THESE days, war no longer feels far away. It appears on our screens in real time — missiles arcing across the night skies, drones slipping past defenses, military bases struck with unsettling precision. What once seemed like distant battlefields now appear as interconnected networks of targets. Watching recent fiery exchanges in the Middle East, one cannot help but ask: in a world of long-range missiles and autonomous weapons, is any base truly safe?
This question feels closer to home than we might admit.
In recent years, the Philippines has expanded its participation in the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United States, bringing the total number of agreed locations to nine. Seven are in Luzon, one in the Visayas, and one in Mindanao. Three sites in Cagayan and Isabela are strategically positioned near Taiwan. Officially, these sites are meant to strengthen disaster response, improve interoperability, and contribute to deterrence in an increasingly uncertain region.
EDCA does not establish permanent US bases. It allows rotational access of US forces to selected Philippine military facilities, which remain under Philippine ownership and control. Yet, in strategic terms, the distinction may matter less than the presence itself.
These are reasonable objectives. The Philippines faces real vulnerabilities, from natural disasters to maritime tensions in the West Philippine Sea. Partnerships can enhance capacity. Deterrence, in theory, can prevent conflict.
And yet, the global security landscape is shifting in ways that complicate these assumptions.
Recent conflicts in the Middle East make this risk more visible. In March 2026, Iranian missiles struck Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. US facilities in Qatar, including Al Udeid Air Base, were also targeted. In Jordan and Iraq, installations hosting American forces have faced repeated attacks. Even countries not formally at war found themselves drawn into conflict, simply because they hosted military infrastructure linked to one side.
What these incidents show is a simple but unsettling shift: military bases are no longer rear positions. They are among the first targets.
Alarm raised
This concern is not merely theoretical for communities in Northern Luzon. As early as the announcement of new EDCA sites, local leaders raised alarm. Manuel Mamba, then governor of Cagayan, recounted a warning relayed to him by a Chinese official. As reported by Kyodo News on May 9, 2024, he said: “If and when we... host their enemies, they will be forced to also shoot us... They will be forced to count us as their enemy.” Reflecting on this, Mamba argued that the presence of foreign forces could draw the country into a conflict, suggesting that without such arrangements, the Philippines might avoid being involved in war.
This brings us to the increasingly fraught question of Taiwan. China maintains that Taiwan is part of its territory, while the US has repeatedly signaled its intent to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait, including the possibility of intervening should tensions escalate. No one can say with certainty what would happen, but few would deny that heightened conflict is no longer unthinkable.
If tensions intensify, the Philippines would find itself in a difficult position, not by declaration, but by geography.
Northern Luzon sits just across the Bashi Channel, one of the most strategically significant waterways in the region. EDCA sites in this corridor may be viewed by allies as part of a broader security architecture. But from another perspective, they could also be interpreted as forward-operating locations in a potential conflict zone.
In such a scenario, the line between deterrence and exposure becomes blurred.
This is the Filipino dilemma.
On one hand, security partnerships offer reassurance. They signal alignment with a long-standing ally and provide access to resources the country might otherwise struggle to mobilize. On the other hand, they raise difficult questions about sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and unintended consequences. Do these arrangements reduce the likelihood of conflict, or increase the country’s visibility as a potential target?
Public discussion remains uneven. In Northern Luzon, concern is immediate and tangible. Elsewhere, it is often overshadowed by more pressing economic and political issues, even as national attention is frequently drawn to high-profile political contests rather than long-term security risks. Yet, the stakes are undeniably national.
Subtle shift
Recent commentaries suggest a subtle shift in tone. Where earlier discussions emphasized alliance and deterrence, a more cautious perspective is emerging — one that asks whether arrangements designed for security might also deepen strategic exposure in an era of long-range and networked warfare.
For many Filipinos, this is not abstract. Over a million overseas Filipino workers in the Middle East — and countless seafarers navigating conflict-prone waters — have already experienced how distant wars can reshape everyday life. Their families follow developments with quiet anxiety, aware of how quickly stability can unravel.
The Philippines is not alone in facing such dilemmas. Across the world, smaller states along geopolitical fault lines are navigating similar tensions: seeking security without becoming staging grounds, pursuing cooperation without surrendering agency. There are no easy answers. But there is value in asking the right questions, and in ensuring that decisions of this magnitude are accompanied by broader public understanding.
It is also important to acknowledge that EDCA’s rationale is not solely military. Proponents point to its role in disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and capacity-building — areas where the Philippines has repeatedly needed support. These are real benefits, especially in a country regularly struck by typhoons.
But even these benefits must now be weighed within a more complex strategic environment.
What recent conflicts have shown is that war no longer unfolds only along declared frontlines. It moves through infrastructures, alliances and networks. It reaches places not formally at war, but nonetheless connected to those who are.
We may not choose the conflicts of great powers. But through our policies and partnerships, we are quietly defining how close we stand to them.
War may still seem distant. But its targets may already be mapped.