One-party dominant governments and coalitions rarely endure indefinitely. Over time, internal decay sets in, followed by decline and, eventually, collapse.
Their downfall is usually driven by a combination of economic pressures, institutional weaknesses, social discontent and elite fragmentation. Legitimacy erodes, governing coalitions lose cohesion, and their ability to maintain control weakens. Economic crises, declining ideological appeal, public mobilisation and external pressures often accelerate the process, particularly in post-colonial states.
Legitimacy is usually the first casualty. When voters no longer believe a ruling coalition serves the national interest, governments increasingly rely on coercive measures. Economic difficulties often provide the immediate trigger, as inflation, unemployment and widening inequality fuel public frustration and weaken elite loyalty.
Elite unity has long been the glue holding dominant coalitions together. Once that unity frays, collapse becomes a matter of timing. Institutional rigidity compounds the problem. Dominant parties often suppress competition and weaken independent institutions, leaving grievances to accumulate until they erupt.
Popular mobilisation by students, workers and the middle class can further challenge the state. Corruption, patronage politics and declining governance standards often hasten the process. External actors may then exploit existing weaknesses.
The question is whether Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s Pakatan Harapan (PH) is beginning to exhibit these symptoms.
Is PH entering a period of crisis?
Malaysia’s ruling coalition faces growing internal strains, declining voter support and a resurgent opposition. PH has already lost its majority in the Negeri Sembilan state assembly and is expected to face significant electoral challenges at the next general election.
Yet the most immediate threat may not come from Peninsular Malaysia.
Sabah and Sarawak collectively hold 56 of the Dewan Rakyat’s 222 seats and have long played the role of kingmakers. Their support for Anwar’s unity government has never been unconditional. Any significant shift in allegiance could threaten the government’s survival well before GE16.
Internal fractures and the East Malaysian factor
Within Peninsular Malaysia, cracks in the PH-Barisan Nasional (BN) partnership are becoming increasingly visible.
In Negeri Sembilan, 14 Umno assemblymen withdrew support for the PH-led administration in April 2026, leaving the government below the governing threshold.
In Johor, the menteri besar has declared that Umno intends to contest all 56 state seats, placing it in direct competition with PH component parties PKR and DAP.
These tensions are amplified by the uncertain loyalty of East Malaysian blocs. Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS), with 23 parliamentary seats, and Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS), with six, are not natural PH allies. They joined Anwar’s administration after GE15 in exchange for federal funding, cabinet representation and commitments related to the Malaysia Agreement 1963.
Should either bloc conclude that PH is heading towards defeat, or if Perikatan Nasional (PN) offers more attractive terms such as higher oil royalties or greater autonomy, political realignment becomes a distinct possibility.
GPS chairman Datuk Patinggi Tan Sri Abang Johari Openg has already expressed dissatisfaction over federal transfers to Sarawak. Continued delays could push GPS closer to PN.
Support erosion in Sabah and Sarawak
PH has struggled to make inroads among conservative Malay voters, but its East Malaysian challenges may prove even more serious.
In the November 2025 Sabah state election, PH contested 22 seats and won only one. DAP failed to secure any of the eight seats it contested as Chinese voters shifted towards Warisan.
The result exposed PH’s organisational weaknesses in Sabah, where the coalition is often perceived as Peninsular-centric and disconnected from local concerns involving illegal immigration, infrastructure development and revenue-sharing arrangements.
Sarawak presents a similarly difficult landscape. Since the 2021 state election, PH has become increasingly marginalised as GPS successfully consolidated support through a strong state-based political narrative.
Looking ahead to GE16, PH may struggle to secure more than a handful of parliamentary seats in Sarawak. Any hope of offsetting losses in Peninsular Malaysia through gains in Borneo appears increasingly unrealistic.
Economic pressures and political costs
The government’s economic reforms, while fiscally necessary, have become politically costly.
Anwar himself has described RON95 subsidy rationalisation as “damn unpopular”. The expanded sales and service tax, introduced in July 2025, has added to concerns over the rising cost of living.
These pressures are felt particularly acutely in Sabah and Sarawak, where transportation costs and geographic realities already make daily life more expensive.
The removal of subsidised cooking gas for commercial eateries in Sarawak has also drawn criticism from businesses concerned about rising operating costs and higher food prices.
East Malaysian voters have historically assessed federal governments based on tangible benefits delivered to their states. With fiscal pressures limiting Putrajaya’s spending capacity, Anwar may find it difficult to offer major development incentives before the next election.
PN’s expanding strategy
PN, now led by Pas vice-president Datuk Seri Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar, has also expanded its ambitions in East Malaysia.
The coalition secured its first elected seat in Sabah in 2025, a symbolic breakthrough suggesting it may be capable of broadening its appeal beyond traditional strongholds.
PN has also sought to soften perceptions that it is narrowly focused on Peninsular Malay interests by building relationships with local parties and political figures in Sabah and Sarawak.
Its strategy is straightforward: present PN as a stable alternative that respects East Malaysian rights while maintaining a Malay-led but inclusive administration.
Should PN secure between 10 and 15 seats in Sabah and Sarawak while retaining strong support in rural Malay constituencies across the Peninsula, it could emerge as a viable contender for federal power alongside GPS and GRS.
The snap election question
Pressure is mounting on Anwar to consider an early general election, possibly as soon as September 2026.
Umno is already preparing for state elections in Johor and Melaka. Anwar himself acknowledged during the PH Convention in Johor that a snap election could occur if further cracks emerge within the unity government.
However, an early election carries considerable risks.
The emergence of new political forces, including Datuk Seri Rafizi Ramli and Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad’s Parti Bersama Malaysia, could further split the reform-minded vote.
While these groups may struggle to win significant representation, they could siphon support from urban PH voters in centres such as Kuching and Kota Kinabalu, indirectly benefiting PN or local rivals.
Meanwhile, Umno’s efforts to secure a pardon for Datuk Seri Najib Razak may resonate in parts of Peninsular Malaysia but are unlikely to significantly influence East Malaysian voters, whose priorities remain overwhelmingly local.
Borneo may hold the balance
PH faces multiple challenges simultaneously: tensions within the unity government, declining voter confidence, unpopular economic reforms and an increasingly organised opposition.
Yet East Malaysia may ultimately prove the decisive factor.
PH’s weak electoral position in Sabah and Sarawak, combined with the transactional nature of support from GPS and GRS, means Anwar cannot assume continued backing after the next election.
The most plausible pathway to a change of government may not require PH to lose heavily in the Peninsula. It may simply require GPS to change sides.
Unless Anwar can rebuild trust and deliver meaningful benefits to Sabah and Sarawak, discussions within PH may increasingly shift from minimising losses to managing a defeat that begins not in Johor or Penang, but in Kuching and Kota Kinabalu.
A snap election remains possible. Whether it strengthens or weakens Anwar’s position may ultimately depend on East Malaysia.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not represent that of Twentytwo13.