First of three parts
THE numbers are unsettling, but they are not destiny. Recent survey trends show that Sara Duterte remains the front-runner heading into the early stages of the 2028 presidential race. Her advantage is clear when viewed through the lens of factional partisanship: the Duterte-aligned bloc stands at approximately 33 percent, making it the single largest identifiable political grouping in the country. By contrast, the Marcos-aligned bloc accounts for around 22 percent, while the opposition, including figures associated with Leni Robredo, Risa Hontiveros, and their allies, comprises roughly 17 percent. At first glance, this configuration appears to position Duterte comfortably ahead. But a closer reading reveals a more complex and far less deterministic picture. The apparent lead is less a sign of dominance than a reflection of a divided political field.
To understand why she leads, one must examine not just the numbers but the structure beneath them. The Duterte bloc is not only the largest. It is also the most internally cohesive. Survey breakdowns indicate that around 65.9 percent of Duterte supporters identify as “solid,” with only small fractions classified as soft or leaning. This level of consolidation gives Duterte a structural advantage in a fragmented electoral environment. In contrast, the Marcos bloc is far more fluid. Only 32.8 percent of its supporters are solid, while 22.8 percent are soft Marcos, 23.3 percent lean toward Duterte and 13.2 percent lean toward the opposition. This suggests that the Marcos base is not ideologically sealed, but rather a transitional space that can shift depending on political conditions. The Pink and Yellow opposition, for its part, shows stronger internal coherence, with 52.6 percent identifying as solid and 23.2 percent as soft, but its overall size remains insufficient to compete on its own. This fluidity is not a weakness, but an opportunity waiting to be organized.
This is the paradox that defines the current political landscape. Sara Duterte leads not because she commands a majority, but because the opposition to her is divided across multiple camps that have yet to converge. The arithmetic is straightforward. When combined, the Marcos and opposition blocs already account for roughly 39 percent of the electorate, surpassing the Duterte share. When the 25 percent who identify with “none of the above” are considered, the potential anti-Duterte vote becomes even larger. The issue, therefore, is not numerical disadvantage, but strategic fragmentation. What appears as Duterte’s strength is, in reality, a by-product of disunity among her opponents.
This is precisely why Duterte’s lead must be interpreted with caution. The trend data shows that her support has not significantly expanded beyond its core. Across successive survey waves, the Duterte bloc has remained within a narrow range, showing no evidence of breakthrough growth. At the same time, the “none of the above” category has declined from 39 percent in November 2025 to 25 percent in March 2026, suggesting that voters are beginning to sort themselves into existing political camps. Importantly, much of this consolidation has benefited both the Marcos and opposition blocs, which posted increases of 8 and 5 percentage points, respectively, over the same period. This indicates that while Duterte’s base remains stable, it is not absorbing the broader electorate. In electoral terms, this suggests a ceiling rather than momentum.
This pattern is consistent with what can be described as a plateau. A plateau is not a collapse, but neither is it growth. It represents a ceiling beyond which further expansion becomes difficult without significant shifts in strategy or context. Duterte’s strength lies in the intensity of her base, but intensity does not automatically translate into majority support. In a multicandidate race, a cohesive plurality can win. But in a consolidated contest, that same plurality can be overtaken. The key variable, therefore, is not her base, but the behavior of those outside it.
This is where the argument becomes more urgent. The case against a Duterte presidency is not merely electoral. It is institutional. Her public record raises serious concerns about temperament, restraint and the capacity to govern within democratic norms. The incident in which she physically assaulted a sheriff while serving as mayor is not an isolated anecdote, but part of a broader pattern that privileges coercion over deliberation. Her public gestures, including simulating the act of beheading the president and her admission that she had asked someone to assassinate key political figures, are not rhetorical excesses that can be dismissed as theatrics. They reflect a conception of power that is incompatible with constitutional governance. These are not just campaign liabilities. They are warning signs.
Beyond temperament, there is also the question of communicative capacity. The presidency requires the ability to articulate policy, manage complexity and engage in diplomacy. What is observed instead is a tendency toward reactive and inflammatory discourse, which may mobilize a loyal base but does not inspire confidence in the ability to navigate the demands of governance. This combination of volatility and limited deliberative capacity is not merely a political concern. It is a systemic risk. It raises the possibility of governance driven more by impulse than by institutional discipline.
The danger, therefore, is not hypothetical. It is grounded in observable patterns of behavior and supported by a political base that is highly resistant to conventional forms of accountability. Yet the numbers show that this danger is not inevitable. Duterte leads, but she does not dominate. Her base is solid, but it is not expanding. Her advantage is real, but it is contingent on the continued division of those who oppose her. Once that condition changes, the electoral equation shifts.
The lesson is clear. The current configuration of support does not reflect an insurmountable lead, but a fragmented opposition. The path to defeating Duterte does not require converting her core supporters wholesale. It requires aggregating the existing anti-Duterte vote into a coherent and viable coalition. The numbers already make this possible. What remains uncertain is whether the political actors involved are willing to act on that reality. If they fail to do so, Duterte’s victory will not be because she expanded her base, but because her opponents refused to consolidate theirs.
To be continued in April 16, 2026
The author is a professor at the University of the Philippines Los Baños and vice chairman of the board of of the state-run PTVNI.
