UNAVOIDABLY, random thoughts on Mindanao cross my mind at this hour when the International Criminal Court (ICC) is conducting confirmation of charges hearings on the crimes against humanity case against former president Rodrigo Duterte.
It was March 11, 2025, when Duterte was arrested at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) upon arriving from Hong Kong and immediately transferred to a waiting private plane for transport to The Hague, the Netherlands, and turnover to the ICC.
In a press statement, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. admitted being quite in the know about the arrest and the entire process of placing Duterte at the disposal of the ICC.
Without necessarily connecting dots, we note that a week before, on March 3, 2025, Murad Ebrahim, chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), who had been hitherto appointed interim chief minister of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), submitted to President Marcos his letter of resignation from the Bangsamoro transition parliament. Events like this do happen, and nothing unusual need be deduced from it — except that shortly after, Ebrahim went on record as complaining that he did not resign (at his own behest, that is) but was replaced.
The letter of resignation was a formality obtained under duress.
Eventually, Ebrahim went on record complaining that he was replaced in a regime change.
Who replaced Ebrahim is an interesting subject matter. Being a personal choice of Marcos, he should enjoy the president’s confidence. But most importantly, he must control the Muslim combatants.
Why should Marcos risk incurring widespread misgivings among Muslims by replacing their decades-long leader, all for his successor being in control of the arms?
“Very insulting naman na alisin ka bilang chief minister tapos ibalik ka bilang member of parliament,” was what said on the matter.
Short of saying, adding insult to injury.
But then again, that is just how things ordinarily go. Somebody in command feels his post threatened, so he seeks to remove all things perceived as contributing to the threat.
Bear in mind that when Duterte was arrested, the Maisug Movement clearly aimed at ousting Bongbong, was on a clear spread not just nationwide but among Filipino overseas communities. Duterte was coming home from one such rally in Hong Kong when he was arrested.
How can the Ebrahim ouster from the BARMM top post bear upon the Duterte crisis?
As things stand now, 14,000 MILF warriors remain in active commission; Ebrahim had stalled their decommissioning on account of what he perceived as the government’s failure to comply with various terms of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB).
If only to ensure facility of managing the autonomous region, deprive BARMM of its full military potential. Otherwise, risk having a shooting war once again.
It just so happens that Marcos’ crisis with Duterte peaked at that precise period in March 2025, when the guy in command of Muslim Mindanao would not let go of his combatants, who, in their still awesome number of 14,000, could do Marcos a lot of harm.
Better be rid of that potential in the event of a Duterte arrest.
In other words, grant that Duterte had aces up his sleeve, one of them being a clandestine modus vivendi with the MILF.
Then be rid of the MILF potential threat before moving against Duterte.
Let’s not forget that the guy who arrested Duterte was then-general Nicolas Torre III, a longtime Philippine National Police (PNP) director of the Davao region immediately prior to his designation as Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) chief, in which capacity he arrested Duterte and had him flown pronto to The Hague.
Would things in the episode have been quite enmeshed in the Mindanao conflict had it been handled by somebody who lacked a clear picture of the region?
Would President Marcos, in fact, have dared proceed with the Duterte arrest completely without regard to the still-burning MILF fire?
If Marprimary concern is to make sure the MILF guns are not trained on him, then he should place on top of the BARMM command the guy who directly controls the MILF combatants — Abdulraof Macacua, chief of staff of the MILF armed forces.
Which, in fact, he did.
And which now accounts for a number of, according to one report, “key, often under-reported areas of intensifying tension,” detailed as follows:
“Cracks within the MILF leadership have become public, with reports in February 2026 of a ‘shake-up’ warned by the MILF leadership amidst a general assembly at Camp Darapanan. There is significant internal pressure to align with the Bangsamoro interim government, with threats of ‘heads will roll’ in the Cabinet if loyalty to the leadership’s direction is not maintained.
There is growing frustration within the MILF regarding the ‘slow, delayed, or stalled’ implementation of key provisions of the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). This includes vague discussions on transitional justice and, more recently, perceived “unilateral appointments” by the national government, which have fueled skepticism about Manila’s commitment to the peace process.
The decommissioning of 14,000 combatants and 2,575 weapons has faced repeated, indefinite postponements. This has led to the return of nearly P788 million in government funds intended for the process. Furthermore, the MILF central committee has gone so far as to ban its commanders from participating in decommissioning activities without written approval, indicating a tightening of control over their armed wing.
The Supreme Court ruling that excluded Sulu from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) has sparked a “growing legal and political divide.” Sulu has passed a resolution banning MILF activities in the province, which the MILF has termed a “dangerous distortion” of peace agreements. This legal friction threatens to undermine the cohesion of the regional government.
The parliamentary elections, originally set for 2025 and delayed, remain a major sticking point. The uncertainty around these elections has sparked a crisis of confidence in the peace process, with some, even within the MILF, questioning whether the BARMM is still truly led by the MILF.
These factors combine to create a fragile environment where, while both sides publicly reaffirm their commitment to peace, the “normalization track” is lagging, and the potential for splinter groups’ localized conflict is quietly increasing.
As the report puts it, the foregoing comprise the Mindanao factor which handlers of the Duterte crisis can exploit to good advantage in advancing Duterte’s fight at the ICC, as well as Sara Duterte’s own domestic altercation with Marcos.
How intensely could father and daughter be wishing Ebrahim had not been deposed as interim chief minister of BARMM?
As chairman of the Senate local government committee that ultimately gave birth to the BARMM, President Marcos is certainly up against clever Duterte maneuvers to do him in, using the very mechanism he crafted to reconcile Muslims with the rest of the Filipinos.
If you were in the shoes of the Dutertes, you would do as they do.
It’s just that every which way their shoes brought them, the Dutertes gaped at Marcos stepping ahead.
