IN July 2018, Republic Act 11321 or the Sagip Saka Act (SSA) was signed into a law. Its main sponsor was Sen. Francis Pangilinan. The avowed purpose under Section 2 is to “strengthen the farmers and fisherfolk enterprise development program by establishing a comprehensive and holistic approach in the formulation, coordination and implementation of enterprise development initiatives, consolidating the roles of the different agencies involved in farmers and fisherfolk enterprise development, and intensifying the building of entrepreneurship culture among farmers and fisherfolks.”
For this goal to be achieved, a Farmers and Fisherfolk Enterprise Development Council was to be established, with various government agencies involved in agricultural and rural development serving as members and the Department of Agriculture (DA) chairing. Among its tasks, the council was assigned the role of formulating Farmers and Fisherfolk Enterprise Development Programs (FFEDPs) intended help uplift the socioeconomic situation of small farmers and fisherfolk.
The council was also tasked with establishing a Farmers and Fisherfolk Enterprise Development Information System (FFEDIS), which would serve as a registry of all FFEDPs and the farmers and fisherfolk groups participating in program implementation. Various government assistance programs were envisioned to be coursed through the FFEDPs, from the production, processing and up to marketing of produce. The law also provided that local government units (LGUs) and other government instrumentalities should source their agri-food requirements from these groups through a negotiated procurement process.
Almost eight years later, there is little evidence that the law has progressed significantly. In fact, Executive Order 101 was issued by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. on Oct. 25, 2025, to revive “full implementation” of the SSA. Despite this well-intentioned initiative, it is difficult to see upscaled or nationwide implementation for a number of reasons.
First, the DA is burdened with so many responsibilities that it has little time to devote to the proper implementation of the SSA. Proof of this is that we hardly saw the establishment and operation of a Sagip Saka desk, formulation of FFEDPs, completion of the FFEDIS and the submission of progress reports.
Second, there is no budgetary item solely dedicated for the SSA's implementation. Agencies or its units mostly operate in silos, not wanting to share resources and holding on to them to support their own activities. For example, there is resistance to use the rice program budget to promote rice-based crop diversification because the plants that will be cultivated in between the two palay planting seasons is not rice but high-value crops. This is despite the recognition that high-value crops can significantly increase the incomes of palay farmers.
Third, the process of selling the products of farmers and fisherfolk to LGUs and other government instrumentalities is tedious and difficult. Rules and regulations must be complied with in a conscientious manner and there is no incentive for those who will process the deal to its successful conclusion.
Finally, for the procuring entities (i.e., LGUs and other government agencies), there is little incentive to prioritize buying from farmers and fisherfolk except, at the minimum, compliance with the law and at best having those purchases credited to their benevolence by constituents who will receive the in-kind assistance. The amount they can afford will also depend on whether they have a surplus budget.
Despite these enormous challenges facing the SSA, National Irrigation Administrator Eddie Guillen tested the system by encouraging Quezon City Mayor Joy Belmonte to procure the rice requirements of her constituents directly from a farmers’ cooperative in Piddig, Ilocos Norte. Guillen is a former mayor of this municipality and under his leadership, he was able to bring down its poverty incidence from more than 30 percent in the early 2000s to less than 10 percent.
As an engineer, he saw the need to integrate production, processing and marketing of the palay produced by farmers and extended support in every step of the value chain. The result was the dramatic upliftment of his constituents' socioeconomic welfare.
Meanwhile, as part of assisting the poorest segment of Quezon City’s population, Belmonte set aside hundreds of millions of pesos for the purchase of rice for distribution. The project intends to distribute 10 kilos of free rice for four times over several months.
Initial delivery was made early this May and continues to this very day. Still, there were many challenges that need to be surmounted.
One is the need to comply with strict rules and regulations on negotiated procurement, such as certification that the cooperative is duly recognized by the government and that the quality of rice being offered justifies the price.
Two involves logistical-related issues such as the rice bag having to comply with government requirements; who is going to shoulder the trucking cost; who is paying the “kargador”; where the 18- to 22-wheeler trucks would be parked and where the rice would be stored (the QC government does not have huge warehouses); and the mode and timing of payments to the cooperative.
The experience of the Piddig farmers’ cooperative and Quezon City clearly demonstrates that despite being motivated by the intention of helping the poor, there are just so many obstacles that lie on the way. The authors of SSA did not anticipate this. They thought that passing the law would automatically help poor farmers and urban dwellers. This is why the SSA barely moved.
I am encouraging Guillen and his team to fully document the experience step-by-step so that other cooperatives and LGUs wanting to attain the noble objectives of the SSA can distill lessons, apply these and make their experience less harrowing.
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