A PLUNDER charge is grave, so prosecutors must prove it carefully. In the case over P75 million in campaign donations to Sen. Rodante Marcoleta, the Ombudsman must show more than a large transfer or irregular disclosures and taxes. It must prove the money was ill-gotten wealth accumulated through criminal acts, and that each accused knowingly joined the alleged scheme.
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Geraldine Faith Econg recently said the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People has made plunder convictions harder and urged that the doctrine be revisited. Her remarks to a Judicial and Bar Council panel are not a ruling on this case.
They sharpen the question now before the court: Has the Ombudsman shown strong evidence against these accused, especially the three donors, or is the accusation being made to do the work of proof?
The donors’ bail petitions are submitted for resolution. The trial has begun, and prosecutors rested their witnesses on its first day. The court directed them to make a formal offer of evidence, after which the defense would respond. These steps decide neither guilt nor innocence. The court must assess the full record. The public should not mistake a pending bail decision for a verdict.
Republic Act 7080 does not make every transfer above P50-million plunder. The threshold is the value of ill-gotten wealth amassed through a combination or series of overt criminal acts identified in the law. Prosecutors must connect the wealth to those acts and to the public officer’s use of office or other means specified by statute. The amount matters, but it cannot prove the case by itself.
A campaign contribution is not automatically lawful just because a deed calls it a donation. Timing, source, reporting, taxes and surrounding communications matter. But irregularities in Marcoleta’s statement of contributions and expenditures, SALN, or tax filings do not by themselves prove that the donors conspired with him to amass ill-gotten wealth. Their liability requires evidence of knowing participation in plunder, not merely that they supplied funds or knew the candidate.
The Arroyo ruling does not immunize political associates. It recognizes that conspiracy may involve a wheel or chain of actors, and participants need not carry out every transaction. But the state must show a conscious common design and evidence linking each accused to it. Association, proximity, or a transfer cannot do that work alone. A theory of conspiracy is not proof of conspiracy.
That is the question the bail hearing makes concrete. Under Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, a person charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua may be denied bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The hearing is not a final judgment beyond reasonable doubt. The two standards serve different procedural purposes. It tests whether the evidence before the court justifies continued detention. The prosecution bears the burden. Donors need not prove innocence. A grant of bail would permit release pending trial, not erase charges or declare anyone innocent. The court must separately assess each donor’s evidence. If the evidence against them is not strong, bail is a constitutional consequence, not a favor.
Reported evidence includes deeds describing the payments as support for Marcoleta’s candidacy and the later payment of donors’ taxes. These documents do not settle the case, but they offer an explanation the prosecution must confront. It must show what predicate criminal acts transformed campaign donations into ill-gotten wealth and what each donor did to further the alleged design.
Marcoleta’s reported statements may matter more to his own case. He allegedly solicited the contributions, assured donors legal requirements would be met, and later said his representatives had processed tax returns and that he would shoulder penalties. If accurate, these statements may show his control over the money and its documentation. They do not, without more, show the donors shared an unlawful plan. Evidence against one accused cannot be transferred wholesale to another.
This does not excuse failures to disclose campaign funds or comply with tax and election rules. Such conduct may carry separate consequences. The point is that plunder has defined elements, and prosecutors must prove them against each person charged. If evidence supports other violations, those should be pursued under the laws that cover them. A broad charge cannot shortcut the proof a narrower one requires.
Ombudsman Jesus Crispin Remulla has criticized the Arroyo doctrine and called for its review. His office also adopted, through Administrative Order 1, Series of 2026, the standard of prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction for preliminary investigations. That standard is not proof at trial and does not bind the Sandiganbayan’s judgment. But it creates an expectation: A case filed under it should have evidence capable of proving each element and identifying each accused’s role.
If the evidence before the court cannot meet the constitutional test for detention, the Ombudsman must explain why it charged the donors with plunder. If the state cannot prove their knowing participation beyond reasonable doubt after trial, acquittal is required. Neither outcome weakens the fight against corruption. Both affirm that the fight must proceed through law, not by converting suspicion into proof.
The prosecution may yet establish a coherent scheme. The court should hear the complete case and decide without regard to political loyalties or public pressure. But the state cannot demand respect for the rule of law only when it charges powerful figures. It must respect the same burden when the accused are people who gave them money.
A defeat for the Ombudsman is not inevitable, and Justice Econg’s remarks do not predict one. Every accused deserves judgment based on individual evidence, not association. But if prosecutors mistook a large sum and troubling paperwork for proof of a shared plunder design, the failure will be theirs. Accountability depends on credible cases, not maximal charges. The court should grant bail if evidence of guilt is not strong, and acquit the donors if the trial record leaves reasonable doubt. That is not leniency. It is what makes prosecution legitimate.
The author is a professor at the University of the Philippines Los Baños and vice chairman of the board of PTV Network Inc.
