OPINION | Why Putrajaya Won’t Say Yes — and Won’t Say No — to Sarawak’s Oil and Gas Claims

Opinion
30 Jan 2026 • 10:00 AM MYT
TheRealNehruism
TheRealNehruism

An award-winning Newswav creator, Bebas News columnist & ex-FMT columnist.

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Image credit: Media Perpaduan / Utusan Borneo

Azalina Othman, our law minister, has just come out to say that the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) does not say anything about oil and gas.

Her exact words were : "The MA63 is the foundational document that sets the terms for the formation of Malaysia, including the rights and autonomy of Sabah and Sarawak in certain areas

“The management and regulation of the oil and gas industry are determined by federal laws, specifically the Petroleum Development Act (Act 144),” she said in a written parliamentary reply.

Now why is she saying that?

Well , To put it simply, it is likely because Putrajaya does not want to give the oil and gas rights it currently holds to Sarawak, which is claiming it.

Why?

Well, the simple answer is , because nobody willingly gives away something they have — and value — if they can help it.

Your boss will not give you a higher salary and bonus, even if you think you deserve it, if they can keep the money for themselves.

Even your parents will not hand over the house your grandfather gave them for as long as they still want it, even if you think you are entitled to inherit it.

Governments behave no differently.

For quite some time now, there has been a great deal of back-and-forth between Kuching and Putrajaya over who should control Sarawak’s oil and gas. Both sides bombard the public with technical arguments — citing laws, ordinances, agreements, and expert opinion — to justify their respective claims. But at the end of the day, the issue boils down to power.

The question of who owns Sarawak’s oil and gas rights, let us not forget, never really arose when Putrajaya exercised undisputed power over the federation.

Until around 2007, Sarawak did not make much noise about reclaiming its oil and gas rights. At that time, Barisan Nasional held Putrajaya firmly, and Sarawak had no chance of challenging Putrajaya's undisputed power. Thus, there was little incentive — and even less room — to challenge the centre.

After the 12th general election in 2007, however, BN’s grip on Putrajaya began to weaken. As federal power weakened, Kuching correspondingly, started to cultivate the belief that it should be the one holding its oil and gas rights, not Putrajaya.

By the time BN’s rule in Putrajaya collapsed completely in 2018, that belief had hardened into something resembling a God-given right — a kind of manifest destiny. Ever since, Kuching has insisted that, in the name of all that if right and good, that it must be allowed to manage its own oil and gas affairs.

Pakatan Harapan in 2018, Perikatan Nasional after the Sheraton Move in 2020, and PH again after 2022, all accommodated Kuching’s insistence to varying degrees. They did it, not because Putrajaya genuinely wanted to give Sarawak what it demanded, but because its hold on Putrajaya was weak, and thus it was very dependent on East Malaysian support, especially Kuching's support, to continue to sit on the throne.

Today, however, the Anwar-led Madani government is not as weak as it was in 2022. It is still far from the dominance BN enjoyed in the pre-2007 era, but it is strong enough to push back — at least cautiously.

This is the context in which Azalina says MA63 contains no provisions on oil and gas ownership or regulation.

Now legally speaking, at least from her point of view, and certainly from Putrajaya's point of view, she is correct. MA63 afterall, does not contain reference to petroleum ownership, nor does it assign regulatory roles to Petronas or Sarawak’s Petroleum Sarawak Bhd (Petros). According to her, at least, management and regulation of the industry are determined by federal law — specifically the Petroleum Development Act 1974, which vests ownership of petroleum in Petronas.

Now I am saying that this is all correct and true only in Azalina's and Putrajaya's point of view, because Kuching also has its own legal point of view, which it deems to be correct and trur, although it will certain contradict Azalina's and Putrajaya's point of view.

So where does this all leave us then?

Well, if you ask me, this leaves us in a familiar place: Putrajaya will not decisively reject Sarawak’s claims, but it will also do everything it can — slowly, carefully, and tortuously — to avoid ever conceding them.

So what will happen now?

The answer is simple. Putrajaya will do everything it can to delay saying yes to Kuching’s demands, while offering limited concessions in other areas. It will extract Kuching’s political support to remain on the throne in Putrajaya, while waiting for more favourable conditions before saying no in a decisive manner.

Petronas’s move to seek clarification from the Federal Court on the regulatory framework governing its operations in Sarawak fits neatly into this approach. So does the emphasis on overlapping functions between Petronas and Petros, legal uncertainty, and the need for judicial determination.

And Kuching — what will it do?

Personally, I think Kuching should have made hay while the sun shone. In 2022, when Putrajaya was weak and Kuching was strong, Sarawak should have tried to expand its political reach — it should have forged alliances with parties in Sabah and even Peninsular Malaysia. If it had looked capable of challenging Putrajaya in its own backyard, the Putrajaya might have sued for peace and traded oil and gas control in return for Sarawak abandoning any expansionist ambitions.

Kuching however, chose to not strike while the iron was hot.

Instead, it waited — it waited while expecting Putrajaya to eventually give it what it wanted, even though it should have known that Putrajaya wants it too, and would go to the moon and back not to be deprived of what it wanted and had.

As a result, Sarawak is now likely to be stuck in endless legal hair-splitting and procedural haggling — arguments over which act says what, and which ordinance means what — that will likely stretch on until kingdom come.

Why will it stretch on until kingdom come?

Because Putrajaya wants it to.

An unresolved issue suits the federal centre just fine. It allows meetings after meetings, negotiations after negotiations, and endless quarrelling over words and clauses — all while the substance remains untouched.

In the meantime, Putrajaya will work relentlessly to strengthen itself, hoping to one day recover the level of power BN enjoyed before 2007 — at which point it can finally tell Kuching no, and shut the door on the matter for good.


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