KOTA KINABALU — The relationship between the United States and Cuba, two neighbors separated by the Florida Straits but divided for more than six decades by ideology, appears to be entering an intriguing new phase. Cuba seems increasingly willing to accommodate economic realities long resisted by its socialist system, including a greater role for private businesses, private imports and exports, and investment from Cubans living abroad.
Is Havana finally bowing to Washington? Not quite. A better description is that economic necessity is forcing Cuba to become more pragmatic. Years of economic weakness, compounded by US sanctions and restrictions, have left Cuba struggling with fuel shortages, electricity disruptions, transportation problems and shortages of basic necessities. For ordinary Cubans, ideology may still matter, but whether the lights come on, public transport runs and food and medicine are available are rather more immediate concerns.
Havana has consequently accelerated reforms aimed at giving private enterprise more room to operate and attracting investment from overseas Cubans. Some of these measures correspond with what Washington has long demanded: less state control, greater entrepreneurship and more market mechanisms. Yet it would be simplistic to regard them merely as concessions to America. Cuba has itself recognized the need for reform; mounting economic hardship has simply made delay increasingly difficult.
This is where the real significance lies. Ideology can sustain a political system, but economics sets the limits of what that system can practically achieve. The American embargo and sanctions have undoubtedly contributed to Cuba’s difficulties, and it would be unfair to attribute all its problems to domestic policies. But external pressure does not remove the need for an economy to attract investment, encourage enterprise and adapt to changing circumstances.
Washington, meanwhile, appears to be pursuing a dual-track strategy: maintaining pressure on the Cuban state while creating selective openings for the private sector. The objective is therefore potentially broader than simply inflicting economic pain. By encouraging private economic activity, Washington may hope to alter the incentives within Cuban society itself. For the first time in its political history, America has a secretary of state, Marco Rubio, who is of Cuban descent and speaks more than fluent Spanish, but it would appear that America’s latest Cuban policy has the imprint of no less than President Donald Trump all over it, not least in the emphasis on private-sector involvement.
That approach carries its own risks. Economic pressure can encourage reform, but it can also strengthen nationalism and allow Havana to portray itself as defending Cuban sovereignty against foreign coercion. Nor does economic liberalization automatically produce political transformation. A government can permit more private enterprise while retaining tight political control.
The evolving US-Cuba relationship should therefore not yet be described as reconciliation. Havana wants economic breathing space; Washington wants deeper behavioral and structural changes. There may be greater room for engagement, but the fundamental political differences remain.
For Southeast Asia, the Cuban experience offers several useful lessons.
The first is that economic resilience is national security. Strategic autonomy cannot rest solely on diplomatic declarations. A country heavily dependent on one source of energy, capital, technology or markets can find its room for maneuver sharply reduced when geopolitical tensions escalate.
This matters greatly to Asean. Southeast Asia has prospered by maintaining extensive economic links with China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Europe and others. The sensible response to intensifying great-power rivalry is therefore not to choose one side, but to diversify sufficiently to preserve strategic options.
The second lesson is that economic flexibility strengthens sovereignty. Allowing private enterprise, encouraging investment and maintaining competitive markets need not mean abandoning national interest. On the contrary, a dynamic economy gives governments greater resources and choices when confronted with external shocks.
Third, interdependence should be managed rather than feared. No Southeast Asian country can realistically isolate itself from the global economy. The objective should instead be to avoid excessive dependence on any single partner, while maintaining alternative markets, suppliers and sources of finance.
Finally, Cuba reminds us that economic engagement does not automatically produce political convergence. Asean can deepen trade and investment with countries whose political systems differ greatly from its own without expecting commerce to turn every partner into a political ally.
Cuba, therefore, is not necessarily becoming “American.” It is learning, perhaps reluctantly, that economic realities cannot simply be wished away. The United States, for its part, is testing whether economic pressure combined with selective engagement can achieve what decades of outright hostility could not.
The broader lesson for Southeast Asia is straightforward. Countries do not have to abandon their principles when circumstances change. But they do need sufficient economic strength and policy flexibility to adapt when those circumstances do.
In international affairs, ideology may determine where a country wishes to go. Economic strength determines how much freedom it has to get there.
And when ideology collides with economic reality, reality usually has the final word.