WHEN interviewed by Philippine media about what transpired in his meeting with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. after he was summoned to Malacañang on July 21, 2026, China’s Ambassador to the Philippines Jing Quan described it as very constructive and “not a kind of diplomatic protest, [or] a demarche.”
What happened, Jing said, was “a useful, in-depth exchange of views,” with no “pointing fingers at each other or an exchange of very strong words against each other,” especially not on the “incident yesterday.” He was referring to the recent confrontation at Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal, in which China Coast Guard (CCG) personnel used wooden batons to hit Philippine Navy personnel stationed at BRP Sierra Madre (LT-57) who prevented the former from further intruding into LT-57’s periphery.
In that same interview, Jing boasted that Philippine Ambassador to China Jaime Adriano FlorCruz was summoned “in protest” by Beijing.
Can we perceive the crowed representations in Jing’s narrative?
While he confirms that FlorCruz was summoned in protest, he said he was called by our president not for a protest or demarche, but for a useful and constructive exchange of views!
In not so many words, Jing had the temerity to blame the Filipino sailors — one of them sustained a severe head injury while seven others suffered various injuries as a result of intentional boat ramming — for provoking the CCG personnel, thus justifying the assault.
Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. took a swipe at Jing for discussing in the interview what was agreed not to be publicly disclosed. Since the envoy has violated the supposed agreement, Teodoro reported that “the president stated in no uncertain terms to the Chinese ambassador the collective anger of the Filipino people over that unjustifiable incident.” That despite taking the diplomatic path, Marcos firmly defended the Philippines’ rights and sovereignty during that meeting.
What Jing said prompted CCG to come close to LT-57
Jing claimed that the CCG observed Philippine Navy personnel doing some kind of construction work on the ship, which he said was a “breach of our provisional agreement.” This was why two boats went to investigate. While the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) confirmed the provisional agreement, it clarified that it concerned only rotation and resupply missions. It neither establishes the need to seek China’s permission for it, nor secures a permit to conduct routine repairs on LT-57, a commissioned Philippine Navy vessel.
Jing’s invocation of such an agreement prompted the resurgence of this question: “What else is in that informal meeting of minds other than that which the DFA has confirmed?”
If there were, indeed, other provisions in that agreement as Beijing claims, then the DFA should come clean. But unless the former can show that agreement and its contents, we should trust and believe our government. Not only because the DFA says so, but also because of the proven propensity of China to lie, distort facts, and violate agreements with regularity.
Beijing’s record of infidelities and lies
In 1995, we were made to believe that a structure being built by Beijing on Panganiban (Mischief) Reef was a mere “fishermen’s shelter,” so we tolerated it. Since then, that “shelter” has been transformed into what is now a 558-hectare, massive and heavily militarized artificial island inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
When China resorted to intentionally ramming and water-cannoning Philippine vessels to physically assaulting Filipino sailors, it was a clear resort to threat and actual use of force, instead of friendly consultation and negotiation.
When Beijing conducted massive and ecologically destructive artificial-island construction in the South China Sea, including that part bound by our EEZ; when it occupied previously uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays and other features; when the CCG personnel’s recent action escalated and complicated the dispute by coming close to LT-57, aware that they will be driven away by sailors duty-bound to protect and defend a commissioned vessel.
China violated Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which it signed with the Philippines and nine other countries on Nov. 4, 2002.
Therefore, to believe China’s claim is to cast doubt on our own declaration as a government and stand as a people. By just engendering distrust to our leaders and succumbing to it, Beijing has already succeeded in creating division among us Filipinos.
Could Beijing be up for something else?
Even though more than two years have passed, the memory of the CCG’s hostility in Ayungin Shoal stays fresh.
It was on June 17, 2024, when CCG personnel attacked Philippine Navy personnel with bolos and machetes, boarded their rigid hull inflatable boat and deflated it afterward. CCG personnel carted away eight disassembled high-powered firearms and left one member of the Philippine Navy Sea, Air and Land unit with a dismembered finger.
Then there’s that daring incident of July 21, 2026, when the CCG seemed to test the waters. When Beijing could just call out the Philippine government over the ongoing construction on LT-57 that it considers a “violation of the provisional agreement,” its CCG acted in a manner that was calculated to invite resistance from the Navy personnel guarding the boat.
This, by its very nature, is a provocation, if not an escalation, by Beijing.
A display of superiority, given its obvious preponderance in number and firepower; a psychological imposition, mindful of Chinese militia, CCG vessels, and the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy lurking on the horizon.
And with the past experiences of Filipino sailors, coast guards, and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources personnel just taking the blows, Beijing knows it can do what it wants in the name of the diplomatic mode of dispute resolution.
Now the nagging question: Is forbearance in the West Philippine Sea our preferred mode of “diplomacy” with China?
atty.edarevalo@gmail.com
