KUALA LUMPUR — There is something almost ritualistic about Southeast Asia’s annual haze season. Skies turn gray, schools consider closing, people reach for face masks, and governments exchange diplomatic reminders. Then the rains arrive, the skies clear, and the region returns to business as usual. Until, of course, the next haze season.
The recurring problem is more than an environmental inconvenience. It tests the region’s ability to address nontraditional security challenges: threats that may not involve armies crossing borders but can disrupt economies, endanger public health and undermine regional stability. The Covid-19 pandemic offered a similar lesson. A crisis originating in one place can rapidly become everybody’s problem. Viruses do not require visas, just as smoke does not respect immigration checkpoints.
To be fair, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) is not starting from scratch. The Asean Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, signed in 2002, established a regional framework for preventing and controlling haze. The Asean Specialized Meteorological Center also monitors hotspots, weather patterns and smoke movement. The question, therefore, is not whether the Asean has institutions, but whether existing arrangements can deliver results on the ground. An agreement can establish principles, but it cannot extinguish a fire by itself.
Prevention must come before crisis management. By the time smoke reaches Malaysia, Singapore or other neighboring countries, damage to public health has already begun. The Asean should strengthen early warning systems by ensuring that satellite imagery, hotspot data and weather forecasts reach relevant national agencies promptly. Governments should also establish clear procedures for deploying firefighting aircraft, technical personnel and other emergency assistance when fires threaten to spread. The objective is straightforward: detect fires earlier and intervene before they become regional emergencies.
Prevention, however, cannot succeed without confronting the economic incentives behind destructive land-clearing practices. Forest and peatland fires may be exacerbated by dry weather and El Niño, but these factors do not explain every human contribution. Illegal burning, inadequate enforcement and unsustainable land management also matter. Governments must investigate suspected violations and hold responsible parties accountable.
This requires particular attention to businesses operating across national boundaries. Companies should not be allowed to enjoy the profits of environmentally destructive practices while neighboring societies bear the health and economic costs. The Asean could help authorities exchange evidence, identify corporate ownership structures and pursue investigations involving businesses with operations in several member-states. Governments must also scrutinize their own domestic industries rather than treating haze exclusively as somebody else’s problem.
Institutional capacity is equally important. The 2025 agreement establishing the Asean Coordinating Center for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control offers an opportunity to make regional arrangements more operational. Member-states should ensure that the center has predictable funding, technical expertise and clearly defined procedures. Its value will ultimately depend on whether it can connect environmental authorities, meteorological services and firefighting teams quickly when circumstances demand action.
Accountability must extend beyond diplomatic statements. The Asean could introduce common reporting standards covering hotspots, burned areas, enforcement measures and progress in preventing fires. Publicly accessible data and regular independent assessments would make it easier to distinguish genuine improvements from political assurances. Time-bound targets and periodic reviews could also help governments identify shortcomings and correct them before another haze season arrives.
Such measures need not require the Asean to abandon its longstanding respect for national sovereignty. Indonesia, where major fires have repeatedly contributed to transboundary haze, has legitimate concerns about economic development and the management of its territory. Other member states have their own domestic priorities and commercial interests. The challenge is to recognize that preventing haze serves Indonesia’s interests as well as those of its neighbors. Healthier forests, fewer fires and more sustainable agricultural practices benefit the region as a whole.
Nor should the discussion end with firefighting and enforcement. The ultimate purpose of haze prevention is to protect people. Governments should provide timely public-health warnings, particularly for children, older people and those with respiratory vulnerabilities. Schools, hospitals and employers need reliable information to make decisions during severe pollution episodes. Meanwhile, communities in fire-prone areas need practical alternatives to destructive land-clearing methods. Peatland restoration, improved water management and support for small farmers may attract less attention than emergency operations, but they address some of the underlying causes of recurring fires.
The Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated the cost of treating interconnected risks as somebody else’s problem. The haze offers a similar lesson, one that Southeast Asia has had considerably longer to learn. Yet the two crises also reveal an important distinction: While governments cannot always prevent a disease from emerging, many land and forest fires can be prevented through effective management, enforcement and timely intervention.
The Asean does not need another grand declaration to demonstrate its commitment. It needs to make existing commitments measurable, adequately funded and consistently implemented. Its success should be judged not by the number of meetings held during a crisis, but by fewer fires, less smoke and fewer people exposed to dangerous air.
The winds will eventually change, and the skies will clear. The more important question is whether the Asean will have changed its approach by then. If every haze season ends with another promise and no measurable improvement, the region will have mastered the art of diplomacy without necessarily mastering the problem itself.