MANY react emotionally when I even float the idea that President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. might endorse Leni Robredo to face Sara Duterte in 2028. The suggestion alone has triggered outrage across political tribes. For some self-identified Pinks, Yellows and Reds, even just entertaining it feels like heresy. For diehard Marcos loyalists, it is betrayal, and I am reminded that I was among Robredo’s fiercest critics in 2016.
Both reactions miss the point.
Politics is not theology. It is not an arena for moral absolutists who mistake ideological consistency for strategic intelligence. It is a field of power, interests, timing and context. I am not driven by tribal loyalty.
I am a political animal, not merely a commentator. Politics is contextual.
The 2016 battlefield is not the 2028 battlefield. In 2016, I opposed Robredo for reasons grounded in that moment’s realities. Those reasons were anchored in alignments and calculations. But threat configurations change. Coalitions recalibrate. Political actors adapt, or become irrelevant.
What we face in 2028 is not a replay of old rivalries. It is the possibility of a dangerous consolidation of power under a Duterte restoration. If that is the risk, the strategic question is simple: What configuration prevents it?
Seen through that lens, a Marcos endorsement of Robredo is not ideological treason. It is a strategic realignment. It acknowledges that defeating a consolidated machine may require an equally consolidated counterweight. If the reflex is hatred toward Marcos or dislike of Robredo, then one is not doing politics. Emotional catharsis may feel righteous, but it does not win elections or prevent institutional capture.
If those reflexes fracture a coalition capable of preventing a Sara Duterte presidency, the consequences will be structural. What is at stake is not merely a change in administration, but the possible return of a governing style defined by impunity, volatility and external alignments that unsettled our strategic posture.
The Duterte brand was marked by a tolerance for excess, a combative and often erratic decision-making style, and a foreign policy drift that many viewed as overly accommodating to Beijing. More troubling is the rhetoric now surfacing among her own supporters, who frame her candidacy not as reconciliation but as retribution, an agenda that signals a politics of settling scores rather than strengthening institutions.
History teaches us that democratic erosion often happens gradually, then suddenly. The cost of miscalculation will be borne by generations, not factions. That is why strategy must trump sentiment.
Those in the anti-Duterte forces must reflect. If they want to defeat Sara Duterte, they will need as many hands as possible, even the president’s. This is no time for purity contests. It is an existential calculation. If more than one serious candidate runs against her and the vote fragments, the loss will not be fate. It will be ego.
We have seen this before. Multi-cornered fights reward the candidate with the most consolidated base. Fragmentation is the silent ally of the front-runner. If two or three candidates split the anti-Duterte vote while her base remains intact, the outcome becomes predictable.
Sara Duterte begins any 2028 race with a structural advantage. Her base, hovering around 30 percent in a multi-cornered contest, is cohesive and disciplined. In a fragmented field, that alone is formidable. Robredo’s core base is smaller. Loyal and energized, but insufficient on its own. If she runs, victory will not come from consolidation alone, but from expansion. She should grow her base.
It is a fact that President Marcos retains a loyal constituency that is more organizational than ideological. If he endorses a candidate, many will follow. While some Marcos loyalists will refuse to vote for Robredo, they would probably abstain, or cast a protest vote, but will not transfer to Sara Duterte. In plurality contests, preventing your opponent from expanding is as important as expanding yourself. Even imperfect transfer yields advantage.
The militant left composed of the Makabayan coalition may field its own candidate and divide the anti-Duterte bloc. But it will not support Sara Duterte. That caps her ceiling.
The progressives among the Pinks and Yellows will likely feel uncomfortable about a tactical alignment with Marcos forces. But discomfort does not automatically translate into defection. Those who see Sara Duterte as a greater threat are unlikely to cross over out of disappointment. Emotional resistance does not equal arithmetic transfer. Many will grumble. Most will act on perceived risk. After all, Marcos is not the one running, but Robredo.
The major battleground would be the noncommitted middle. This swing bloc is driven less by partisan loyalty and more by issues and perception of competence. Robredo will be labeled unqualified. But questions of competence are often more survivable than allegations of corruption.
Sara Duterte carries heavier baggage. Investigations and controversies create doubts harder to neutralize among undecided voters. For supporters, allegations are dismissed as attacks. For the middle, they raise questions. In a close race, doubt is decisive.
Among swing voters, the calculus becomes comparative: Who carries less risk? Who appears less tainted? On that terrain, Robredo’s perceived weakness may be lighter than Sara’s perceived baggage. Charges of incompetence can be thrown at both.
In the end, machinery still matters. Ground networks and alliances mobilize turnout. If Pink and Yellow mobilization combines with Marcos-era machinery, especially in Northern and provincial bailiwicks, the organizational advantage becomes formidable. Voters are comfortable splitting tickets. People can vote for Robredo for president even if they vote for different vice presidents.
In a plurality system, 30 percent is dangerous when the opposition is fragmented. But it is not unbeatable when the battleground expands and machinery coordinates. The mistake is to treat 2028 as a morality contest. It is an arithmetic exercise about preventing a political nightmare. If anti-Sara Duterte forces divide, her base becomes enough. If they consolidate and the middle tilts toward the candidate perceived as less risky, the numbers shift.
Anger may feel pure. But when purity politics refuses to build the coalition necessary to block authoritarian resurgence, it becomes reckless.
In the end, anger does not win elections. Arithmetic does.
The author is a professor at the University of the Philippines Los Baños and vice chairman of the board of the state-run PTV Network Inc.
