Jakarta’s recent engagement with Washington reflects a calculated attempt to secure influence and economic concessions in an uncertain geopolitical environment.
However, shifting US trade policies and escalating tensions with Iran show why Indonesia must continually assess whether the relationship remains reciprocal and strategically prudent.
For months, Indonesia worked to defuse the threat of steep US tariffs on its exports. The effort appeared to succeed when Washington finalised a reduced rate from 32 per cent to 19 per cent, a development that coincided with Jakarta’s participation in new diplomatic initiatives connected to the Gaza crisis.
But the apparent breakthrough quickly unravelled. A US Supreme Court decision soon challenged the legal foundation of the tariff policy. Complicating matters further, within days the United States and Israel launched major strikes on Iran.
The rapid succession of events highlights a broader dilemma confronting Indonesia: engagement with the United States remains necessary, but proximity to Washington may carry greater risks than returns without necessarily delivering political or economic reciprocity or strategic stability.
Why Indonesia chose engagement
Indonesia’s participation in the Board of Peace (BoP) and potential stabilisation initiatives in Gaza should be understood primarily as a strategic decision to remain present in an emerging diplomatic framework shaped by the United States. Several influential Muslim-majority states had already become involved in related discussions, including Turkiye, Qatar and Pakistan, while Saudi Arabia and Egypt were engaged in broader negotiations surrounding the conflict.
For Jakarta, remaining outside such processes risked marginalising Indonesia in discussions that could shape the political future of Gaza and the wider Palestinian question. Participation therefore allowed Indonesia to maintain diplomatic relevance and ensure it had a voice in shaping potential outcomes.
At the same time, Prabowo framed the decision as consistent with Indonesia’s longstanding support for Palestinian self-determination. Indonesian officials argued that participation would allow Jakarta to advocate the two-state solution and defend Palestinian interests from within the process rather than criticising developments from the sidelines.
The move was also described as a pragmatic diplomatic calculation, reflecting the view that the BoP – despite its uncertainties – was currently the only active international framework addressing Gaza’s post-war stabilisation.
Beyond these official justifications, Indonesia’s involvement carries certain diplomatic advantages. The country brings an additional layer of credibility to discussions on post-conflict stabilisation as a valued contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations, with deployments of its Garuda contingents in missions such as Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan.
At the same time, as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country outside the Middle East, Indonesia can present itself as an engaged yet relatively neutral actor compared with regional powers directly involved in Middle East geopolitics.
A dilemma in navigating between reefs
Despite these strategic calculations, Indonesia’s decision to join the BoP quickly generated debate among foreign policy analysts and political observers. Some critics argued that participation risked aligning Indonesia too closely with a US-led initiative that also involved Israel, potentially complicating Jakarta’s longstanding diplomatic stance on Palestinian self-determination.
Others questioned the institutional logic of the initiative itself, warning that it could sideline established multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations.
Several analysts also cautioned that Indonesia should clarify its role within the initiative and ensure that Palestinian interests are not overshadowed by broader geopolitical or commercial agendas surrounding Gaza’s reconstruction.
Concerns were also voiced by segments of Indonesia’s Islamic leadership and civil society organisations, which have historically been among the strongest advocates of the Palestinian cause.
Some Islamic groups initially criticised the initiative on the grounds that Israel’s involvement could dilute the central demand for Palestinian independence and shift the conversation from justice to conflict management.
Activists and religious leaders warned that participation in a US-led framework without clear Palestinian representation risked legitimising arrangements that might not prioritise Palestinian sovereignty.
Others argued that membership in the BoP appeared inconsistent with Prabowo’s earlier rhetoric about preserving Indonesia’s independence in foreign policy, warning that participation could leave Jakarta appearing to follow the agenda of larger powers rather than shaping outcomes itself.
Although several major Islamic organisations later softened their opposition following consultations with the government, the episode highlighted the enduring sensitivity of the Palestinian issue within Indonesia’s domestic political landscape.
Broader strategic calculations that may have informed Prabowo’s decision are now also at risk. Beyond efforts to maintain proximity to Washington amid tariff pressures from the Trump administration, participation in the BoP had potentially offered Indonesia a diplomatic channel to engage with actors shaping Gaza’s post-war arrangements while maintaining its advocacy for a two-state solution.
Involvement in the initiative could also have provided a pragmatic pathway for Indonesia to manage sensitive diplomatic questions surrounding Israel, particularly in the context of Jakarta’s ongoing efforts to advance its accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), where Israel’s support would likely be influential.
In this reading, participation could have allowed Indonesia to engage emerging diplomatic frameworks without requiring explicit normalisation while positioning itself as a constructive actor seeking to advance a viable political settlement for Palestine.
Nevertheless, subsequent developments have complicated this calculation. The escalation of hostilities following US and Israeli strikes on Iran has renewed domestic criticism of Indonesia’s involvement in the initiative, with some observers warning that Jakarta risks being drawn into a widening geopolitical confrontation in the Middle East.
The episode has reignited debate within Indonesia’s foreign policy community about the risks of proximity to major powers.
The reputational costs of association with the initiative have also become more pronounced, as the escalation of regional conflict casts doubt on whether the diplomatic framework can realistically deliver meaningful progress toward Palestinian peace.
Reflecting these concerns, President Prabowo recently convened an extended consultation with several former presidents and vice presidents to discuss the implications of the crisis and Indonesia’s diplomatic posture – a meeting reportedly described as an effort to navigate Indonesia’s position carefully “between the reefs” of competing geopolitical pressures.
Implications for Indonesia’s foreign policy
Indonesia cannot disengage from the United States. American decisions continue to shape global trade, finance and security dynamics, making engagement with Washington unavoidable.
Yet recent developments – particularly the escalation of US-aligned conflicts in the Middle East – illustrate how proximity to Washington, especially under the Trump administration, can quickly complicate Indonesia’s diplomatic position.
Strategic engagement must therefore remain anchored in reciprocity – or at the very least a clear payoff. Cooperation should deliver tangible diplomatic or economic benefits.
Indonesia should also be cautious about committing itself to diplomatic frameworks whose trajectory depends on rapidly shifting geopolitical conditions beyond its control.
Recent developments surrounding the BoP illustrate how quickly such exposure can generate political costs. Criticism within Indonesia has intensified, with Islamic leaders, civil society groups and student organisations calling on the government to exit the initiative.
Protests are set to return to Jakarta, while prominent figures – including leaders linked to the once-banned Front Pembela Islam (FPI) – have publicly urged Prabowo to withdraw.
Because Prabowo’s foreign policy has been highly personalised, the political consequences of such decisions are likely to fall directly on the presidency.
In response to these concerns, Prabowo has sought to reassure domestic audiences that Indonesia would withdraw from the Board of Peace should the initiative fail to advance Palestinian interests.
Diplomatic proximity should strengthen Indonesia’s leverage – not expose the country to geopolitical risks abroad, undermine its long-standing principles, or generate mounting political costs at home.
Muhammad Haziq Jani, Adhi Priamarizki, and Muhammad Garda Ramadhito are senior analyst, research fellow and associate research fellow in the Indonesia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not represent that of Twentytwo13.
