
Muafakat Nasional was born out of political shock. After Barisan Nasional’s defeat in the 2018 general election, UMNO and PAS—longtime rivals—came together under the banner of Malay unity. For the first time, Putrajaya was governed by a multiracial coalition, and Muafakat Nasional was presented as a necessary response to that new reality.
Officially, the alliance was created to defend Malay rights and dignity. Unofficially, it was an attempt to restore a sense of Malay political control that had been disrupted by Pakatan Harapan’s victory.
That arrangement did not last long. Following the Sheraton Move in 2020, Bersatu was folded into the alliance, transforming Muafakat Nasional into Perikatan Nasional. Later still, UMNO exited PN ahead of the 2022 general election, leaving PAS and Bersatu to carry the coalition on their own.
Today, with PAS and Bersatu increasingly at odds—most visibly in the Perlis power struggle—and with UMNO’s partnership with DAP inside the unity government growing more uncomfortable, talk of reviving the original Muafakat Nasional has resurfaced.
UMNO heavyweight like Akmal Saleh and PAS's Kedah MB Sanusi are already talking about a possibility of PAS and UMNO joining forces again.
But talk should not be mistaken for intent.
The chances of Muafakat Nasional being revived are actually slim. If it were revived, it will likely be a spur of the moment event, fuelled by passion rather than rational or strategic consideration, and being so, it it would almost certainly be short-lived, just as how the original Muafakat Nasional was shortlived.
The reason is simple: the problem Muafakat Nasional claims to address is not the problem Malays are actually facing.
The alliance presents itself as a defender of Malay dignity and rights. Yet in reality, it functions as a vehicle to preserve Malay political status—particularly the status of the Malay elite, political class, and religious establishment.
In reality, Malays today do not face a problem of dignity or erosion of rights.
History shows that genuine, large-scale Malay unity only emerges during moments of real existential threat. This happened during the Malayan Union crisis and again in the early decades after independence, especially in the tumultuous decade in the 60s, when Malays believed that they were being overwhelmed economically by the non-Malays, to the point that their collective rights and dignity was at risk.
That is not the situation today.
Modern Malay anxiety is not about rights, survival or dignity. It is about status.
More specifically, it is about the fear of no longer being the unquestioned political “boss” of the land.
For decades, Malay-dominated parties set the rules of governance, decided national priorities, established behavioral norms and controlled how economic rewards were distributed. The presence of a multiracial coalition—one in which DAP plays a central role and East Malaysian parties wield substantial influence—has altered the structure of this control.
This change is unsettling, even if it does not materially threaten Malay rights. The discomfort lies in the loss of exclusive command, not in oppression or marginalisation.
Yet this discomfort is rarely expressed honestly or articulately by Malay leaders and parties. Instead, they still translate their discomfort and anxiety into the language of dignity, rights, and unity. The problem however is that these terms might have been able to move the heart and mind of the Malays in the 40s and 60s, but today, they do not really strike a chord with the Malay population.
Because of that, there is a limit to how much the Malay parties and leaders are able to unite the Malays using the language of dignity and rights. It might rally enough support to to oppose to multiracial coalitions. But when this narrative is pushed too far—especially when it demands total Malay political unity—it collapses under its own contradictions.
How so?
Because the moment full unity is achieved, dignity and rights stop being the issue.
Status takes centre stage.
Once all Malay and Malay-based parties unite, every leader, faction, and grassroots base will expect to be treated as the dominant force. No one wants unity as an equal; everyone wants unity under their leadership. What will then inevitably follow is not harmony, but rivalry.
Each group begins competing to define itself as the true “boss”, and unity quickly disintegrates into infighting.
This is why Muafakat Nasional was unstable—and why any revival would inevitably face the same fate.
Malaysia today has four major Malay or Malay-based parties: UMNO, PAS, Bersatu, and PKR. As long as alliances involve only two of these parties, status tensions can be managed. Once three come together, the question of dominance becomes unavoidable—and destructive.
Although both major Malay alliances today are strained—UMNO with PKR, and PAS with Bersatu—it is unlikely that these tensions will result in a three-party Malay coalition. Such an arrangement would immediately trigger internal power struggles that none of the parties can afford.
If this is the case - if Malay unity will not be achievable without triggering infighting - why is UMNO and PAS promoting it as a possibility ?
Well, if you ask me, I believe that UMNO and PAS are just promoting it, because each is trying to renegotiate its position within its existing alliance.
PAS is currently trying to put Bersatu in its place, as the junior member of PN, while Bersatu is trying to assert itself, most notably in its power grab against PAS in Perlis today, as the leading component of PN.
At the same time, UMNO is also trying to up its status within the ruling government, not only by confronting DAP, but also extract more concessions from PKR.
By openly talking reviving Muafakat Nasional, both are likely signaling to their existing partners about the possibility of them exiting their existing coalition, to acheive their respective ends.
Public threats and symbolic gestures—such as UMNO hinting at withdrawal from government or PAS expressing interest in Muafakat Nasional—should thus be understood as bargaining tools, not genuine strategic shifts.
They are signals meant to pressure current partners, not blueprints for new alliances.
A real PAS–UMNO reunion would create a new problem: For one, it would almost certainly push Bersatu and PKR towards closer cooperation, re-opening the same status contest under a different configuration. Two, it would also cause the issue of status to cease being an external issue, and cause internal competition and quarrels to rise amongst the Malays.
In the end, Malay unity remains elusive because the debate is framed incorrectly. The political struggle is no longer about dignity or rights—it is about hierarchy.
And hierarchy is not resolved through unity.
Unity addresses injustice and exclusion. Status conflicts are settled through dominance, and dominance is not something you achieve through unity.
As long as this contradiction remains unresolved, Muafakat Nasional will remain what it has always been: an idea that sounds powerful in theory, but collapses the moment it confronts political reality.
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