LAST year, I wrote about a word that briefly escaped the confines of legal language and entered everyday conversation: “forthwith.” It appeared in Article XI, Section 3(4) of the 1987 Constitution, where it provides that impeachment trial by the Senate shall “forthwith proceed.” At the time, I turned to dictionaries — especially the Oxford English Dictionary — to clarify its meaning: “immediately, at once, without delay or interval.”
A year later, the word returns — this time not as a subject of linguistic curiosity, but as an object of constitutional interpretation.
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court defined “forthwith” as meaning “within a reasonable time,” allowing for variation depending on circumstances. The court thus reframed what many had assumed to be a strict temporal command into a more flexible standard.
This raises a fascinating question at the intersection of language and law: How does a dictionary meaning compare with a judicial meaning? And more importantly, is the court justified in operationalizing “forthwith” in this way?
At first glance, the difference appears stark. The dictionary definition emphasizes immediacy — “without delay or interval.” It suggests continuity: once the articles of impeachment are triggered, the trial should begin without interruption. In my earlier column, I noted that this meaning is not deictic or context-dependent; rather, it carries a relatively fixed sense in legal usage. Historical examples reinforce this: “forthwith” often meant action within hours or, at most, a very short and definite period.
By contrast, the Supreme Court’s interpretation introduces elasticity. “Within a reasonable time” is inherently contextual. What is reasonable depends on institutional capacity, procedural requirements and situational constraints. It acknowledges that the Senate, acting as an impeachment court, must prepare — organizing procedures, ensuring quorum and addressing logistical matters. In this sense, the court moves from a lexical definition to a functional one.
Yet, despite the apparent divergence, there is also a subtle convergence. Even in legal dictionaries and historical usage, “forthwith” has rarely meant instantaneous action in the literal sense. Rather, it has meant action without “undue” delay — promptness consistent with the demands of the situation. For example, a 19th-century legal interpretation might require pleading “forthwith” within 24 hours, not within seconds. The word signals urgency, but not impossibility.
Seen this way, the court’s definition does not entirely depart from the semantic core of “forthwith.” Instead, it foregrounds what linguists might call its pragmatic dimension: how meaning is realized in real-world contexts. Language in law is never purely lexical; it is always mediated by institutions, procedures and norms.
Still, the court’s operationalization is not without tension. By translating “forthwith” into “reasonable time,” the decision arguably shifts the burden from immediacy to justification. The constitutional text appears to impose a presumption of urgency; the court’s interpretation allows for delay so long as it can be justified as reasonable. This is not merely a semantic adjustment — it has institutional consequences. It grants greater discretion to the Senate in determining when to act, while limiting judicial intervention to cases of grave abuse.
Whether this is “rightful” depends on one’s view of constitutional interpretation. From a strictly textualist perspective, one might argue that the framers chose “forthwith” precisely to avoid ambiguity. A more precise phrase — such as “within a fixed number of days” — could have been used, but was not. Thus, the argument goes, the court should adhere closely to the ordinary meaning of immediacy.
From a structural or functional perspective, however, the court’s approach appears more defensible. The Constitution operates within a system of co-equal branches, each with its own prerogatives. The Senate, in particular, is not merely a passive recipient of impeachment cases but an institution with procedural autonomy. Allowing it a “reasonable time” to convene recognizes this autonomy while still imposing a standard against undue delay.
In the end, the story of “forthwith” is not simply about a word, but about how law negotiates the tension between precision and practicality. Dictionaries provide clarity, but they do not govern institutions. Courts, in turn, must translate language into workable rules, even if that means softening its edges.
If there is a lesson here, it is the same one I suggested last year: legal language, for all its elegance, can obscure as much as it reveals. Forthwith sounds definitive, even commanding. But as we now see, its meaning — like many words in law — is ultimately shaped not only by dictionaries, but by the institutions that bring it to life.
Ariane Macalinga Borlongan is a public intellectual, language scholar and migrant advocate. He is one of the leading researchers on English in the Philippines and one of the pioneers of migration linguistics. He is the youngest to earn a doctorate in linguistics, at age 23, from De La Salle University, and has had several teaching and research positions in Germany, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Poland and Singapore. He is currently associate professor of sociolinguistics at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.
