It is axiomatic that each of India’s 14 prime ministers has been distinct. Indira Gandhi scarcely brooks comparison with her father and political mentor, Jawaharlal Nehru, while VP Singh, the seventh in line, disowned his Congress roots that placed him as one of Rajiv Gandhi’s close confidants until their spectacular fallout. Narendra Modi and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the BJP’s two prime ministers, born and bred under the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)’s tutelage, were markedly different, although they shared similar views on the Sangh’s core ideological concerns with nuances.
It is impossible to separate Modi’s 12.5 years as the Gujarat CM from his innings as the PM for approximately the same length because unlike the five other PMs, whose passage to Delhi wound its way through their state capitals, Modi cannot get Gandhinagar out of his system. Much like HD Deve Gowda was fixated on Karnataka. But the reasons for their fixations were different.
Gowda fought battles with his perceived rivals in Bengaluru, who he imagined were out to torpedo him in Delhi. Modi left Gujarat as the BJP’s supremo in the state without a challenge. If he did face one, it was to deflect attention from the 2002 riots to an unrelated aspect that was above social divisiveness.
Development was Modi’s mantra. He defined it through infrastructure expansion, industrialisation, support for small and medium enterprises and welfare schemes. Rural infrastructure, however, remained a weak link. This model of development fashioned the pioneering Gujarat model, which became Modi’s biggest selling point in his campaign before the 2014 elections.
Comparisons may be odious, but an overzealous BJP drew one when Modi completed 12 years in office. It claimed that Modi had overtaken Nehru’s tenure by a day, excluding Nehru’s years between 1947 and 1952 on the ground that he had not emerged from a direct electoral contest, but was elected by the Congress.
Incidentally, the irony inherent in the BJP’s antipathy towards Nehru, that often manifests viscerally, appears to have escaped its creators’ notice, so caught up they were drawing an equivalence on their longevity in office. The juxtaposition spawned flattering mentions and unflattering memes on social media, but did the BJP care?
Today, as he sits comfortably in his office, it is easy to forget that Modi’s ascent was stressful. The RSS had made up its mind in 2012-13 that he was their man deserving of the crown.
But a formidable lobby in Delhi, led by LK Advani and his associates who were also Modi’s peers, made evident its resentment. They pitched for Shivraj Singh Chouhan, the then Madhya Pradesh CM and Chouhan, in turn, fancied himself as a serious contender. Ultimately, Advani — on a weaker wicket after his controversial 2005 Pakistan trip — was overruled and Modi was declared as the BJP’s next PM candidate “unanimously".
At the top, Modi worked to a self-drawn agenda: the RSS’ expectations could not be ignored; the BJP’s organisational authority had to prevail over the government (he remembered the hard times the Sangh gave Vajpayee); the bureaucracy was to remain stable; and large economic initiatives were seen as the key to success. These initiatives were market-driven and the more money that was pumped into infrastructure building (supervised by the PMO), the more bullish the market.
Education, healthcare, micro-irrigation and improved drinking water supply were not prominent on the agenda. Though a flagship scheme in his first tenure resulted in building more rural toilets.
Winning elections became another imperative. It was not merely about capturing more states but also about expanding the BJP’s footprint nationwide — an obsession that drives Modi even today. Consequently, he cherry-picked his long-term political associate and former Gujarat minister Amit Shah to head the BJP.
Shah had already proven his mettle in the 2014 elections by winning Uttar Pradesh for his party, after revitalising a moth-eaten organisation torn apart by factionalism and caste conflicts. UP was the crowning glory in the BJP’s acquisitions in the Hindi heartland.
Modi realised that elections could be won by overhauling rival power centres rampant in states, each of which had been propped up by political leaders in the central apparatus.
He empowered Shah to set up teams of people he trusted in the state who would report to people he trusted in the central party apparatus. No longer could an office-bearer claim status based just on “proximity” to Modi or Shah. Each appointee was given clearly defined responsibilities.
In the pre-Modi-Shah era, a BJP general secretary in charge of the organisation was crucial because he was tasked to deal with the RSS almost exclusively and that gave him a certain niche in the organisation.
The position still exists, but its earlier importance has diminished because the Sangh trusts Shah to manage that relationship.This centralisation has also put an end to the endless speculation that precedes an appointment. That’s why no one had a clue that Nitin Nabin would replace JP Nadda as BJP chief.
Modi also realised that demography was key to the party’s expansion, and therefore there was no point in forever drawing political capital and support forever from the Hindi belt and the western part of India. So he worked to a plan.
He first focussed on Assam, always considered a low-hanging fruit for the BJP. He neutralised its ally, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), won over newer parties based in the Adivasi pockets, freed Bengali-speaking Hindus from the stigma of being labelled “illegal immigrants", isolated the Muslims, worked on the Assamese vote and eventually wrested the state from the Congress.
Tripura was the second acquisition, but the trophy winner was West Bengal, and with its victory came the pulverisation of the TMC.
This is the defining characteristic of Modi’s successful run. Delhi and West Bengal demonstrated that a victory would not be a one-time celebration. An opponent was to be vanquished for a long time, if possible.
Within the political spectrum, Modi stands unchallenged with no adversary in sight. His apparent challenges lie in South India and in the emergence of a new demographic — younger voters — that is manifestly restive about various aspects of his governance that impinge on the youth’s future.
