AMERICAN investigative journalist Sterling Seagrave published in 1988 the book “The Marcos Dynasty,” just after EDSA forced dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. out of power. Political science and public administration professor Belinda Aquino wrote in 1990 that Seagrave’s book “repeats accounts that are already well-known.” For the standard of that period, as the dictatorship was still fresh in the memories of Filipinos, the accounts in the book were probably quite well-known.
However, the 1970s are 50 years ago already for us in 2026. Filipinos who are 60 years old and older — elementary school children in 1972 — are just 10 percent of our household population as of 2024. I was not even born when the entire country was put under martial law in 1972.
I say these accounts bear repeating at this stage of our history.
On page 239 of his book, Seagrave wrote:
“President Marcos was nearing the end of his second term. He could not run for another unless the constitution (i.e., the 1935 Constitution — V.Y.) was amended. When Vice President [Fernando] Lopez announced his intention to run for president in [the] 1973 [elections], the big question was whether Ferdinand planned to rig things so he could have a third term. A Constitutional Convention was about to begin (i.e., in 1971 — V.Y.), and everyone was anxious to see whether he would attempt to manipulate its outcome. One alternative, to keep power in the family, was to have Imelda run for president in his place as the new champion of the Nacionalista party.”
Even in the early 1970s, it was popular knowledge that the power-hungry Marcoses were not ready to step down from Malacañang. One option was to let Mrs. Marcos run for president in 1973 after Ferdinand Sr.’s second term expired. Another option was to manipulate the 1971 Constitutional Convention (Con-con) into allowing Marcos a third (and maybe more?) term under the new constitution. Ultimately, these options never came into fruition because Marcos Sr. declared martial law in 1972 to overtake everything.
Nevertheless, Seagrave wrote that Marcos sought to intimidate the Con-con delegates, citing as examples a bomb that exploded in the men’s room of the convention in 1971, followed by the infamous Plaza Miranda bombing a week apart from each other. The unexpected effect of the bombings, however, was a landslide victory for the opposition Liberal Party slate in the 1971 midterm elections after Marcos’ Nacionalista Party dominated the 1967 midterm and the 1969 presidential elections. Seagrave added:
“Encouraged by the Liberal victory, delegates at the Constitutional Convention bravely put forth a proposal to ban Ferdinand Marcos and all members of his family from ever holding the position of head of state, no matter what form of administration was finally chosen.”
This account is echoed by the 1997 documentary film, “Batas Militar: A Documentary on Martial Law in the Philippines,” about martial law during the Marcos dictatorship produced by the Foundation for Worldwide People Power, which narrated:
“... another storm was brewing at the Constitutional Convention... Because of the maneuverings of the pro-Marcos delegates, not enough attention was paid to social and economic reforms. Instead, debates focused on changing the system of government from presidential to parliamentary. The focus was on Marcos.
“The first shot was fired by delegate Napoleon Rama. He filed a resolution to bar Marcos from running for a third term. The resolution won majority support.”
The Con-con’s committee on suffrage and election reforms, chaired by former senator Raul Manglapus, drafted a resolution that read:
“No person who has served as President of the Philippines shall be eligible to occupy the same office or that of chief minister or chief executive any time in the future, nor shall his spouse or relatives to the second degree by consanguinity or affinity be eligible to occupy the same office during any unexpired portion of his term or in one immediately succeeding term.”
The Marcoses clearly were not pleased by the turn of events. Con-Con delegate Eduardo Quintero of Leyte, Mrs. Marcos’ home province, was summoned to Malacañang and handed by the first lady, according to Seagrave, a large sum of money to be distributed to key convention delegates with the understanding that they would ensure the defeat of the Ban Marcos clause. On Quintero’s entry in bantayog dot org (Bantayog ng mga Bayani) it is written:
“In May 1972, before all the assembled members of the convention, Quintero unexpectedly made a public disclosure that the media called a ‘bombshell.’ He had been receiving, he said, money in envelopes, amounting to over P11,000 which almost certainly came from Marcos’ wife. He set all the envelopes aside, waiting for the right time for him to speak out. ‘I want to do the correct thing,” he said.
“Later exposés revealed that other Con-Con delegates were similarly bribed by the Marcoses, or acted as their agents, in order to get their votes. Public opinion believed Quintero, the ‘whistleblower.’”
Deliberations in the Con-con dragged on and were eventually overtaken by the declaration of martial law a few months later. Seagrave claimed that many of the Con-con delegates and important politicians in the country were tipped off on September 18th that martial law was going to be declared by Marcos and hurriedly left the country:
“Sergio Osmena Jr. went to America, as did Eugenio Lopez, brother of the vice president. Raul Manglapus suddenly departed for a US ’speaking tour’ on September 21.”
Those who were left behind (or chose to stay behind) were arrested immediately after martial law was imposed in the country.
With their numbers drastically reduced, the remaining Con-con delegates approved a draft constitution that was deemed favorable to Marcos, including according to Manglapus in an interview for “Batas Militar,” a transitory provision to cover the period between the old and the new constitution where executive and legislative power were entrusted to the incumbent president.
Some people have been intently studying our history and have learned that in order to subvert a constitutional process, you can either bribe some politicians and/or put the opposition in jail.
The incumbent Marcos administration certainly learned a lot from history.
However, the 1970s are 50 years ago already for us in 2026. Filipinos who are 60 years old and older — elementary school children in 1972 — are just 10 percent of our household population as of 2024. I was not even born when the entire country was put under martial law in 1972.
I say these accounts bear repeating at this stage of our history.
On page 239 of his book, Seagrave wrote:
“President Marcos was nearing the end of his second term. He could not run for another unless the constitution (i.e., the 1935 Constitution — V.Y.) was amended. When Vice President [Fernando] Lopez announced his intention to run for president in [the] 1973 [elections], the big question was whether Ferdinand planned to rig things so he could have a third term. A Constitutional Convention was about to begin (i.e., in 1971 — V.Y.), and everyone was anxious to see whether he would attempt to manipulate its outcome. One alternative, to keep power in the family, was to have Imelda run for president in his place as the new champion of the Nacionalista party.”
Even in the early 1970s, it was popular knowledge that the power-hungry Marcoses were not ready to step down from Malacañang. One option was to let Mrs. Marcos run for president in 1973 after Ferdinand Sr.’s second term expired. Another option was to manipulate the 1971 Constitutional Convention (Con-con) into allowing Marcos a third (and maybe more?) term under the new constitution. Ultimately, these options never came into fruition because Marcos Sr. declared martial law in 1972 to overtake everything.
Nevertheless, Seagrave wrote that Marcos sought to intimidate the Con-con delegates, citing as examples a bomb that exploded in the men’s room of the convention in 1971, followed by the infamous Plaza Miranda bombing a week apart from each other. The unexpected effect of the bombings, however, was a landslide victory for the opposition Liberal Party slate in the 1971 midterm elections after Marcos’ Nacionalista Party dominated the 1967 midterm and the 1969 presidential elections. Seagrave added:
“Encouraged by the Liberal victory, delegates at the Constitutional Convention bravely put forth a proposal to ban Ferdinand Marcos and all members of his family from ever holding the position of head of state, no matter what form of administration was finally chosen.”
This account is echoed by the 1997 documentary film, “Batas Militar: A Documentary on Martial Law in the Philippines,” about martial law during the Marcos dictatorship produced by the Foundation for Worldwide People Power, which narrated:
“... another storm was brewing at the Constitutional Convention... Because of the maneuverings of the pro-Marcos delegates, not enough attention was paid to social and economic reforms. Instead, debates focused on changing the system of government from presidential to parliamentary. The focus was on Marcos.
“The first shot was fired by delegate Napoleon Rama. He filed a resolution to bar Marcos from running for a third term. The resolution won majority support.”
The Con-con’s committee on suffrage and election reforms, chaired by former senator Raul Manglapus, drafted a resolution that read:
“No person who has served as President of the Philippines shall be eligible to occupy the same office or that of chief minister or chief executive any time in the future, nor shall his spouse or relatives to the second degree by consanguinity or affinity be eligible to occupy the same office during any unexpired portion of his term or in one immediately succeeding term.”
The Marcoses clearly were not pleased by the turn of events. Con-Con delegate Eduardo Quintero of Leyte, Mrs. Marcos’ home province, was summoned to Malacañang and handed by the first lady, according to Seagrave, a large sum of money to be distributed to key convention delegates with the understanding that they would ensure the defeat of the Ban Marcos clause. On Quintero’s entry in bantayog dot org (Bantayog ng mga Bayani) it is written:
“In May 1972, before all the assembled members of the convention, Quintero unexpectedly made a public disclosure that the media called a ‘bombshell.’ He had been receiving, he said, money in envelopes, amounting to over P11,000 which almost certainly came from Marcos’ wife. He set all the envelopes aside, waiting for the right time for him to speak out. ‘I want to do the correct thing,” he said.
“Later exposés revealed that other Con-Con delegates were similarly bribed by the Marcoses, or acted as their agents, in order to get their votes. Public opinion believed Quintero, the ‘whistleblower.’”
Deliberations in the Con-con dragged on and were eventually overtaken by the declaration of martial law a few months later. Seagrave claimed that many of the Con-con delegates and important politicians in the country were tipped off on September 18th that martial law was going to be declared by Marcos and hurriedly left the country:
“Sergio Osmena Jr. went to America, as did Eugenio Lopez, brother of the vice president. Raul Manglapus suddenly departed for a US ’speaking tour’ on September 21.”
Those who were left behind (or chose to stay behind) were arrested immediately after martial law was imposed in the country.
With their numbers drastically reduced, the remaining Con-con delegates approved a draft constitution that was deemed favorable to Marcos, including according to Manglapus in an interview for “Batas Militar,” a transitory provision to cover the period between the old and the new constitution where executive and legislative power were entrusted to the incumbent president.
Some people have been intently studying our history and have learned that in order to subvert a constitutional process, you can either bribe some politicians and/or put the opposition in jail.
The incumbent Marcos administration certainly learned a lot from history.