Pakatan Harapan faces a credibility crisis after losing Negeri Sembilan as the BN-PN alliance consolidates Malay support and threatens GE16 dominance.
THE 2026 Negeri Sembilan election constitutes a significant setback for Pakatan Harapan (PH).
The Barisan Nasional–Perikatan Nasional (BN–PN) pact secured 25 of 36 seats, with BN winning 18 and PN seven, whereas PH retained 11.
The defeats of DAP secretary-general Anthony Loke in Chennah and former Menteri Besar Datuk Seri Aminuddin Harun in Linggi were symbolically consequential. Nevertheless, losing a state constituency does not affect Loke’s federal parliamentary seat or ministerial appointment.
The outcome indicates that PH’s central challenge is restoring public confidence. An explanation centred exclusively on ethnic politics would be analytically inadequate.
Electoral reversals in Sabah, Johor and Negeri Sembilan suggest wider dissatisfaction associated with the cost of living, the limited pace of institutional reform and ambiguity surrounding PH’s political identity.
Its participation in a federal administration alongside BN has also complicated its capacity to present itself simultaneously as a reformist alternative and a defender of the incumbent government.
Accordingly, PH may require state-level leadership renewal, stronger grassroots organisation, and attainable reforms before the sixteenth general election (GE16). Loke’s defeat is likely to intensify debate within DAP regarding its appeal beyond urban constituencies.
Similarly, PKR must broaden its Malay support rather than rely disproportionately on Anwar Ibrahim’s national standing.
PH should remain competitive in urban and ethnically mixed constituencies; however, without visible economic improvement, its national representation may contract.
For BN and PN, the result strengthens the strategic rationale for continued electoral cooperation.
Their combined performance illustrates how avoiding three-cornered contests can consolidate Malay support while enabling BN component parties to retain some appeal among non-Malay voters.
Datuk Seri Zahid Hamidi’s indication that the arrangement may continue in Melaka further suggests that the Negeri Sembilan model could influence subsequent state contests.
A BN–PN pact would enter a Melaka election with considerable advantages. BN possesses established networks and incumbency, while PN may contribute conservative Malay support.
Subject to disciplined candidate allocation, the partnership could plausibly secure between 20 and 24 of Melaka’s 28 seats.
Extending this model to GE16 would be more complex because parliamentary constituencies are larger and more heterogeneous, while BN and PAS retain overlapping ambitions, distinct political cultures, and competing leadership interests.
Despite these constraints, coordinated campaigning could position BN–PN to win the largest number of parliamentary seats in Peninsular Malaysia, particularly by preventing the fragmentation of anti-PH votes in marginal constituencies.
The formation of a federal government, however, would probably depend on parties from Sabah and Sarawak, which may be reluctant to support an administration perceived as heavily influenced by PAS.
A BN–PN plurality at GE16 is therefore plausible, although an outright parliamentary majority is less certain.
Bersatu appears to face the most serious strategic challenge.
Having contested independently and failed to secure a Negeri Sembilan seat, it has weakened its claim to serve as the principal intermediary between Malay nationalist voters and PAS.
The emergence of Datuk Seri Hamzah Zainudin’s Parti Wawasan Negara within PN may further erode this function by occupying a similar political space.
Bersatu’s options are reconciliation with PAS, negotiation with PH, or participation in a smaller coalition of parties excluded from the BN–PN arrangement.
Reconciliation offers the greatest electoral value but presents political difficulties; cooperation with PH could undermine Bersatu’s credibility after sustained opposition; and a smaller alliance would have limited reach.
Its survival may therefore depend on leadership renewal, reconciliation with former leaders, and reintegration into a larger coalition.
Without such adaptation, Bersatu risks losing much of its parliamentary representation at GE16 and becoming marginal within Malaysia’s party system.
Afi Roshezry Abu Bakar
Adi Wira Mohd Zin
Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman (Kampar Campus)
