Sixth of twelve parts
IN my guest columns published on July 9, Aug. 20 and Oct. 1, 2026, I presented part 1 of the Philippine Century Blueprint, envisioning the Philippines as the largest economy in Southeast Asia by 2034; parts 2 and 3, “Building a human-capacity economy through AI-driven world-class education”; and parts 4 and 5, “Beyond flood control: A systemic, self-financing tunnel strategy.” Copies are at https://tinyurl.com/3tkf95v3. Presented now is part 6, which is about what we all hate — traffic. Is there a solution that can rid us of road traffic forever?
Most anti-traffic solutions have been supply-side focused. The assumption is that more roads and mass transit will solve congestion. That is only partly correct.
There is the economic concept of induced demand. When a new road is built and travel becomes faster, more motorists use it. The added capacity is gradually absorbed, and congestion returns. We are back to square one.
Mass transit does not automatically solve the problem either. People accustomed to private cars are often reluctant to return to public transport. The “last kilometer” is another obstacle; even an efficient mass-transit system may not be convenient enough if reaching the final destination remains difficult.
If supply-side solutions alone cannot fully solve traffic, perhaps the answer lies in the demand side.
A demand-side strategy seeks to change motorists’ behavior by giving them a reason to travel less during peak periods. The premise is simple: If enough private vehicles are removed from the road during rush hour, traffic can move freely. The proposed system is based on the premise that deterring roughly 20 percent of peak-hour private-vehicle trips could restore much faster traffic flow.
So how do we motivate 20 percent of private motorists not to travel during rush hour?
A widely used demand-side tool is congestion pricing: charging vehicles to enter congested areas to discourage discretionary trips. London, Stockholm and Singapore have implemented such systems. New York City’s Lower Manhattan program illustrates the political controversy surrounding congestion pricing.
Could congestion pricing work in Metro Manila and other Philippine cities? The central issue is inequality, or the absence of equality. In wealthier cities, many motorists can absorb the charge. In the Philippines, however, critics could reasonably argue that congestion pricing would allow affluent motorists to pay for the privilege of driving while lower-income motorists bear the burden. A conventional congestion-pricing model may therefore face serious public resistance.
Proposed instead is a hybrid of congestion pricing: incentives and disincentives designed to make travel demand management more socially acceptable. While the app technology is proprietary, elements of the concept may be shared by its inventor, the undersigned.
The principle is straightforward: ”Drive less and receive cash, coupons and discounts.” Motorists who defer their unnecessary travel get incentives. The system affords value to those willing to drive less.
The disincentive operates on the other side: Traveling excessively on designated roads during restricted periods would constitute a traffic violation, subject to applicable penalties. Incentives without disincentives may be too weak to change behavior; disincentives without incentives may be socially unacceptable.
The app would be free and optional. However, motorists wishing to use designated roads such as EDSA, C-5, Quezon Avenue and other major arteries during restricted periods would have to comply with the protocol of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) or the relevant local government. The system could also generate revenue for the MMDA and/or local government units while their traffic gets fixed.
As with any novel policy, initial opposition is expected. The test is whether motorists see measurable improvements: faster traffic and better public transport. If the system demonstrably works, public acceptance likely follows.
So, is traffic gone forever? Perhaps the more practical question is: Why not experimentally test the scheme, measure the results and let the data determine whether it works?
To be continued
Lawyer Leandro B. Verceles Jr., BSBA, LLB, MPA, is the architect of the Philippine Century Blueprint. He is the principal author of the landmark E-Commerce Act (Republic Act 8792), which established the legal framework for electronic commerce and digital transactions, and helped usher in the Philippine digital economy. He was a three-term congressman and two-term governor of Catanduanes. He writes on public policy, AI, governance innovation and long-term economic strategy.
leandrovercelesjr@gmail.com
