THE violent confrontations between the Philippine Navy (PN) and the China Coast Guard (CCG) at the Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal have been our country’s defining moments in protecting our territorial integrity, sovereignty and sovereign rights.
On June 17, 2024, an elite team from the Philippine Navy was physically attacked while carrying out a lawful rotation and resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre. It shocked Filipinos and the international community that one member of the team lost a finger and eight high-powered firearms were seized by the CCG. Then came the July 21, 2026, incident; eight sailors were hurt and one sustained a serious head injury. These and many other past incidents show China’s vicious pattern of resorting to dangerous maneuvers, intentional ramming, water cannoning and physical intimidation to prevent the Philippines from exercising its lawful rights within its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
These events raise a difficult but unavoidable question that I asked in my previous article: Is forbearance and bearing the physical and morale impact of these attacks our preferred mode of diplomacy with China? Or should we begin responding with commensurate force?
Both former President Rodrigo Duterte and current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. pursued a policy of restraint toward China’s aggression, following the principle “a friend to everyone and an enemy to none.” The objective has been clear — to avoid giving China any justification to escalate the situation into an armed conflict. And in that pursuit, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) have shown remarkable discipline worthy of recognition. Despite repeated harassment, they have followed orders, completed missions and avoided actions that could trigger violence, which earned for our nation vast international support and reinforced our image as a responsible state that respects international law.
However, Beijing has mistaken our restraint for passivity to a point that their repeated attacks no longer constitute isolated incidents but a deliberate strategy designed to wear down our resolve. And if we only meet every violent act with diplomatic protests, China may conclude that the cost of coercion is negligible.
Stoking war?
Responding with commensurate and proportional force is not the same as provoking war. International law recognizes the inherent right of states to protect their personnel and government vessels. Defensive actions such as blocking unsafe approaches, employing non-lethal water cannons against aggressive vessels, or physically preventing illegal boarding attempts are justified if they are strictly limited to protecting government security and law enforcement personnel and ensuring mission accomplishment.
The key principle is proportionality.
We should never become the aggressor. We must not fire the first shot or initiate violence. But we must neither allow our soldiers to perpetually play the victim card. Our soldiers must be equipped and authorized by government — with clear and unmistakable instructions — to employ reasonable defensive measures when their lives and missions are threatened.
While there is reasonable ground to fear that stronger responses could trigger a military escalation with China, history suggests that escalation is not automatic.
Out there in the South China Sea, Beijing has been employing the “gray zone strategy,” i.e., coercive tactics calibrated below the threshold of armed conflict. China generally seeks to avoid actions that could activate treaty obligations, severely damage its international standing, or disrupt regional stability. Therefore, a carefully calibrated AFP-PCG response using non-lethal, defensive measures is unlikely, by itself, to trigger full-scale war.
What increases the danger instead is uncertainty. Clear rules of engagement, disciplined execution and continuous communication between both sides reduce the risk of miscalculation far more effectively than complete inaction.
Way forward
Being in that isolated post and the possibility of physical attack hanging like a sword of Damocles, we cannot be sure how long our soldiers can exercise maximum restraint. Certainly, the AFP and the PCG should continue exercising the highest level of discipline, but they should be authorized to defend themselves using graduated, non-lethal responses. Every mission should be supported by improved surveillance, real-time communications, legal documentation and international transparency. Every confrontation should be recorded and immediately shared with the Filipino people and the international community.
We should prepare for the possibility of China ultimately seizing control of the BRP Sierra Madre. While no public declaration has been explicitly made of such intention, Beijing’s sustained efforts to obstruct resupply missions and challenge our presence there strongly suggest their intent to make our continued occupation increasingly difficult. If resupply eventually becomes impossible and if even ship repairs are prevented by strong resistance and violent confrontation, the grounded ship could deteriorate beyond habitability, potentially allowing China to alter the status quo without firing a single shot.
That possibility underscores why maintaining the BRP Sierra Madre is a strategic imperative rather than merely a symbolic act.
The way forward requires neither reckless confrontation nor submissive accommodation. Marcos was well-applauded in his fifth State of the Nation Address (SONA) when he said, “Filipinos are a noble, kind, gracious and a great race ... and we do not yield.”
We should therefore pursue a strategy of “restrained firmness.” Diplomacy must be pursued, but it should be backed by credible maritime capability through accelerated modernization. The PN and PCG should receive better ships, drones, communications systems, and non-lethal defensive equipment. Alliances with like-minded nations should continue to strengthen deterrence while avoiding unnecessary provocation. Most importantly, we must sustain a coherent national position — whoever sits in Malacañang.
Less rhetoric, more coherent and decisive actions
The West Philippine Sea is not merely a foreign policy issue. It is a test of our national resolve in addressing a “common threat” that Marcos said in his SONA “(is) directed against our dignity and self-respect as a people ... (where) our very humanity has been called into question.”
We should strive to continue choosing peace as far as possible — but peace must never come at the expense of our dignity as a nation, as an armed force, and as a people. By calmly, lawfully and resolutely defending our rights by “pushing back” with commensurate force when attacked earns not only the respect of the international community but also the confidence of our own people. And it will do justice to our troops beyond providing hazard pay, pinning medals on their chests, or giving them pats in the back.
That would add purpose and meaning to the most applauded and rooted part of the president’s SONA, “Sa mga pang-aalipusta, hindi tayo matitinag. Sa manlulupig, hindi tayo pasisiil (We will not be moved by the mockery; we will not be subdued by the invaders).”
atty.edarevalo@gmail.com
