ON Aug. 7, 2026, a military alliance known as the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement was established among Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. The agreement states that an armed attack against any one of them shall be regarded as an attack against them all. Its language closely resembles the collective defense clause on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), where an attack on one member creates an obligation for the others to respond with military force in order to repel the attack. The Mecca pact was presented as a means to strengthen collective deterrence and mutual security among the three Muslim-majority states.
A similar form of protective arrangement has long existed between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In 1974, the two countries reached an understanding where Saudi Arabia agreed to sell its oil exclusively in dollars in exchange for being placed under the US’ protective umbrella. This arrangement formed the foundation of the petrodollar system that dominates the oil industry today. Parallel arrangements were later extended to the Gulf states. These countries were also brought under the American protective umbrella through formal security commitments. These protective umbrellas are primarily for deterrence.
However, these protective arrangements have failed to achieve their stated objective of deterrence. On Feb. 28, 2026, Iran began firing missiles and drones at US military facilities in the host countries in the region. The attacks demonstrated that the presence of American forces and existence of security guarantees did not prevent direct strikes on the territory of the host states or on American assets stationed there.
More recent events have further exposed the limits of these security guarantees. Ansarallah (aka Houthi) forces attacked Saudi-backed units known as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) on the western coast of Yemen. The Ansarallah fighters, many of whom were barefoot or wore simple sandals, routed the PLC forces with relative ease. The success of this operation has generated fear within the Saudi ruling class, as this episode raises the real possibility that Ansarallah forces could extend operations into Saudi territory itself. Pakistan has refused to send ground forces or take military action under the Mecca agreement. Pakistani officials have stated that no military response is currently under discussion. Turkey has also not taken any military action and has limited itself to strong condemnation of the attacks. Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump has refused the request of Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, for direct American military action against Ansarallah. It appears that the combination of Iranian missile attacks and Ansarallah advances has made American decision-makers hesitant. Washington has chosen restraint rather than escalation even while the formal security relationships remain in place.
History has shown that the US has repeatedly failed to deliver the full guarantees it promised to its client-states. In the Vietnam War, the US committed some 500,000 troops and vast resources. It ultimately withdrew in April 1975, leaving its ally South Vietnam to collapse. In Afghanistan, the US spent 20 years training, equipping and advising local forces. When US forces withdrew in August 2021, the American-supported government fell within days.
The Philippine experience during World War II shows another clear illustration. The country stood under the American protective umbrella, with major bases such as the Subic Naval Base and the Clark, Sangley and Nichols air bases present on Philippine soil. Despite the presence of these bases, Japan invaded and occupied the country for three years. At the critical moment, the US proved unable to prevent the Japanese invasion.
The pattern is consistent. Formal guarantees and the physical presence of the protecting power do not automatically produce effective deterrence or reliable defense when a determined adversary is prepared to accept costs and when the protector faces competing priorities or domestic constraints. This pattern should not be lost on Philippine government officials. The country should not presume that the US will automatically come to its rescue if the dispute with China turns into a shooting war. Such a scenario could arise from the current policy of assertive transparency that publicizes Chinese actions in the disputed waters and seeks to internationalize the issue.
The said policy itself has not produced the results its advocates claim. It has not driven China out of the disputed waters. Chinese presence and control at key locations remain intact. Within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the policy has not gained any support, and the bloc’s members have declined to back Manila with strong collective language. Meanwhile, other member-states have continued and even increased their economic engagement with China.
The cumulative evidence from the Mecca agreement, Gulf security arrangements, the recent Iranian and Ansarallah operations, and historical record of American guarantees points to a single practical conclusion. Diplomacy and sustained engagement offer the only viable path for managing the dispute between the Philippines and China. Philippine government officials should be wise enough to recognize the limits of the protective umbrellas and to adjust policy accordingly.
Rafael P. Tuvera is a lawyer who taught law and political science. He analyzes geopolitics and diplomatic strategy with an emphasis on productive approaches with legal and historical context.
