WHEN great powers expand wars, smaller states connected to their military infrastructure discover a harsh geopolitical truth: alliances do not eliminate danger, but often relocate it.
For the Philippines, this reality is becoming increasingly urgent. The rapid expansion of the United States’ military access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) risks transforming the archipelago into a forward operating platform in Washington’s next major conflict in Asia.
Recent events in the Middle East illustrate the danger. On Feb. 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched large-scale strikes on Iran, hitting strategic sites in Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, and other cities.
Iran’s retaliation quickly extended beyond Israeli territory to US military facilities and allied states hosting American forces. The conflict spilled into the Strait of Hormuz, where about 20 percent of the world’s oil trade passes. Shipping traffic was disrupted, halting the passage of millions of barrels of oil daily while Iran threatened to close the vital waterway.
The result is a widening conflict affecting multiple countries hosting American forces, threatening shipping routes, and destabilizing energy markets tied to the Persian Gulf.
Gulf allies were frustrated after the US launched strikes on Iran without prior notification, leaving them exposed when Tehran retaliated.
The lesson is clear: when the US enters a major war, the geography of that war expands to include locations where American forces operate.
This brings us to the Philippines.
Under EDCA, the US has gained access to nine locations across the country, allowing rotational troop deployments, construction of military facilities, and the prepositioning of equipment inside Philippine bases. These include sites in Palawan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Cagayan de Oro, and northern Luzon facing Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Philippine officials maintain that these are not US bases, but Philippine facilities used for joint cooperation with American forces. Legally, that distinction exists; practically, it may matter far less.
To a rival state calculating retaliatory strikes during a conflict, a facility hosting American military assets or supporting US operations becomes part of the battlefield, regardless of legal ownership.
Sen. Erwin Tulfo has called for a review of EDCA, warning that the Philippines could become a target if the US becomes involved in major conflicts abroad.
He pointed to the Middle East war as an example of how countries hosting American military installations can quickly become targets once war begins.
Modern wars rarely start with conventional invasions. Instead, they begin with precision missile strikes designed to cripple military infrastructure within minutes. Airfields, radar systems, bases and logistics hubs are targeted to degrade an adversary’s operational capacity before ground forces even move.
If a war breaks out, the bases under EDCA will function as staging grounds for US military operations. They will become prime targets during the opening phase of that war.
The Philippines is becoming deeply embedded in a great-power military architecture aimed at containing China, the country that would very possibly find itself on the front line of confrontation.
This is why intelligent policy and diplomacy remain indispensable.
The Department of Foreign Affairs, particularly maritime affairs spokesman Rogelio Villanueva Jr., has emphasized dialogue and communication as essential tools in managing tensions.
At the same time, the Philippine government has maintained diplomatic channels with Beijing. Officials have continued discussions with Chinese representatives in Manila, reaffirming commitments to communication and peaceful engagement despite ongoing maritime tensions.
Framing diplomacy as weakness misunderstands the dilemma facing the Philippines.
The country must pursue two objectives simultaneously: defending its sovereignty and sovereign rights while preventing the archipelago from becoming a battlefield between major powers.
Countries hosting foreign military assets often discover they inherit not only the perceived benefits of an alliance, but also the dangers of retaliation. When a superpower’s military infrastructure exists inside your borders, your territory becomes part of the wider battlefield.
Alliances and partnerships should serve Philippine interests first, not subordinate them to the military objectives of other powers. A sovereign nation must retain the ability to pursue diplomacy, de-escalation, and regional cooperation without automatically being drawn into great-power conflicts.
Our archipelago sits in one of the most strategically important locations in the Asia-Pacific, linking the South China Sea with the wider Pacific, and is being used to choke and intervene in internal issues of a superpower. In any major confrontation between the US and China, military planners on both sides would view Philippine territory as a crucial theater.
Involved theaters become targets.
This is why the debate over EDCA must move beyond slogans about alliances and accusations of foreign influence. It is, for the Philippines, fundamentally a question of national survival and the lives of Filipinos that will have no bearing on the outcomes of the war. We only need to see how the US is treating its allies in Europe, Asia and the Gulf states, obviously protecting Israel’s interests, but risking all the others.
History shows that when great powers fight, geography becomes destiny. The Philippines must ensure that its geography does not become someone else’s battlefield.
Daniel Long writes for various newspapers and journals on geopolitics, including the Asian Century Journal. He was also a speechwriter for Sen. Imee Marcos.
