
THE aggressive stance taken by the Philippines against China in the South China Sea dispute has backfired. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration, the country shifted to a more confrontational policy. This included frequent public protests, highly publicized maritime incidents, and joint patrols and stronger military ties with the United States. The goal was to assert Philippine claims and deter Chinese actions in the “West Philippine Sea.” This approach, however, has produced the opposite result.
The clearest evidence of this failure is the current oil crisis. Energy needs have become pressing due to the war in the Middle East. Also, exploration in disputed areas such as the Reed Bank remains stalled. As a result, the Philippine government has found it necessary to soften its aggressive posture. Officials, including the president, have begun to woo China for cooperation on oil purchases and development. This reversal shows that the hardline policy could not be sustained when real economic pressures appeared. The confrontational strategy has left the country with fewer practical options.
This outcome also reveals the weakness of heavy reliance on the US. The Philippines turned away from China to align more closely with American interests. When the oil crisis hit, however, the US did not offer sufficient practical support to offset the costs of confrontation, and the country was forced to seek engagement with Beijing. This sequence demonstrates that subordinating Philippine energy security to American strategic dictates was unwise. It left the nation more vulnerable rather than stronger.
From the start, Philippine leaders should have followed a different path. They should have maintained an independent foreign policy based on realpolitik, which means being a friend to all and an enemy to none. Such a pragmatic approach would have avoided unnecessary antagonism toward China. It would have kept open channels for economic cooperation and energy development that will serve Philippine interests. At the same time, it would have protected core concerns such as fishing rights and sovereignty claims. The current need to pivot back to China proves that deviation from this principle has weakened the Philippines’ position.
The South China Sea dispute does not cover the whole Philippines-China relations. It is not the only issue that matters between the two countries. By allowing this single territorial matter to dominate bilateral ties, the Philippines has damaged broader opportunities. Trade, investment, tourism, infrastructure projects, and other areas of mutual benefit have suffered. Reducing the entire relationship to one particular dispute was a strategic error.
Philippine policy should also reject a zero-sum approach to relations with China. It is a mistake to treat every form of cooperation with China as a loss or disloyalty to alliances with Washington. A wiser course recognizes that the Philippines can defend its legitimate interests in the disputed waters while still pursuing constructive engagement in other fields. This non-zero-sum thinking allows the country to maximize its own advantages without turning every interaction into a contest that must produce a clear winner and loser.
Experience has now shown that diplomacy remains the only realistic way to manage the dispute with China. Disputes should be handled through quiet diplomatic channels rather than through public statements that inflame tensions. Marcos should have exercised firmer control over officials such as Defense Secretary Gibo Teodoro and Philippine Coast Guard spokesman Rear Adm. Jay Tarriela, whose public remarks and actions often escalated the situation and made calm negotiation more difficult. Quiet diplomacy would have preserved Philippine dignity and created space for practical solutions instead of turning the issue into a daily media event.
In summary, the aggressive stance has not advanced Philippine interests. It has instead created a situation in which the country must now retreat from its earlier position because of energy realities. A return to independent foreign policy guided by realpolitik offers a better foundation. This approach puts Philippine national interests first. It avoids both excessive dependence on any single power and unnecessary conflict with another. It treats the South China Sea dispute as one important issue among many rather than the defining element of the entire bilateral relationship. By adopting this measured and pragmatic path, the Philippines can better protect its sovereignty, secure its energy needs, and pursue broader economic benefits with China and other partners.
Rafael P. Tuvera is a lawyer who taught law and political science. He analyzes geopolitics, diplomatic strategy with emphasis on productive approaches with legal and historical context. He is also a contributor to IDSI and other publications.

