What the Constitution embodies is not a method of adjudication, but a standard of adjudication — a fair procedure, a fair hearing, an impartial and independent adjudicator, and a reasoned decision,” Justice Chitkara asserted.
Questioning the justification for prolonged criminal proceedings once the monetary liability stood fully discharged, Justice Chitkara observed that cheque dishonour disputes were essentially private and compensatory in nature. “Once the person has paid the compensation in full, that does not warrant keeping the person in the clutches of the criminal system,” the court observed.
Making extensive observations on proportionality in sentencing, Justice Chitkara linked the issue with Article 14 of the Constitution. Observing that similarly placed convicts should not suffer unequal deprivation of liberty, the court held that imprisonment imposed for non-payment of fine or compensation must remain proportionate to the amount involved.
“The seeds of proportionate sentencing have now sprouted, and the green shoots are visible across jurisdictions,” Justice Chitkara observed, while adding that in the absence of legislative standards, constitutional courts could not remain “in the cocoon of a deep slumber”.
The court further observed that the high court, being a primary guardian of fundamental rights, could not remain passive when questions concerning personal liberty arise. “How many ounces of flesh does a convict have to pay every day for the inability to pay the money?” the bench questioned.
After considering the cheque amount, compensation already deposited and the custody already undergone, Justice Chitkara held that the ends of justice would be adequately met if the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone.
Partly allowing the petition, Justice Chitkara maintained the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act but reduced the substantive sentence of imprisonment to the custody already undergone by the petitioner.
The court also held that no enhancement of compensation was warranted since the entire amount already stood deposited and issued directions regarding preservation of the compensation amount in view of the complainant’s death and absence of identifiable legal heirs.
The trial court concerned was directed to place the deposited amount in a fixed deposit with automatic renewal and accrual of interest for the maximum possible term in a state-owned bank or a bank listed on the NSE or BSE in favour of the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned.
The court also directed the trial court to send a copy of the order to the complainant’s last known address and permitted it to seek nominee details from the bank concerned so that possible legal representatives could be informed.
The high court clarified that legal representative would be at liberty to approach the trial court for release of the compensation amount along with accrued interest, subject to lawful deductions, if they later became aware of the entitlement,
At the same time, Justice Chitkara held that the trial court might pass a reasoned order forfeiting the amount along with accrued interest and transfer it to Local or District Legal Services Authority if claimants did not come forward within a reasonable period of at least three years.
