KUALA LUMPUR — Vietnamese President and Communist Party General Secretary To Lam’s state visits to Australia and New Zealand this month are significant not only for the agreements expected to be concluded, but also for what they say about Vietnam’s increasingly confident place in the Indo-Pacific. At a time when geopolitical competition is intensifying, global trade is being reshaped and many countries are concerned about strategic uncertainty, Hanoi is responding with greater engagement.
By strengthening ties with two influential middle powers, Vietnam is expanding its economic, technological, educational and diplomatic horizons. Its relationship with Australia, elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2024, is already substantial, with bilateral trade reaching around AU$30 billion in 2025. Cooperation in critical minerals, energy, digital transformation, education, agriculture and health care can further complement Vietnam’s impressive economic development.
The visit also demonstrates that Vietnam increasingly sees foreign policy as an instrument for national development. For a rapidly growing economy seeking to move further up the global value chain, access to technology, expertise, investment and markets is every bit as important as traditional political and security ties.
The New Zealand leg is similarly valuable. The two countries have also upgraded their ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, creating a broader framework for cooperation in agriculture, food production, education, tourism, technology and investment. These areas may sound less dramatic than defense or geopolitics, but they are precisely the foundations upon which sustainable national strength is built. Vietnam’s engagement with New Zealand also illustrates the flexibility of Hanoi’s diplomacy. Vietnam maintains close relations with China, the United States, Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and others. It reflects a sensible recognition that a country is stronger when it has many friends, many economic connections and many diplomatic options. Strategic autonomy, after all, is not about standing alone; it is about having sufficient relationships and capabilities to make one’s own choices. For a middle power such as Vietnam, this diversification is particularly valuable.
This offers an encouraging lesson for Southeast Asia. The region’s strength has historically rested on precisely this ability to engage different powers without becoming wholly dependent upon any one of them. Vietnam’s current outreach is, therefore, consistent with a broader Asean tradition of pragmatic diplomacy. It also provides an economic opportunity. The restructuring of global supply chains offers Southeast Asia the chance to attract investment, develop new industries and move further up the technological value chain. But the objective should go beyond simply attracting factories. The more lasting prize is investment that creates skilled employment, transfers technology, develops local suppliers, strengthens research and development, and connects domestic companies to international markets.
There is also a particularly positive human-capital dimension to these relationships. Australia and New Zealand possess considerable strengths in education, research, technology, agriculture, healthcare, and professional training, while Vietnam has a large and increasingly ambitious young workforce. Deeper educational and technological cooperation can therefore help Vietnam prepare for the next phase of development, when competitiveness will depend increasingly on skills, innovation, productivity and entrepreneurship rather than low labor costs alone.
This is an important lesson for other Asean economies. Southeast Asia’s demographic and economic advantages will be meaningful only if the region can equip its people with the skills required by the industries of the future. Universities, technical institutions, businesses and governments should therefore be connected through wider regional and international networks. Cooperation in digital transformation is particularly promising. As artificial intelligence, automation and advanced manufacturing reshape the global economy, countries that can combine a young workforce with strong digital capabilities will possess an important competitive advantage. Vietnam’s engagement with Australia and New Zealand can contribute to this transformation while creating opportunities for the latter two countries to deepen their economic presence in one of the world’s fastest-growing regions.
The geopolitical implications are equally constructive. Vietnam has a direct interest in freedom of navigation and a rules-based maritime order because of its South China Sea interests, while Australia and New Zealand share broader concerns about regional stability, open sea lanes and a peaceful Indo-Pacific. Southeast Asia does not have to choose between confrontation and passivity. It can promote cooperation wherever interests converge while preserving its diplomatic flexibility. Stronger security relationships can be complemented by wider trade, investment, technology, education and diplomatic networks. The more diversified these relationships become, the greater the region’s collective resilience. Vietnam’s approach demonstrates that security cooperation need not crowd out economic cooperation. A country can simultaneously seek a stable maritime environment, welcome foreign investment, develop trade links, strengthen educational exchanges and maintain constructive relations with countries that may have competing interests with one another.
Ultimately, To Lam’s visits offer an optimistic message about Southeast Asia’s future. The region does not have to be merely an arena in which larger powers compete for influence. Its countries can increasingly become partners whom others actively seek to engage. Vietnam’s strategy illustrates how a middle power can build influence not by choosing one camp, but by becoming useful to many partners while developing its own capabilities. This is perhaps the most important lesson for Asean as it navigates a more complex international environment.
Strategic autonomy is not achieved by loudly declaring neutrality, nor by keeping every major power at arm’s length. It is built patiently through diversified economic relationships, strong domestic institutions, capable people, technological advancement and a broad network of trusted partnerships.
Vietnam’s outreach to Australia and New Zealand is therefore more than a diplomatic success for Hanoi. It is a useful reminder that Southeast Asia has the capacity to shape, rather than merely react to, the changing regional order. If Asean countries continue to expand their partnerships, strengthen their own capabilities and maintain their tradition of pragmatic engagement, Southeast Asia can become an increasingly influential center of cooperation, growth and opportunity.