First of two parts
OCT. 2, 2026, was the day Dr. Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean diplomat and scholar, delivered a lecture, “Colloquies in Social Sciences: US-China Rivalry,” at the Leong Hall Auditorium of the Ateneo de Manila University.
A certain Mariel Castañeda Cutab got her reaction paper to the lecture passed on to this column. All in the spirit of giving first place to the other fellow’s idea, the paper was received appreciatively.
To begin with, the subject matter is one dear to this column. Ms. Cutab’s paper has the effect of making this writer personally listen to Dr. Kishore Mahbubani’s lecture without being there.
Here are some of Ms. Cutab’s key takeaways on the lecture, treated as if in the first person.
The Philippines is again living through a great-power transition. Professor Mahbubani emphasized that the country should learn rather than assume it can simply attach itself to whichever power is dominant.
The US-China rivalry is the defining geopolitical contest confronting the region. Even when relations appear temporarily calmer, the underlying competition remains. For Southeast Asian countries, the challenge is preparing for the next period of tension rather than assuming a temporary lull means the rivalry has disappeared.
The Philippines should be cautious about simply piggybacking on a hegemon. The uncomfortable question is whether Philippine strategy has become too dependent on the assumption that alignment with a stronger power will automatically provide security.
Mahbubani’s broader writings have criticized both China and the United States for selective adherence to international legal rules. The implication is not that law is meaningless, but that legal victories alone cannot substitute for diplomacy, deterrence, economic resilience and strategic judgment.
Ukraine was presented as a warning about great-power competition and proxy dynamics.
The most obvious and most disturbing possibility is the Philippines becoming a proxy arena. The lecture’s warning was that countries located on geopolitical fault lines can bear enormous human and economic costs while the principal competing powers remain geographically insulated.
Segueing to part 2 of her takeaways, Ms. Cutab addresses the fundamental question:
How does a country like the Philippines avoid becoming somebody else’s proxy battlefield?
The lecture was profoundly sobering because it forces us to confront a possibility we rarely discuss openly: The Philippines could become the physical arena of a great-power confrontation while the principal powers themselves remain largely protected from its consequences.
Are there historical examples of smaller states that came dangerously close to becoming proxy-war arenas but successfully preserved their sovereignty, relationships and national survival? What exactly did they do?
If no outside power can ultimately guarantee our survival, what should Philippine strategy look like?
Do we confront China, accommodate it, submit to the realities of unequal power, or can we construct a credible third path?
How do we defend Philippine sovereignty without sacrificing the Philippines in somebody else’s war? Perhaps the most important insight I took from Mahbubani’s lecture is that the alternative to choosing sides is not weakness or surrender. The harder task is building enough diplomatic space, economic resilience, regional cooperation and strategic judgment to retain the capacity to choose for ourselves. In that sense, Asean may not simply be part of the answer. Its experience of keeping competing powers engaged while preserving a regional diplomatic space may be one of the most important models available to the Philippines as it navigates an increasingly dangerous US-China rivalry.
“Do not take sides” sounds simple, but Mahbubani has long argued that Southeast Asian countries generally prefer maintaining productive relations with both rather than being forced into a binary choice.
Australia demonstrates how difficult strategic balancing can become. The lesson is that strategic autonomy is not the same as neutrality. It requires carefully managing several relationships simultaneously. Fear, history and culture also shape perceptions of China. The discussion raised the historical idea of the “Yellow Peril” and the possibility that strategic perceptions are influenced not only by objective security concerns but also by cultural narratives and inherited fears. This does not erase legitimate concerns about Chinese actions, particularly at sea, but it suggests that policy analysis should distinguish between threat assessment and broader cultural assumptions.
Asean may offer the most important regional lesson.
Mahbubani has repeatedly argued that Asean’s achievement lies partly in creating habits of dialogue, inclusiveness and regional diplomacy that allow states with very different political systems and strategic relationships to coexist. He describes Asean’s ability to maintain relationships with competing major powers as one of its central geopolitical strengths.
“The Asean Miracle,” a book authored by Mahbubani, therefore has practical relevance beyond traditional diplomacy. For my work on regional fishing agreements, this is particularly significant. Fisheries disputes in the South China Sea cannot be treated solely as questions of sovereignty, enforcement or maritime power. Asean’s experience suggests the value of building functional arrangements around shared interests such as fisheries sustainability, scientific cooperation, information sharing, livelihood protection and conflict prevention even when larger sovereignty disputes remain unresolved.
Perhaps the most important insight Ms. Cutad took from Professor Mahbubani’s lecture is that the alternative to choosing sides is not weakness or surrender. The harder task is building enough diplomatic space, economic resilience, regional cooperation and strategic judgment to retain the capacity to choose for ourselves.
In that sense, Asean may not simply be part of the answer. Its experience of keeping competing powers engaged while preserving a regional diplomatic space may be one of the most important models available to the Philippines as it navigates an increasingly dangerous US-China rivalry. Mahbubani has consistently described that rivalry as a long-term strategic competition that transcends individual leaders.
International law remains important, but it does not eliminate power politics. Mahbubani argued that major powers have historically applied international law selectively. His broader writings have criticized both China and the United States for selective adherence to international legal rules. The implication is not that law is meaningless, but that legal victories alone cannot substitute for diplomacy, deterrence, economic resilience and strategic judgment.
Ukraine was presented as a warning about great-power competition and proxy dynamics. Russia’s invasion was described as illegal, while the lecture also raised the separate strategic question of whether the escalation toward war could have been prevented. The larger lesson was that smaller countries must understand how great powers use partnerships, military assistance and regional conflicts to pursue their own strategic objectives.
The most obvious and most disturbing possibility is the Philippines becoming a proxy arena. The lecture’s warning was that countries located on geopolitical fault lines can bear enormous human and economic costs while the principal competing powers remain geographically insulated from the destruction.
To be concluded on Oct. 24, 2026
