THERE is a particular kind of political arrogance that mistakes interference for stewardship. It is the belief that a peace process painstakingly built through decades of war, negotiation and sacrifice can be managed, redirected, or reorganized from Malacañang without consequence. The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) is now living through the consequences of that assumption.
The warning signs are no longer subtle. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has suspended the final phase of decommissioning involving about 14,000 combatants. Nearly P788 million in peace funds has been returned to the national treasury, not because the money was unnecessary, but because confidence in the implementation process has eroded. The Government Peace Implementing Panel, the body mandated to engage the MILF on matters arising from the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), has been left without a permanent chair after the resignation of its head. These are not isolated administrative problems. They are symptoms of a peace process under strain.
The 2014 CAB was not an act of generosity by the Philippine government. It was a negotiated political settlement. The MILF abandoned its decades-long struggle for independence in exchange for genuine autonomy, an MILF-led political transition and implementation through bilateral mechanisms founded on mutual trust. That bargain became the cornerstone of the peace process.
When President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. replaced MILF chairman Murad Ebrahim with Abdulraof Macacua as interim chief minister in 2025, without the endorsement of the MILF central committee and while departing from the movement's submitted list of nominees for the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), many within the MILF viewed the move as inconsistent with both the spirit of the transition and the understandings that produced the CAB.
MILF vice chairman Mohagher Iqbal, the chief negotiator of the peace agreement, described these developments as "a classic divide-and-rule tactic" aimed at weakening the organization. Whether or not one accepts that characterization, it reflects the depth of concern within the movement that negotiated and signed the peace agreement.
History gives these concerns added weight.
The Philippines has seen the consequences of broken commitments before. In 1976, the government of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. signed the Tripoli Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Implementation faltered, confidence collapsed, and internal divisions followed. From that breakdown emerged the faction led by Hashim Salamat, which eventually became the MILF.
The lesson is not simply historical. It is political. Peace agreements survive because both sides continue to believe that negotiated commitments will be honored. When that confidence weakens, instability follows.
Former government peace negotiators led by Miriam Coronel-Ferrer have warned that divisions within the MILF could increase the risks of radicalization, criminality and a breakdown of the peace process. Their recommendation was straightforward: Government should help unite, not divide, its peace partner.
At the heart of the current approach lies a fundamental misunderstanding of autonomy. BARMM is not a program administered by Manila. It is a political settlement recognized in law through the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) and grounded in years of difficult negotiations. Autonomy means allowing the Muslims of Mindanao to govern themselves, build institutions, resolve internal disagreements, and earn democratic legitimacy through their own political processes.
That is precisely why the BTA was created. It serves as a bridge between revolutionary legitimacy and electoral democracy, allowing former combatants to become public servants and institutions to mature before power is fully transferred to elected leaders. It was never intended to become an extension of national political management.
Concerns have also been raised about the changing role of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity (Opapru). Critics argue that it has increasingly shifted from being a facilitator of the peace process to becoming an active political player, bypassing established bilateral mechanisms, and relying instead on unilateral executive decisions. Whether intended or not, such actions weaken the very institutions designed to sustain trust between the government and the MILF.
The Muslim people of Mindanao must be allowed to make their own political choices, resolve their own tensions, and build their own institutions. Durable peace cannot be imposed from above. It must grow from the confidence that agreements will be respected and that local institutions will be allowed to evolve.
The greatest mistake is treating the MILF as merely one political actor among many to be balanced against traditional clans, technocrats and Manila-backed personalities. The MILF is not simply another stakeholder. It is the peace partner. It remains the only organization with the legitimacy and organizational capacity to complete the normalization process, including the decommissioning of thousands of former combatants. Weakening that institution does not diversify BARMM politics. It risks weakening the peace itself.
The way forward is neither complicated nor impossible. Reconstitute the government peace implementing panel with a chair carrying the full confidence of the president. Respect the bilateral mechanisms established under the CAB. Restore Opapru to its role as facilitator rather than political manager. Resume decommissioning together with the socioeconomic commitments promised to former combatants and their communities.
Most importantly, allow the Muslims of Mindanao to decide their own political future. The September 2026 parliamentary elections should be conducted freely, fairly and without unnecessary intervention from Manila. Their legitimacy depends on the confidence that the people are choosing their own leaders. And what Macacua is doing is not enhancing resolution of issues; rather, he is creating more problems.
The BARMM was not built by presidential appointments. It was built through decades of sacrifice, negotiations, and painful compromise by the Muslim people and the MILF. Its future will not be secured through greater control from Manila, but through fidelity to the commitments that made peace possible in the first place.
The greatest contribution the national government can make today is not to manage the BARMM. It is to keep its word.
