THE latest petition filed before the Supreme Court of the Philippines by lawyers allied with Vice President Sara Duterte is framed as a defense of constitutional order. Strip away the rhetoric, however, and what emerges is a calculated attempt to cripple the impeachment process at its most critical stage of fact-finding. Ironically, in accusing the House Committee on Justice of engaging in a “fishing expedition,” the petition itself is a desperate cast into judicial waters, hoping to hook a technicality that would halt accountability altogether.
The petition rests on several arguments. Each collapses upon closer scrutiny.
First, the claim of a “double standard” in evaluating complaints. This assumes that sufficiency in form and substance is a rigid, mechanical test. It is not. The Constitution entrusts the House with discretion precisely because impeachment is not an ordinary legal proceeding. Complaints differ in detail, evidentiary support and framing. That earlier complaints were dismissed while later ones were admitted does not prove inconsistency; it reflects evaluation. To demand identical outcomes from nonidentical complaints is to misunderstand the very nature of constitutional gatekeeping.
Second, the assertion that subsequent complaints are “repackaged” and duplicative. This is a familiar tactic: reduce evolving allegations into redundancy. But impeachment practice allows consolidation. What matters is whether the body of complaints, taken together, establishes a basis for inquiry. Refinement, supplementation, and even reframing are part of legal processes everywhere. The Constitution prohibits multiple impeachment proceedings within a year, not multiple complaints feeding into a single proceeding. To equate development with duplication is to weaponize form against substance.
Third, the allegation that the issuance of subpoenas transforms the process into a “fishing expedition.” This is perhaps the most revealing argument, because it seeks to redefine investigation itself as illegitimate. The House is not a passive recipient of complaints. It is a constitutional body empowered to determine probable cause. That task cannot be performed blindfolded. Subpoenas are not tools of abuse; they are instruments of clarification. Without them, the committee would be reduced to reading allegations without the means to test their credibility.
Fourth, the claim that due process is violated when complaints are allowed to proceed and then “strengthened” through evidence. This turns logic on its head. In any preliminary proceeding, whether administrative or criminal, complaints initiate inquiry. They do not conclude it. Evidence is gathered precisely to determine whether allegations hold. Due process is satisfied when the respondent is informed, allowed to answer and given the opportunity to participate. These conditions have been met. What the petitioners seek is not due process, but preemptive dismissal.
Fifth, the argument that threshold review cannot involve evidentiary proceedings. This artificially narrows the concept of “sufficiency in substance.” One cannot assess substance without engaging facts. The committee’s role is not limited to checking whether a complaint is neatly written. It must determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed. That necessarily involves examining documents, hearing explanations and resolving ambiguities. To prohibit this is to hollow out the impeachment mechanism into a mere clerical exercise.
Sixth, the insistence that complaints must already contain clear, direct linkage of offenses to the respondent, free from hearsay or general allegations. This imports criminal trial standards into a political process designed to operate differently. Impeachment addresses “betrayal of public trust,” a concept broader than codified crimes. At the House level, the threshold is probable cause, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Demanding courtroom-level precision at the initiation stage effectively raises the bar so high that no impeachment could ever begin.
Taken together, these arguments reveal a common thread: an attempt to collapse the distinction between investigation and adjudication. The House initiates; the Senate tries. By insisting that the House behave as if it were already adjudicating guilt, the petition seeks to paralyze initiation itself. It is a subtle but dangerous inversion of constitutional design.
Equally telling is the strategic timing. The petition does not merely question procedure; it seeks to halt the process altogether. This is not about refining rules. It is about stopping inquiry before it can mature. The language of constitutional protection becomes a shield against scrutiny.
The irony is difficult to ignore. Lawyers decrying a “fishing expedition” are themselves casting a wide net before the court, hoping that somewhere in the expanse of procedural doctrine lies a hook that can snag the proceedings.
The Supreme Court has historically exercised restraint in impeachment matters, recognizing that these are political processes with constitutional allocation of roles. To intervene prematurely would not only disrupt that balance but also set a precedent where every impeachment can be stalled through litigation. That would effectively transfer the power of initiation from the House to the court, an outcome neither contemplated nor sanctioned by the Constitution. Such a shift would also erode the accountability architecture embedded in the separation of powers, where each branch has distinct but complementary roles.
At stake here is not merely the fate of one official, but the integrity of a constitutional mechanism designed to ensure accountability at the highest levels of government. If the House is stripped of its ability to investigate, to compel documents and to test allegations, impeachment becomes an empty ritual of form without function. It reduces a vital democratic safeguard into a procedural illusion, where accountability exists only on paper. Worse, it sends a signal that high officials can evade scrutiny by litigating the process itself rather than confronting the allegations.
The Constitution does not demand perfection at the outset. It demands process. And the process, by its nature, unfolds. It allows institutions to gather facts, test claims and refine judgments over time. To freeze this process at the threshold stage is to deny the very logic of constitutional accountability.
To call that unfolding a “fishing expedition” is to misunderstand and misrepresent what accountability looks like in a constitutional democracy.
In the end, the real fishing expedition is not happening in the House. It is unfolding in the petition itself, which seeks to trawl through legal doctrine in search of an escape hatch.
Antonio P. Contreras is a professor at the University of the Philippines Los Baños and vice chairman of the board of the state-run PTVNI (PTV4).