Second of three parts
This article is from a speech delivered in observance of Constitution Day at the Philippine Constitution Association (Philconsa), Manila Polo Club, on Feb. 10, 2026.
THE inconvenient question is how do we meet this problem of continuing failure to attract the best of our citizens because of our systems of election and appointments?
First, let us look at our defective electoral system. There is no divergence of opinion that we need to eliminate or at the very least regulate the proliferation of political dynasties. In a democracy, ballots and not bloodlines should determine electoral contests. If this tenet is infringed, the people will vote with bolos and not with ballots. After decades of inaction if not complicity, both houses of Congress today have awakened to this live threat to our democracy. Several bills banning or regulating political dynasties are being fast-tracked for approval. The slaying of political dynasties, however, will not be a walk in the park. The Philippine Constitution Association (Philconsa) has submitted its position paper on the problem. We took a two-pronged stance. One, we suggested that term limits should be lifted, thus:
“Term limits were adopted with the objective of preventing the prolonged concentration of power in a single individual. In practice, however, they have produced an unintended but predictable result: the fragmentation of political authority within families and the normalization of electoral succession based on kinship rather than individual performance.
“When an elected official is constitutionally barred from seeking reelection despite continued public support, the political constituency, organization machinery and voter mandate do not simply disappear. They are transferred — most often to a spouse, child, sibling or close relative.”
Deprived of the option to retain a leader they continue to support, voters gravitate toward the most familiar and politically proximate substitute. In this way, term limits operate as a structural mechanism that encourages dynastic succession.
And two, we pointed out the nightmare of working out a definition of “political dynasty” that is invulnerable to constitutional challenge. Thus, we pointed out:
“There is also a fundamental difficulty in arriving at a final and workable definition of ‘political dynasty’ without running into serious constitutional problems. Any attempt to define political dynasties by law will necessarily classify people based on family relationships. That immediately raises concerns under the Constitution, particularly the guarantee of equal protection of the laws and the right of all qualified citizens to seek and hold a public office whether elected or appointed. Disqualifying a person solely because of who he or she is related to, rather than because of personal qualifications or conduct, places the law on constitutionally fragile ground.
There is also a practical danger that such a definition may end up excluding the very individuals who are otherwise most qualified. Family relation, by itself, does not determine competence, integrity, or fitness for public service. A blanket exclusion based on bloodline risks depriving the electorate of capable candidates and substitutes a legal prohibition for vote judgment.”
In addition, if we want our elections to attract the participation of the best from our citizens, reforms must be instituted in our political parties.
Among the reforms are the following: ensure that political parties have a distinct identity with crystal clear platforms, principles and policies, and a program of government; that political parties are freed from despots by adopting a democratic system of internal decision-making, including the selection of its party officials and candidates for public office; that political butterflies are prevented from changing political parties due to crass opportunism; that campaign finance of political parties is regulated to prevent vote-buying and stop the growing foreign interference in our election through financing of favored candidates.
In complement, reforms must be instituted in our party-list system. As originally visualized, our party-list system was intended to promote the political inclusivity of the marginalized sectors in our society. Sad to state, that vision has vanished, for today the system has been used by scoundrels to gain additional seats in Congress by masquerading as marginalized. The reforms should define the specific groups that will qualify as marginalized such as farmers, workers, Indigenous people, persons with disabilities, etc. They should establish a no-nonsense process to determine whether these requirements have been fulfilled by examining evidence that the parties and their candidates truly represent marginalized sectors such as membership lists, sectoral support, specific programs and funding sources. They should also require the parties to prove that their candidates are chosen through democratic, participatory and transparent processes to prevent party bossism.
We now go to reforms in our appointing process. Reforms on this area must focus on the appointment of officials in institutions that ought to be independent for their all-important mandate is to check abuses of power in all branches of government. I refer to appointments in the judiciary, the Commission on Audit, the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Elections. The reforms must insulate these appointments from the evils of partisan politics. Under our 1987 Constitution, the commissioners on audit, civil service and elections are all appointed by the president with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. In other words, they are appointed by and they are at the mercy of politicians of all types and stripes. The judges and justices are the worst situated. They are appointed by the president alone without the concurrence of the Commission of Appointments. Giving this monopoly to the number one politician of the country has raised the eyebrows of many. For a government without independent mechanisms to prevent abuse of powers by the appointment authority will be lawless. To avoid this lawlessness, countries like New Zealand and Canada have used independent bodies that include representatives of sectors as law, the academe, civil society and other major stakeholders to make these appointments. In any event, if we sincerely want these institutions to be independent in order for them to have a fighting chance to stop abuses of power in government, especially abuses perpetrated by our elected officials, the reforms must insure the following: their legal autonomy; their financial autonomy; their operational autonomy and their immunity against undue influence or retaliation.
To be concluded on Feb. 14, 2026
Reynato S. Puno is a former chief justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
