First of five parts
IN the matter of the consolidated petitions for writ of habeas corpus of former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte filed by the children of the latter, namely Veronica A. Duterte, Sebastian Z. Duterte and Paolo Z. Duterte, with the Supreme Court on March 11, 2025, the highest judicial tribunal, in an en banc resolution dated Dec. 11, 2025, required the petitioners, as well as the respondents, to file their respective memoranda, taking into consideration the following issues, among others, to wit:
“1. Whether the controversy is already moot.
“a. Whether the respondents may legally carry out possible directives from the court that may be issued in connection with the instant legal dispute.
“b. Whether other, more appropriate legal remedies may be availed of by the petitioners.
“c. Whether the exceptions to mootness apply.
“2. Whether the Court must exercise restraint in view of the ongoing proceedings before the International Criminal Court (ICC).
“a. Whether the ICC possesses, and may exercise, exclusive jurisdiction over the case and/or the person of former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (FPRRD) despite the withdrawal of the Philippines from the Rome Statute.
“i. Whether the withdrawal from the Rome Statute has any effect on the applicability and enforceability of Republic Act No. 9851;
“ii. Whether there is a violation of the principle of complementarity;
“1. Whether Republic Act 9851 permits the application of the principle of complementarity;
“2. Whether the principle of complementarity can be waived solely upon the discretion of the Executive.
“3. Whether the principle of complementarity can be waived for acts committed while the Rome Statute was in force in the Philippines.
“iii. Whether the existence and/or exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC is to the exclusion of all other tribunals, including this Court;
“iv. Whether Article 172(2) of the Rome Statute imposes a continuing obligation on the Philippines to cooperate with the ICC in relation to investigations initiated prior to its withdrawal;
“b. Whether any further action from the Court may be characterized as an encroachment upon, or interference with the prerogative of the executive branch to handle matters relating to foreign relations or policy;
“c. Whether any action from the Court may be regarded as a violation of the international obligation(s) or an interference with the Philippines’ foreign relations;
“3. Whether a writ of habeas corpus must be issued;
“a. Whether the requisites under Rule 102, Section 3 of the Rules of Court have been sufficiently established;
“i. Whether FPRRD was arrested in accordance with international and domestic laws;
“1. Whether the request received by the respondents from Interpol may be characterized as a red notice or diffusion;
“2. Whether a diffusion or red notice is enforceable within Philippine jurisdiction as a domestic warrant of arrest;
“3. Whether the text of the request sent by Interpol to the Philippine Center for Transnational Crime was sufficient to effect the arrest and direct surrender of FPRRD to the ICC.
“Whether the imprisonment or restraint of FPRRD is without any legal authority;
“1. Whether FPRRD’s detention by the ICC, by virtue of either a red notice or diffusion and without warrant of arrest issued by a Philippine court in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, is legal;
“iii. Whether the government may be considered to have surrendered or extradited FPRRD to the ICC;
“iv. Whether the arrest of FPRRD violated his constitutional and statutory rights;
“b. Whether the provisions of the Rome Statute apply in the apprehension and/or arrest of FPRRD;
“i. Whether Article 59 thereof may be considered as a right of an accused;
“ii. Whether Article 59 thereof which outlines the procedures which state-parties must follow in the arrest and surrender of the individuals to the ICC, was violated;
“iii. Whether such irregularities, assuming any, have an effect on the existence and/or exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC;
“c. Whether Section 17 of Republic Act No. 9851 renders the procedure observed in the arrest of FPRRD valid.”
In compliance of the order of the Supreme Court requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda, taking into consideration the above-quoted issues, petitioner Veronica A. Duterte, through her lawyers, submitted her memorandum on Jan. 5, 2026.
Pertinent portion of the said pleading, which confronted the issues head on, is quoted hereunder:
“Part V(B) of petitioner Veronica Duterte’s Memorandum dated and filed on January 5, 2026
“5.22. In its Resolution dated November 11, 2025, one of the issues identified by this Honorable Court for resolution is “(w)hether the Court must exercise restraint in view of the ongoing proceedings before the International Criminal Court (ICC).” Petitioner respectfully submits that judicial restraint is totally unwarranted under the circumstances.
“5.23. Judicial restraint has no place in the case at bar where fundamental constitutional protections are imperiled. As will be discussed in detail Part V (C) of this Memorandum, the respondents blatantly violated the Constitution and undermined the rule of law by surrendering a Filipino citizen, a former Philippine president at that, to a foreign tribunal without due process or legal basis.
“5.24. Further, restraint cannot be justified when the Executive openly mocks this Honorable Court by deliberately evading judicial review, as shown by the respondents’ rushed rendition of FPRRD on a chartered aircraft on the same day of his illegal arrest — an obvious ploy to deprive FPRRD of any habeas relief, and shield their actions from scrutiny. Such willful defiance and circumvention of the judiciary cannot be tolerated, as it directly assaults judicial authority, and the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.
“5.25. Indeed, to choose restraint or refuse relief, would reward the respondents for their wrongdoing, and constitute an abdication of this Honorable Court’s duty to exercise judicial power. This is clear from Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which emphasizes that judicial review is not merely a power, but a duty of this Honorable Court:
“‘SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.’
To be continued on Jan. 19, 2026