THE House of Representatives has approved on third reading a measure that seeks to finally operationalize one of the most neglected provisions of the 1987 Constitution: the prohibition against political dynasties.
For nearly four decades, Article II, Section 26 has declared that the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. Yet Congress has repeatedly failed to enact an enabling law. The constitutional provision has remained more aspiration than reality.
The House proposal attempts to change that.
Contrary to some public impressions, the bill does not prohibit all political dynasties. Instead, it adopts a narrower approach. Relatives within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, which include spouses, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, grandchildren and corresponding in-laws, would be prohibited from simultaneously running for or holding elective positions within the same province, city, municipality or territorial jurisdiction.
In practical terms, it seeks to prevent situations where a mayor, vice mayor and councilors all belong to the same family, or where a governor, vice governor and members of the provincial board simultaneously come from the same clan. The underlying principle is straightforward: Public offices exercising authority over the same political community should not be concentrated within a single family.
Predictably, the measure has attracted criticism.
Some observers argue that it does not go far enough. Political clans could still place relatives in neighboring municipalities, separate congressional districts or different provinces. Family members could continue to dominate regional politics while technically complying with the law. Critics therefore contend that the proposal addresses only the symptoms of dynastic politics rather than its root causes.
These criticisms are not without merit.
The bill will not eliminate political dynasties overnight. It will not dismantle every entrenched political machine. It does not prevent relatives from succeeding one another in office, nor does it stop families from exercising influence across multiple jurisdictions.
If the objective is the complete eradication of dynastic politics, then the proposal is clearly imperfect.
But that is precisely why the debate requires greater nuance.
The question should not be whether the bill is perfect. The question should be whether it represents meaningful progress.
Many of its critics appear to be evaluating it through what policy scholars call a rational-comprehensive framework. Under this approach, policies are measured against an ideal solution that addresses every aspect of a problem. Applied to political dynasties, this would mean a law that closes every loophole, prevents every form of familial succession and eliminates every avenue through which political clans can retain power.
In theory, that sounds attractive. In practice, it is unlikely to happen.
Public policy does not emerge from academic seminars where ideal solutions can be freely designed. It emerges from political institutions populated by individuals with interests, constituencies and incentives. Any anti-dynasty measure must pass through Congress, an institution that includes many members of political families.
Expecting legislators to enact the most sweeping restrictions imaginable on their own political interests may satisfy theoretical rigor, but it ignores political reality.
This is where the principle of incrementalism becomes relevant.
Associated with political scientist Charles Lindblom, incrementalism recognizes that policymaking is often the art of the possible rather than the pursuit of perfection. It asks not what the ideal solution would be, but what reforms can realistically be enacted that move society in the desired direction.
Viewed through this lens, the House proposal deserves more credit than it is receiving.
First, it addresses one of the most problematic manifestations of dynastic politics: the concentration of power within the same political community. When a mayor, vice mayor and several councilors all belong to the same family, the issue is not merely kinship. The issue is institutional power. These officials exercise authority over the same bureaucracy, budget, personnel and constituency. Positions that are supposed to provide checks and balances become less independent when occupied by individuals whose loyalties extend beyond public office into family relationships.
Second, it creates opportunities for greater political competition. One of the enduring problems with dynastic politics is that it discourages the emergence of alternative leaders. Political newcomers often find themselves competing not merely against individual candidates but against entire family networks that have accumulated resources, patronage relationships and name recall over generations.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the bill establishes a legal principle that has remained dormant for nearly 40 years. For decades, the constitutional prohibition against political dynasties has existed without meaningful legislative implementation. The passage of an anti-dynasty law, even an imperfect one, would finally transform a constitutional aspiration into an enforceable public policy.
That matters because reforms often evolve incrementally. Initial laws establish principles and precedents. Future reforms build upon them. Once the principle is established, that familial concentration of political power can be regulated in the interest of democratic competition, future legislatures may choose to expand the scope of such regulation.
Ironically, some critics are judging the proposal not against the status quo but against a hypothetical ideal law that may never emerge from the legislative process. The choice before us is not between this bill and a perfect anti-dynasty law. The more realistic choice may be between this bill and another 40 years of constitutional inaction.
This is not an argument for complacency. Much remains to be done. Loopholes may eventually need to be addressed. Additional safeguards may be necessary. But rejecting a meaningful reform because it does not achieve perfection risks allowing the perfect to become the enemy of the good.
Democratic reform is often built one imperfect step at a time.
The House proposal may not dismantle every political dynasty in the country, but it narrows the space within which dynastic power can operate, expands political competition and finally gives life to a constitutional mandate that has remained dormant for decades.
Most importantly, it moves the country forward. And sometimes, moving forward is exactly what reform looks like.
Antonio P. Contreras, PhD, is a professor at the School of Environmental Science and Management, University of the Philippines Los Baños. He is vice chairman of the board of People’s Television Network Inc. (PTVNI), representing the academic sector.