In today’s increasingly tense geopolitical climate, the way powerful nations manage rising challengers is a question of both history and urgent relevance.
Dong Jung Kim’s Compound Containment: A Reigning Power’s Military-Economic Responses to a Challenging Power offers a timely and thoughtful framework for understanding this dynamic. Kim’s central argument is straightforward yet profound: when a dominant state such as the United States or Britain decides to confront a rising power, it may go beyond military deterrence to restrict economic ties – but only when the costs of doing so hurt the challenger more than itself.
My own interest in the book comes from a professional background where understanding the link between economics and security is not just theoretical but practical. I see direct parallels between the historical cases Kim examines and the strategic dilemmas we face in Southeast Asia. Balancing economic ties with security interests is a constant consideration, whether in defence planning or foreign policy.
Kim introduces “compound containment” as a strategy that combines military deterrence with economic restrictions to weaken a challenger’s ability to sustain its rise. Unlike traditional economic sanctions aimed at quick behavioural change, compound containment is a long-term effort to erode the rival’s material base. He draws on realism, economic statecraft, and grand strategy to build his theory, referencing scholars such as Albert Hirschman, Michael Mastanduno, and David Baldwin.
The book’s strength lies in its use of historical case studies. In the lead-up to World War I, Britain viewed Germany’s military build-up as a threat but chose not to cut trade ties. Britain needed German goods and had few alternatives, while Germany could find other partners. Cutting trade would have hurt Britain more, so military deterrence alone was used. In this case, compound containment was too costly to attempt.
The US response to Japan between 1939 and 1941 provides a contrast. Japan was heavily dependent on American oil, scrap metal, and machinery, while the US could easily find other buyers and was not reliant on Japanese imports. By cutting off these economic lifelines and increasing its military presence in the Pacific, the US severely weakened Japan’s war-making capacity. Here, economic and military measures reinforced each other, showing how compound containment can be effective when the reigning power holds a structural advantage.
Similarly, the US combined military alliances such as NATO with export controls and the Marshall Plan, deliberately excluding the Soviet Union during the early Cold War. The US could afford to do so because it dominated global capital markets and technology exports, while the Soviet economy remained closed and underdeveloped. The asymmetry in economic options made compound containment viable.
However, Kim also shows that even when structural conditions are favourable, domestic politics can undermine the strategy. During the Carter and Reagan years, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan initially triggered grain embargoes and technology restrictions under Carter. But Reagan shifted focus back to military measures, easing economic restrictions under pressure from agricultural and energy lobbies. This illustrates that compound containment is not purely a structural calculation – internal political pressures matter.
The book also examines the US–China relationship from 2009 to 2016. Military tensions rose, particularly over the South China Sea, yet broad economic restrictions were not imposed. The deep integration of the two economies meant that any attempt at decoupling would have hurt both sides significantly. This is perhaps the most relevant lesson for today: military rivalry does not automatically lead to economic confrontation when interdependence runs deep.
Across these cases, the deciding factor remains whether the reigning power can endure the economic costs of cutting ties better than the challenger. When it can, compound containment is an option; when it cannot, military deterrence alone is more likely.
One deeper insight from Kim’s work is that economic interdependence is not simply a constraint – it can also be a deliberate choice to avoid escalation. The US–China case shows that when two powers are deeply tangled in trade and investment, the costs of economic confrontation act as a stabilising force, even if military tensions remain high. For smaller states like Malaysia, this interdependence can provide both opportunities and vulnerabilities.
Another noteworthy point is that compound containment is not inherently aggressive or defensive, but a tool. Its effectiveness depends on timing, economic structure, and political will. Britain’s reluctance to sever trade with Germany before WWI was not weakness but a rational assessment of self-interest. Likewise, the US approach to China in the Obama years reflected a recognition that abrupt decoupling would cause self-inflicted harm.
For Malaysia, the lesson is clear: economic resilience and diversification are not just economic policies but security imperatives. The ability to sustain trade and investment flows under pressure – whether from sanctions, supply chain disruptions, or shifting alliances – will shape our ability to maintain strategic autonomy.
In conclusion, Compound Containment offers a clear, well-argued, and historically grounded theory of how and when great powers combine economic and military strategies against rising challengers. The case studies demonstrate that the key question is not whether a reigning power wants to contain a rival, but whether it can afford to do so without harming itself more.
The book is a timely contribution to understanding power struggles in a globalised world. With the US–China rivalry heating up, Kim’s framework explains why the US has not been able to fully decouple from China, despite growing military tension. His view is realistic: in a globalised economy, cutting economic ties is harder than it seems.
For Malaysians, especially those involved in policy, defence, or international business, the book is both an academic contribution and a guide to recognising the strategic trade-offs that will shape the coming decades.
Understanding the logic of compound containment can help us anticipate how global tensions might influence regional stability and economic prosperity. We may not be able to control the choices of great powers, but by understanding the principles behind their actions, we can better position ourselves to adapt and thrive.
Aimi Mohd Yusoff, is an Administrative and Diplomatic Officer in the Research Division, Prime Minister's Department of Malaysia and is currently attending the Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College (MAFDC), PUSPAHANAS, in Putrajaya.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of Twentytwo13.