First of two parts
I HAVE not written about the Iran war until now, as I wanted some clarity on its scope and how it is going before opining as if I knew what I was talking about when not only I but all clearly do not know. Both are still unclear. I don’t think we know as of now, but the direction and possibilities are multiple with very different consequences. Though in keeping with past practices when it gets too painful, the TACO trade returns as it seems to be. For me, the main variant on how it will play out for the Iranians and the rest of us is time, including how long will active resistance last. We already know the form — asymmetric warfare — which is to be expected. You do not face an opponent with overwhelming force in like manner, that would be futile. You use asymmetric tactics like the Vietnamese and the Afghans did successfully. Related to time is pain. Who can take more of it over time? Clearly, the Vietnamese military and people suffered tremendously over decades, but eventually the French and American tolerance for pain — casualties, cost and internal dissent — were too much, relative to the Vietnamese capacity to accept it. Same with the Taliban in Afghanistan, which is unfortunate, given their repressive social policies. Let’s see how it plays out with Iran, its neighbors and the United States.
With the Vietnamese and Afghans, the effect was largely limited to their area and the cost to their enemy. Alas, with Iran, it affects the Middle East more broadly through the cost and supply of oil, and the social and political order in the region. The US and its ally Israel may find out yet again that when you throw a stick, it may be a boomerang. As noted by others on regime change, it is hard to make work and has rarely worked when caused by an invasion. When it works like the Velvet Revolution in then-Czechoslovakia (now peacefully divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and EDSA, it came from within. There can be help from outside, but the impetus for change and the alternative needs to be internally driven. As the Buddhists say, change comes from many countries, including China, which is one of our major suppliers of gasoline and diesel within.
Besides the military cost, there is the economic cost in price, availability and activity of oil. Brent Oil was $59 on Dec. 17. On March 9, it breached (proper use of the word unlike in much of Philippine journalism as breach means to exceed with a negative connotation) $111, and as of March 11 was around $93, or a 57-percent increase in three months. Then there is availability as the Strait of Hormuz is basically shut down for shipping so there goes the supply chain. Many countries, including China — which is one of our major suppliers of gasoline and diesel — have curtailed exports to reserve supplies for themselves. Thanks to our leave-it-to-the-private-sector approach to let markets dictate everything, which led to Shell and Caltex closing their refineries, and Petron having the sole remaining refinery, and keeping that going is not an easy task. That left us heavily dependent not just on crude oil imports but even for end use products. Then there is activity as the Middle East is also a major transportation, trade and financial link. Plus, Iran is a major supplier of fertilizer (nitrogen, urea and phosphate), and as Bloomberg notes, one-third of world fertilizers go through the Strait of Hormuz, and prices have moved up and supply tightened. Much of shipments through there are in a state of suspension. Even if supplies resume but at these elevated prices, this will increase not just the cost but the level of working capital and financing required. President Trump could not explain that away and said in an interview with Reuters on March 5 about oil prices, “I don’t have any concern about it... They’ll drop very rapidly when this is over, and if they rise, they rise, but this is far more important than having gasoline prices go up a little bit.” Let’s see, but as of March 11, he was talking very differently.
I have read and listened to some very intelligent and insightful commentary since the crisis, and please, if you can, look some of them up. Bloomberg’s weekend email on March 7 analyzes this and quotes the excellent interview Mishal Husein had with Bernard Haykel of Princeton (available on YouTube) which was very insightful. He says there are three ways the war can end — “the regime could fall. It could stay but soften its stance and cut a deal with the US. Or it could simply hold on and survive — but “hardened even further in its determination to be a revisionist power.” The last one is the most likely. As for how long the fighting will last, Dina Esfandiary of Bloomberg Geoeconomics highlights three factors. The greater the economic cost — meaning mostly energy prices — the more pressure there will be on Trump to end the war. For Iran, willingness to deal will depend on how fast its weapons stockpiles are depleted or destroyed, as well as which factions emerge most powerful in the wake of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death.”
Bloomberg Geoeconomics considers a transition to democracy highly unlikely, and their analyst Antonio Barroso notes, “Of 60 foreign-backed leadership change attempts since 1945, only seven produced democracies that endured for at least a decade. In cases allegedly involving the US, just two of 26 did. In the Middle East, none resulted in a consolidated democracy.”
From March 7 in The New York Times is Nicholas Kristof’s “The Arrogance of Power Drives War in Iran,” and I will quote two paragraphs where he recalls what Sen. J. William Fulbright said during the Vietnam War and then elaborates on that.
“One of America’s great senators, J. William Fulbright, responded to the Vietnam War in 1966 by denouncing what he called ‘the arrogance of power.’ He cautioned: ‘Power confuses itself with virtue and tends also to take itself for omnipotence.’ He framed it this way: ‘We are still acting like Boy Scouts dragging reluctant old ladies across streets they do not want to cross.’
“In Iraq, our arrogance of power led us to start a war that ended up costing hundreds of thousands of lives (mostly those of Iraqis) and perhaps $3 trillion — and ultimately benefited Iran. In Afghanistan, we wasted lives and some $3.4 trillion over two decades to replace the Taliban with the Taliban.”
As Robin Wright wrote in the New Yorker on March 9, the war is costing the US $900 million “a day” and has deployed half its air power and a third of its naval assets to the region.
To be concluded on March 20, 2026
The author is an independent director of the state-run Maharlika Investment Corp.
