
Less than a fortnight after a Haryana judicial officer questioned whether the mere pendency of a vigilance matter — without even a decision to chargesheet him — could be used to stall his career advancement, the amicus curiae appointed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court has submitted that the officer could not have been bypassed or “passed over”.
The matter was placed before the Bench headed by Chief Justice Sheel Nagu after Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate First Class at Ellenabad, Prateet Singh Dhonchak, filed the petition against the High Court through its Registrar-General alleging arbitrary and discriminatory withholding of his promotion to the post of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) despite juniors being promoted.
In his opinion placed before the Bench, senior advocate and amicus curiae Rajiv Atma Ram stated that the question for consideration was whether the petitioner could have been superseded and denied promotion merely on the basis of a complaint pending against him in the absence of issuance of any chargesheet till date.
Referring to Supreme Court rulings, the amicus said it had been categorically held that disciplinary proceedings commenced only upon issuance of a chargesheet. The petitioner could not be denied promotion or superseded while his juniors were promoted, he added.
It was submitted that the sealed cover procedure or denial of promotion could be resorted to only in cases where the employee was under suspension, facing disciplinary proceedings or criminal prosecution. In the absence of such circumstances, supersession or deferment of promotion consideration was wholly unsustainable in law.
The senior advocate further submitted that the criteria for designation/promotion as Civil Judge (Senior Division) approved by the Full Court in its meeting dated April 29, 2024, specifically provided that an officer having an entry of “integrity doubtful” in his annual confidential report (ACR) would be ineligible for such designation/posting.
But final entry of “integrity doubtful” did not exist against the petitioner in the ACR. His matter was merely referred to the vigilance disciplinary committee (VDC) and the proceedings were still pending.
“The petitioner could not have been passed over in the Full Court meeting dated April 21, 2025, merely on account of pending VDC/disciplinary proceedings, contrary to the criteria prevailing on the date of consideration,” he submitted.
Among other things, the petitioner’s counsel Dr MM Dhonchak had earlier raised a series of unusually pointed questions on judicial administration, the scope of Article 235 of the Constitution, the sanctity of Full Court decisions and the balance between institutional discipline and individual judicial independence.
The questions framed in the petition included: whether pendency of a complaint before VDC “would ipso facto” render a judicial officer unsuitable for promotion “despite the fact of the same being in utter negation of the criteria laid down by none other than the Full Court”. The petitioner had further questioned whether an ACR remark merely stating “complaint is pending consideration of VDC” could be treated at par with “integrity doubtful”, especially when his overall grading remained “B-Plus (Good)”.






