BEIJING is allegedly considering sanctions against Filipino politicians, restrictions on oil and fertilizer supplies, measures affecting Filipino workers, and even the forcible removal of the BRP Sierra Madre from Ayungin Shoal. These reported threats of retaliation deserve a firm response: The Philippines must prepare for pressure without allowing fear to determine what rights it will defend.
The report, carried by The Manila Times and attributed to Chinese Commercial News, acknowledges that the proposals remain officially unconfirmed. An anonymously sourced menu of possible cannot automatically become a Chinese government ultimatum. Nevertheless, the prospect of coercion warrants scrutiny, particularly when some Filipinos already seem eager to prescribe submission.
Their reasoning rests on an astonishing assumption: China can punish us without suffering consequences, while the Philippines has no meaningful choices. That assumption exaggerates Chinese power and diminishes our capacity to act. Beijing possesses considerable leverage, but leverage does not confer immunity from losses, miscalculation or strategic failure.
Consider trade. Philippine Statistics Authority figures show that we imported $38.44 billion in goods from China in 2025, while exporting $9.31 billion there. Filipino buyers sustain substantial business for Chinese manufacturers. These are paying customers, whose purchases support commercial activity and revenues in China. Beijing is hardly doing us a charitable favor by allowing its companies to sell here.
China’s larger economy can absorb losses more easily, so these figures do not mean it would suffer more. But restrictions would still jeopardize Chinese sales and encourage Philippine importers to cultivate alternative suppliers. Weaponizing commercial dependence invites customers to question whether maintaining that dependence makes sense.
China also faces economic difficulties that military displays cannot erase. The International Monetary Fund’s February 2026 assessment identifies a prolonged property downturn, pressures on local government finances, weak domestic demand and deflationary pressures. It warns about the limitations of relying on exports to sustain growth. Deliberately undermining confidence in Chinese suppliers would introduce another risk into an already difficult adjustment.
The suggestion that Beijing might expose the Chinese business interests or assets of Philippine politicians should hardly frighten the public. Authentic records revealing corruption or conflicts of interest would be welcome evidence in our search for accountability. Public officials answer to Filipinos. Their private financial exposure must never determine our national position.
Strangely, disclosure could also embarrass figures already facing questions about financial dealings with Chinese entities, including Vice President Sara Duterte. In her impeachment hearings, an Anti-Money Laundering Council official testified about remittances from China and Hong Kong to a company linked to her husband. The nature of those transfers remains disputed; Duterte denies wrongdoing, and Beijing denies funding Philippine political factions. Neither Chinese remittances nor political sympathy alone establishes illicit financing.
If Beijing possesses authentic records clarifying these allegations, let it produce them for independent scrutiny. But it should bear in mind that such disclosure to threaten critics could also hurt a Philippine politician whose accommodating posture toward China makes her, in my assessment, one of China’s more congenial political figures.
Selective disclosure would also invite questions about whose transactions were concealed and why. China cannot assume that releasing financial secrets would embarrass only its adversaries. Filipinos seeking accountability could welcome evidence that Beijing had intended as leverage.
Oil and fertilizer restrictions would hurt farmers, transport workers and households. Yet hardship does not establish that surrender is sensible. It establishes the urgency of securing alternative contracts, maintaining adequate inventories and protecting vulnerable sectors before a disruption occurs.
China does not monopolize either commodity. Department of Energy records document petroleum supplies from South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore alongside China. The Department of Agriculture documented fertilizer imports from Vietnam in October 2025. These existing relationships demonstrate practical options, although replacement volumes, delivery schedules and prices would require careful negotiation. Alternatives must be developed through competent preparation.
The same realism applies to Filipino workers. Hong Kong’s immigration department reported that Filipinos accounted for approximately 55 percent of its more than 360,000 foreign domestic helpers at the end of 2024. These workers provide services that households need. Politically motivated restrictions could therefore inconvenience employers and disrupt care arrangements, alongside the severe consequences for workers and their families.
We must protect those workers through consular assistance, legal support and contingency planning. Their vulnerability cannot excuse foreign control over Philippine decisions. Otherwise, every overseas worker becomes potential collateral in the next dispute, exposing governments defending national interests to recurring threats.
The proposed removal of the Sierra Madre carries far graver risks. A forcible operation against an occupied Philippine naval vessel could cause casualties and trigger an escalating confrontation. The US-Philippine bilateral defense guidelines expressly cover armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels and aircraft, including the coast guard, anywhere in the South China Sea. Treaty responses follow constitutional processes, but Beijing cannot dismiss the potential consequences.
Overpowering one vessel would not guarantee control over subsequent events. A confrontation could produce stronger defense cooperation, additional deployments and wider international opposition. China could face a more coordinated regional response, even after achieving its immediate objective. Tactical success can carry a substantial strategic price.
China also depends on maritime stability. The United States Energy Information Administration reported that 92 percent of Chinese crude oil imports arrived by sea in 2024. A wider confrontation that disrupts shipping or increased freight and insurance costs could damage China’s own interests.
We should therefore engage China with clear expectations and adequate preparation. Verify actual policies, coordinate with partners and preserve diplomatic channels. Continue defending our lawful maritime interests. The 2016 arbitral award found that Ayungin Shoal forms part of the Philippine exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. Neither economic leverage nor military superiority can rewrite that finding.
Our leaders must explain the stakes honestly and distribute the burdens fairly. Concessions extracted through intimidation invite further demands because they demonstrate that intimidation works. National policy cannot depend on whether Beijing approves of our officials defending Filipino interests.
The Philippines cannot allow threats to force us to surrender our sovereignty to a foreign country, no matter how powerful it may be.
The author is a professor at the University of the Philippines Los Baños and vice chairman of the board of People’s Television Network Inc.
