IN the first week of the trial of the decade — the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte — viewers were treated to typical courtroom drama: offer of testimonial evidence, the direct examination of the witness, objections, ruling on objections, cross-examination, re-direct and re-cross examination. But people are impatient. They want to hear the story. They want the sordid details, and they want all these quickly. Forthwith!
Thus far, both impeachment managers (the prosecution) and the counsel for the respondent have heavily — almost exclusively — leaned on the rules of evidence detailed in the Rules of Court and amplified by jurisprudence.
And that is the first matter that merits serious examination. The Senate is not really a court. It is called a “court of impeachment” only by analogy to courts of law. Those who sit in judgment are not judges. Most of them would not qualify, and some would not even qualify as stenographers or interpreters. They are senators — politicians — tasked by the Constitution to determine whether a high official, charged under any of the titles enumerated in Article XI of the Constitution, should remain in office or should be booted out and forever disqualified. It is a political process of holding a high official to account that draws some of its elements from legal procedure and is analogous — underscoring analogy is important! — to judicial processes.
Thus far, the Senate has not made any pronouncement as to the rules of evidence it goes by. There are rules for administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers — the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, the Office of the Ombudsman, the National Labor Relations Commission, among them, and a fundamental precept in their regard is that the technical rules of evidence do not apply — and there are rules for special courts such as the first-level trial courts sitting as small-claims courts, the Court of Tax Appeals, and finally, the Rules of Court that govern proceedings before all courts of law. The Senate seems to have preferred to enunciate its rules as the proceedings unfold. While this holds the advantage of forestalling what could be a protracted debate on admissible and inadmissible evidence, it is disadvantageous in the measure that it does not provide the parties — and the public — with clear rules about what to expect.
The rules of evidence are promulgated in an attempt to guide the courts in getting at the truth. That, for example, is the reason for the “best evidence rule” — the rule that rather than having a witness talk about the contents of a document, the document itself should be presented. That is also the reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence — the rule that bars the repetition in court of what the witness heard another person utter as proof of the truth of what was uttered! The source of the utterance should be presented, and the adverse party against whom the witness is presented should be given the chance to cross-examine. But it will not do to lose sight of the fact that the rules of evidence also screen out what would otherwise be probative but transgress some value that the legal system protects. A spouse may be the most reliable witness about the acts and schemes of a partner, but the “marital privilege rule” shields one spouse from having to answer questions about the acts and omissions of the other. It is the same thing with regard to questions asked of a priest respecting disclosures made in the confessional. Recently, there had emerged “the rape shield rule” that bars testimony on the previous promiscuous conduct of one who claims to have been raped to be used against her. There is no doubt that the evidence from these sources would get a judge closer to the truth — but there are values that the system upholds and that the rules are designed to safeguard.
One thing is sure: When there is a flurry of objections, the spectator can be sure that a crucial question has been asked of the witness. Otherwise, opposing counsel would just allow an innocuous matter to pass without further ado. So, objections may still have the salutary function of signaling to the public that something that the objecting party considers vital or pivotal is being asked — and, as far as it is within its power to object, should not be disclosed.
With our penchant for high drama, it should be no surprise at all that our Senate has gladly obliged. After all, our senators don theatrical gowns that give them the “feeling” of being judges. They revel in the title “senator-judge,” although, constitutionally, that is a non-existent character. What they are in fact are senators tasked to judge in an impeachment case. That does not make them judges, any more than a judge in a beauty contest is thereby styled “judge” and addressed “Your Honor!”
There have been memes deriding Sen. Win Gatchalian for sitting alongside Sen. Chiz Escudero like some glorified “sacristan.” That is unfair to him. He remains president of the Senate, and he presides over the roll call, as well as superintends the calendar of business and continues to preside over the Senate’s legislative tasks — its primary role. He was humble and prudent enough to yield to Escudero, who is familiar with lawyering craft and often tries his best to be stentorian when he announces his rulings over the strain of objection and refutation. This was the case at the trial of former president Joseph Estrada. Sen. Nene Pimentel sat alongside Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr., and he was not any less for having done so. True, it is not the president but the vice president who is on trial, but that does not make the trial any less daunting for a presiding officer who does not have the familiarity with the rules of evidence and of procedure that a lawyer or one skilled in the law has, facing a panoply of lawyers all poised to spring to their feet and cry out “Objection!” — only to be met with an often lengthy peroration on why the question should be allowed.
I hope however that the Senate, the impeachment managers or House prosecutors and their team of private prosecutors, and the counsel for the respondent realize that the nation is sitting in judgment as well, for however the Senate may vote at the end of the trial, that evidence that shall have been disclosed publicly will leave no doubt about whether the vice president is deserving of trust or has betrayed it. And that is the reason that all the evidence should be publicly bared.
rannie_aquino@sanbeda.edu.ph
rannie_aquino@csu.edu.ph
