Since Independence, India has fought three out of four wars with Pakistan over Kashmir. Following its resounding defeat in 1971, Pakistan realised the futility of conventional warfare and resorted to state-sponsored cross-border terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. This plan, conceptualised in the 1980s by General Zia-ul-Haq under the doctrine “Bleed India with a Thousand Cuts", proved to be a win-win strategy for Pakistan. It exploited India’s internal fault lines, remained low-cost, tied down Indian forces and avoided full-scale war, all while maintaining plausible deniability.
For decades, India’s default response was strategic restraint. India chose the path of bilateral diplomacy and exposing Pakistan’s duplicity internationally. Following the 2001 Parliament attack, in a watershed moment, India mobilised the military on the western border under ‘Operation Parakram’. The peace could be restored only after Pakistan agreed to investigate and stop terror activities. In February 2008, as a result of a long-term investigation into weak ‘anti money-laundering’ and ‘combating the financing of terrorism’ laws, Pakistan was listed in the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) ‘Grey List’. However, it didn’t make much of a difference as Pakistan-sponsored terrorists attacked Mumbai in November 2008. Pakistan has the dubious distinction of being listed in the FATF ‘Grey List’ for a total of nine years across three different periods since 2008. At present, Pakistan has managed to move out of the ‘Grey List’ with the help of its all-weather friends China and Türkiye, with no change in its terror-related policies.
One of the reasons cited by many strategic analysts for Pakistan’s continued support of cross-border terrorism is its belief that India will refrain from taking any military action due to Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella. The paradigm shift in this unstable status quo happened in the form of precision surgical strikes across the Line of Control to dismantle terror launch pads in 2016, following the terror attacks on the Air Force and Army bases at Pathankot and Uri. Since then, India has adopted the strategy of “deterrence by punishment", aimed at imposing calibrated but visible costs without crossing the threshold of full-scale war. Over a period, the degree of active deterrence has been intensifying. After the Pulwama bombing of 2019, India carried out the Balakot strikes on terror infrastructure not only in Pak-occupied Kashmir but also in sovereign Pakistani territory, raising the stakes for sponsoring cross-border terror activities. It was also the first use of the Indian Air Force for offensive purposes in peacetime.
Last year, in retaliation for the Pahalgam terror attack, the intensity of active deterrence was escalated to make it multi-dimensional. In ‘Operation Sindoor’, other than the services using standoff weapons and cruise missiles, the Indus Water Treaty was also held in abeyance to impose economic and social pressure. This multi-dimensional campaign displayed India’s readiness to shift from defensive operations to highly targeted, kinetic and non-kinetic punitive operations to impose significant costs for misadventure on Pakistan. However, this shift has not yielded the desired results as Pakistan continues to sponsor terror activities.
This raises a critical question: should India abandon its defensive strategy of deterrence and pivot towards a more coercive offensive policy of compellence? It is felt that unless India adopts a more coercive and compellent posture, Pakistan will not abandon its state policy of sub-conventional aggression under the nuclear umbrella.
Deterrence and compellence are both part of coercive diplomacy. Deterrence is a defensive response to persuade an adversary to avoid unwanted action by threat of retaliation which will outweigh any perceived benefit. Conversely, compellence is offensive in nature, where sustained pressure is applied until the adversary alters its behaviour, as dictated.
Historically, compellence only succeeds under the condition of overwhelming disparity in military strength, which can be applied in a sustained manner and a total absence of external support for the target state. Post World War II, Germany and Japan were convincingly defeated and were compelled to surrender. They had to agree to have limits on defence forces and adopt a pacifist constitution. The US intervention in Panama in 1989 led to the capture of General Manuel Noriega and similarly, the January 2026 US operation in Venezuela resulted in the capture and extradition of President Nicolás Maduro. Subsequent to the abduction of their leaders, both these countries toed the line dictated by the US. These are the examples where compellence succeeded decisively. The common factors in these cases were overwhelming disparity in military strength, sustained application of force, lack of strategic depth, nuclear capability and external support.
Conversely, compellence failed or turned out to be enormously more costly than the cost of deterrence when it was attempted on deeply entrenched, ideologically driven states, having robust external support. This bitter lesson was learnt by the US in Vietnam and Afghanistan, by the USSR in Afghanistan and by Russia in Ukraine. In the case of Afghanistan, covert support to the Taliban by Pakistan, a country surviving on US doles, negated 20 years of hard work by the US. The present status of US involvement in Iran also falls in a similar category. India, too, had a disastrous experience in Sri Lanka when it tried to compel the LTTE to disarm.
In the geopolitical realities of South Asia, Pakistan has strategic and economic partnerships with its all-weather friends, China, Türkiye and several West Asian countries. This reliable and enduring network provides Pakistan with critical financial buffers, military hardware and diplomatic support in multilateral forums, like the UN Security Council and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Moreover, Pakistan’s military establishment exercises a disproportionate influence over the country’s strategic and political decision-making. Consequently, the military has the first right on all national resources. It also has almost free access to Chinese weaponry and is nuclear-capable. Consequently, no coercive measures, such as trade suspensions or precision military strikes, can generate the existential threat necessary to compel Pakistan to alter the core of its foreign policy with respect to India.
Furthermore, the strategy of compellence has a major drawback. Once started, the coercer can’t afford to fail or back out without substantial loss of credibility. In the recent Iran and Ukraine wars, the US and Russia, respectively, tried to draw redlines for compliance. The crippling sanctions and military interventions failed to create existential threat for the target countries. Now a situation has reached a point where both these superpowers are searching for honourable exits from the situation. This apparent impotence signals to the rest of the world that defiance is survivable, permanently weakening the coercer’s leverage elsewhere.
Though India has been increasing the intensity of deterrence, there are limits to escalation in a nuclear environment and there is always a threat of the strikes losing their impact and punishment potential, like Israeli strikes over Lebanon. Moreover, as brought out earlier, compellence is not a viable option. Therefore, India must shift its focus towards imposing costs on Pakistan by reciprocating in an asymmetric manner and applying multi-dimensional pressure. Instead of waiting for a terror attack to occur before retaliating, India should proactively exploit the fault lines within Pakistan and degrade the standing of the Pakistan army in the eyes of its citizens. To achieve this, India could encourage deniable grey-zone operations to expose economic disparities among the Pakistani population and exploit ethnic fissures. India should also proactively shape the strategic environment through intelligence dominance, cyber and information operations. Leveraging its partnership status with the US, Japan and the EU, India can impose financial costs on Pakistan for any misadventure and work towards making its proxy war unsustainable by effectively utilising agencies like the FATF.
By neutralising conventional nuclear blackmail through deniable, non-linear coercion, India can shift from a reactive defensive state to an active shaper of the strategic environment without the risk of attempting to impose compellence. In a nuclearised environment, the objective of strategy is not absolute coercion, but sustainable pressure that steadily raises the cost of proxy warfare without triggering uncontrolled escalation.