Historically, China occupied a contentious position in Southeast Asia, viewed through two critical lenses.
First, its ethnocentric assumption that all overseas Chinese remained fundamentally loyal to the “Motherland”, regardless of their actual citizenship, generated significant regional unease.
Second, from the late 1920s onward, particularly after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Communist China actively sought to export its ideology by sponsoring communist parties across Malaya, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma (now Myanmar).
These actions cultivated a pervasive “China Threat” mentality, exacerbated by the Cold War context in which the United States positioned itself as the region’s “saviour”, championing Western political, economic, socio-cultural, and ideological frameworks.
However, developments since the late 1970s have fundamentally transformed China’s image from an enemy state to a strategic partner – a shift rendered all the more remarkable by its concurrent rise to great power status, and that too, peacefully.
The Thucydides Trap and China in Southeast Asia
Given the enduring dominance of Western powers, particularly American hegemony in the region since 1945, much scholarly attention has focused on the so-called “Thucydides Trap”.
This concept suggests that a rising China, threatening to displace the United States, will inevitably trigger great power conflict, thereby embroiling Southeast Asia either directly or indirectly and forcing regional states to choose sides.
Drawing from his seminal work, History of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), Thucydides concluded that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”
Western scholars who advance the “China Threat” thesis argue that China’s rapid ascendance across political, economic, diplomatic, military, and technological domains will inevitably challenge American regional dominance, precipitating confrontation between the two powers and involving Southeast Asian states in a looming great power conflict.
Why the ‘China threat’ thesis fails in Southeast Asia
Several interconnected factors explain why China has succeeded in emerging as a respected great power in Southeast Asia since the late 1970s, particularly following the launch of its Four Modernisations. Through a combination of push and pull dynamics, Beijing has become the region’s partner of choice.
First, China’s steadfast commitment to economic integration has proven decisive. Through bilateral and multilateral engagement, Beijing has cultivated a partnership model distinct from the hegemonic posture often attributed to the United States, especially given Washington’s “America First” orientation from the 1940s through the 1970s, which treated the region as part of an informal empire acquired through military victory over Japan.
Unlike such hegemonic framing, China has consistently positioned itself as a value-adding and generous partner. Since 2019, China has been Asean’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade approaching US$800 billion by 2025. This economic interdependence has been institutionalised through mechanisms such as the Asean-China Free Trade Area, which has evolved through multiple phases of deepening cooperation.
Second, China’s emphasis on infrastructure connectivity through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a particularly effective approach. While Western critics have dismissed the BRI as a “debt trap”, Beijing’s investments have played a pivotal role in developing land, air, and maritime infrastructure across Southeast Asia, catalysing economic growth and broader development.
Preoccupied with domestic political, social, and economic challenges, Western nations have largely failed to deliver comparable infrastructure support in recent decades, offering high-volume criticism but limited concrete assistance. Notable projects include the China-Laos Railway, the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway, Cambodia’s integrated railway-road project to Sihanoukville Port, and Malaysia’s East Coast Rail Link.
Third, China has demonstrated consistent support for Asean’s institutional diplomacy, including the organisation’s foundational principle of “centrality” in managing external power relations.
While the United States, particularly under the Trump administration, attempted to circumvent or marginalise Asean’s role as the hub of Asia-Pacific regional architecture, China has anchored its regional diplomacy through policies that reinforce Asean’s institutional significance.
This approach has earned Beijing the confidence of Southeast Asian states as a constructive and positive player, despite its emergence as the region’s dominant power over the past decade.
Fourth, despite persistent tensions, most notably in the South China Sea, China has generally refrained from employing military force to resolve disputes.
This restraint contrasts with what is often described as American “gunboat diplomacy”, a continuation of Washington’s long interventionist tradition, most recently seen in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Venezuela, Cuba, and ongoing tensions involving Iran.
China’s avoidance of such coercive measures enhances its standing as a regional partner, particularly as a counterweight to American interventionism. Its rise as a positive player may serve as a counter-force to potential regime change efforts in Southeast Asia – a region where China’s interests are significant and where it exerts considerable influence.
Finally, since the PRC’s establishment, Chinese foreign policy has operated on three diplomatic levels: state-to-state, party-to-party, and, critically, people-to-people relations.
It is through this third dimension that China’s regional presence has achieved broad acceptance among Southeast Asian populations. The growth of Chinese business investments, tourism, and educational exchanges has strengthened Beijing’s soft power, cultivating an image of a constructive and reliable partner.
This stands in contrast to perceptions of the United States as primarily profit-driven and more inclined to deploy force in pursuit of its objectives.
While Southeast Asian states have not abandoned the United States in favour of China, continuing instead to pursue strategic hedging, China’s rise as a regional great power is unmistakable.
What once seemed improbable just decades ago is now a defining feature of the regional order. China’s success lies in its ability to project itself as a friend and partner rather than a threat, reshaping perceptions and establishing a durable foundation for influence.
At the same time, American domestic instability and uneven growth, contrasted with China’s stability and continued economic and technological rise, position Beijing as a strong partner for Southeast Asia in the years ahead – challenging the “Thucydides Trap” and reframing the “China Threat” thesis as a narrative that no longer fully reflects regional realities.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not represent that of Twentytwo13.
Image: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
