IN a high-stakes military escalation with China or Russia, can — or will — the United States defend the Philippines?
Manila operates under the assumption that under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), which was recently declared “ironclad” by Washington, an armed attack on its forces or territory in the South China Sea would trigger an American military response. However, the US was unable to prevent the bombardment of its own bases in the Middle East since March, causing the host nations to become targets and subject to massive economic damage.
What has the record of the US defending allies — and their trust in Washington — shown in the last two years? And to what extent?
Financial bedrock under strain
One must always examine financial capacity in assessing the ability to support. The US financial landscape is facing increasing pressure now, as its national debt has surged past $40 trillion. Yields on 10-year Treasury bonds reached 5 percent as international lenders are demanding ever higher yields due to higher risks. Annual interest costs can reach almost $2 trillion a year, exceeding the annual military budget of the US. This is already forcing the Treasury to buy back active bonds, instead of going to international markets, whose confidence is declining.
The US dollar reserve currency-based global financial system that allows American dominance is also eroding. Consider:
– Gold repatriation. Due to the US and European Union’s freeze on the foreign reserves of countries such as Russia, Iran and Venezuela, central banks are pulling physical gold out of US vaults. The Netherlands quietly repatriated 86 metric tons of the commodity from North America to London. France repatriated over 120 tons, while Germany and other central banks now prioritize domestic storage.
– De-dollarization trends. Bilateral nondollar trade agreements are expanding. As an example, Egypt and China have agreed to bypass the US dollar by settling trade in Chinese yuan and Egyptian pounds. India, the Gulf states, and Southeast Asian and Latin American nations are now trading more in regional currencies despite US President Donald Trump’s threats. De-dollarization will weaken the US’ ability to finance without limit by charging costs to the rest of the world.
– Expansion of Brics. The Brics bloc is rapidly expanding, attracting Southeast Asian nations like Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam, alongside new full members like Indonesia. While internal friction persists — e.g., India’s refusal to support a unified Brics currency and other policies for regional peace, despite trying to portray itself as a bloc leader — the trend highlights fast-growing alternatives to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (Swift) banking system controlled and weaponized by the US.
Unfulfilled defense, strained military capacity
Simultaneous commitments in Ukraine and the Middle East have severely drained American interceptor and missile stockpiles.
US power projection has been fractured. Consider:
– Asymmetric warfare. US bases across the Gulf have suffered regular attacks, causing so much damage that many are no longer operating. US allies like Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Ukraine could not be supplied enough interceptors anymore. Even Saudi Arabia, which has spent hundreds of billions of dollars buying US weapons and is a partner in maintaining the US dollar hegemony as an investor in US Treasuries, could no longer be defended against threats like those from Yemen’s Houthi rebels, possibly to the point of blocking oil shipments in the Red Sea. Drone and missile attacks forced aircraft carriers to operate ever farther from conflict zones, unable to restock, even for basic necessities, for months.
Weapons stocks will take years to replenish without reopening the Strait of Hormuz or defeating Iran. This has caused missile systems and other resources to be redeployed from key deterrent posts in the Middle East, and even from countries such as South Korea and Japan, reducing security in those areas. Replenishing stocks is not only a financial issue, but also one of industrial incapacity and lack of rare earth minerals, which China controls.
– Allied reluctance. Key European allies have shown hesitation in supporting US-Israeli war plans. Spain restricted its territory for strikes against Iran, while the United Kingdom and Germany refused direct involvement. In the Gulf, traditional supporters like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are diversifying their security arrangements with other countries to hedge against uncertainty over the US’ commitment.
Domestic politics and public priority
Domestic political friction further complicates Washington’s capacity for military defense. Trump and US congressional leaders have to deal with the widespread opposition to these wars, public anger over inflation, scrutiny over the Trump family’s business dealings, and the blocking of controversial files like those involving the pedophile networks of the late financier Jeffrey Epstein.
Voters increasingly ask why billions of tax dollars subsidized foreign conflicts on behalf of non-US interests while measures to address homelessness, infrastructure, crime and education in the country remain underfunded.
What this means for the Philippines
Given these economic, military, and domestic constraints, will the US honor its promises to the Philippines?
– Strategic necessity. The MDT remains legally binding, and containing China remains a major US strategic interest. Failing to respond to an attack on the Philippines would further erode the credibility of US globally, affecting alliances with Japan, South Korea, North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, and Middle East countries.
– Calibrated reality. Washington will strictly avoid a direct major conflict with a nuclear-armed peer like China or Russia. It will push proxies to frontline battles through the media and intelligence operations. It will also create political issues in the Philippines and in its political, economic, and even social relations with rival powers.
While the Philippine-US alliance remains vital in economic, defense, diplomatic and tech terms, Manila cannot view Washington’s assistance as a guarantee. Even calamity assistance was spared despite the announcement of military facilities for American use under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA.
The Philippines must continue strengthening its own national defense, deepening ties with regional partners, and maintaining clear diplomatic, economic, social channels across all global powers and friends. It must also enhance its own independent interests and development for its people, and not overrely on the simplistic, lack of dimension, and overemphasis on some aspects that, while significant, should be seen on an overall-interests basis.
Those countries that focused too much on some disputes have generally suffered disasters that keep expanding, while those that treat issues rationally solve some problems and postpone others, while their economies and societies grow and develop new capabilities, win respect, and gain new perspectives over time on how to manage issues. This is crucial to the interests of the Filipino people, the majority of whom now need support and direction for the improvement of their lives.
New Worlds by the Integrated Development Studies Institute (IDSI) aims to present frameworks based on a balance of economic theory, historical realities, ground success in real business and communities, and attempts at the common good, culture and spirituality. We welcome logical feedback and possibly working together with compatible frameworks.
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