IF the much-publicized 14-point memorandum that Donald Trump claims could end his war is eventually signed, America may find itself confronting a result reminiscent of the Korean armistice: not an outright military defeat, but a strategic setback nonetheless.
Hostilities may largely cease. Neither side may achieve its full objectives. The underlying political disputes would remain unresolved. The ceasefire itself would become the settlement.
The political consequences could be substantial. Trump and his MAGA allies may pay a price in the 2026 midterm elections. Benjamin Netanyahu’s political future could become increasingly uncertain. Iran would retain influence over the Strait of Hormuz. China would emerge as the principal strategic beneficiary. More importantly, the world would enter a more unstable era.
What is unfolding before us is no longer a collection of isolated conflicts. It is a widening contest driven by energy, trade routes, technology, economics, and great-power rivalry. For the Philippines, an island nation dependent on maritime commerce and imported fuel, distant crises quickly become local realities affecting prices, security, and economic stability.
The return of geopolitics
At the center of this contest remains the United States. Administrations change, but strategic objectives remain remarkably consistent: protect the homeland, secure trade routes, preserve financial influence, maintain technological leadership and sustain global power.
To achieve these goals, Washington places enormous importance on strategic choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca and the Panama Canal — the arteries through which the global economy flows.
The Philippines sits squarely within this maritime system. Our trade, energy supplies and economic stability depend on open and secure sea lanes. When disruptions occur thousands of miles away, Filipinos often feel the consequences through higher fuel costs, inflation and economic uncertainty.
For decades, globalization encouraged the belief that economics would gradually replace geopolitics. That illusion is now fading. Supply chains have become strategic weapons. Energy is increasingly used as leverage. Shipping routes are no longer viewed simply as commercial pathways but as assets that must be protected and controlled.
Russia’s strategy reflects this reality. Despite the immense costs of the Ukraine war, Moscow continues pursuing long-term plans to connect Eurasia through pipelines, railways, and overland transport corridors that reduce dependence on Western-controlled sea routes.
China has chosen a different path. Rather than direct military confrontation, Beijing has concentrated on industrial expansion, infrastructure development, and economic influence through initiatives such as the Belt and Road.
For Manila, the challenge is obvious. China remains both one of our largest economic partners and the principal source of pressure in the West Philippine Sea. In geopolitics, patience itself can become a form of power.
The new battlefield
The oceans are no longer merely highways of commerce. They are increasingly becoming arenas of geopolitical competition. The disputes surrounding Russian and Iranian oil exports illustrate this shift. As sanctions expand and efforts to intercept so-called “dark fleet” shipments intensify, maritime tensions continue to grow.
For the Philippines, the implications are profound. The South China Sea and the waters surrounding our archipelago are becoming more — not less — important in the strategic calculations of major powers. At the same time, the nature of conflict itself is changing.
Events in the Middle East demonstrate how modern warfare increasingly rewards disruption rather than conquest. Iran’s use of drones, missiles, and proxy forces shows how relatively inexpensive technologies can impose enormous costs on far stronger adversaries. A drone costing thousands of dollars can threaten military assets worth billions. A disruption in a critical shipping lane can affect economies across multiple continents.
The battlefield now extends far beyond conventional military forces. It includes ports, pipelines, satellites, undersea cables, financial networks, digital infrastructure, and global logistics systems.
Strategic pressure no longer requires a formal declaration of war. Economic coercion, cyberattacks, maritime harassment, information warfare and supply-chain disruptions can achieve significant effects without crossing the threshold of open conflict.
Nor is Iran as isolated as many Western policymakers once assumed. Russia provides strategic access through the Caspian region while China maintains extensive economic links throughout Asia and the Middle East. Increasingly, regional conflicts are becoming interconnected through broader networks of great-power competition. This is precisely what makes the current moment more dangerous than many appreciate.
The Philippine question
Perhaps the greatest irony of the emerging geopolitical landscape is that China may ultimately benefit most from the rivalries consuming other major powers.
While Washington and Moscow absorb the costs of sanctions, military competition, and geopolitical confrontation, Beijing remains focused on manufacturing, infrastructure, trade and industrial expansion.
China appears to understand a lesson many great powers learned too late: global dominance is expensive. Wars consume resources. Military overreach weakens societies. Endless confrontation drains capital and attention.
Its preferred victory may not be military conquest but economic endurance — remaining productive while competitors exhaust themselves.
For the Philippines, this creates a difficult balancing act. We depend on the United States for security and deterrence yet operate within an Asian economy where China is simply too large, too close, and too economically important to ignore.
The real lessons for PH
The old assumptions of globalization are fading. Economic growth, military power, energy security and political stability can no longer be treated as separate issues. They are increasingly interconnected.
For the Philippines, resilience can no longer be measured solely by GDP growth or foreign investment. It must also be measured by our ability to protect maritime rights, secure sea lanes, diversify energy sources, strengthen critical infrastructure and withstand external pressure without political fragmentation.
Yet this is precisely where the country’s greatest vulnerability lies.
The Philippines is not being weakened primarily by foreign adversaries. It is being weakened by a political system perpetually at war with itself.
Political dynasties compete for power while often sharing the same economic allies within the oligarchy. The result is a governing class more focused on factional advantage than long-term national strategy.
At the very moment, the geopolitical environment demands discipline, competence, and strategic foresight, much of the nation’s political energy is consumed by investigations, hearings, impeachment threats, personality conflicts, and endless electoral maneuvering. The Senate and Congress, institutions meant to formulate policy and provide national direction, too often resemble arenas for political theater rather than engines of statecraft.
Meanwhile, the world grows more dangerous. History offers a sobering lesson: declining powers rarely retreat quietly. The danger facing the world today is not a single war in a single region. It is the growing interaction of economic, military, technological and political crises that reinforce one another.
A conflict in the Middle East can affect fuel prices in Manila. A disruption in Europe can influence food costs in Davao. Maritime tensions in the Indo-Pacific can alter trade, investment and national security across the archipelago.
That is the geopolitical reality now unfolding before us. The question is whether the Philippines can confront a turbulent world while its political elite remain trapped in the small wars of dynasty, patronage and personal ambition.
For nations, as for individuals, the greatest danger often comes not from enemies beyond the gate, but from decay within the walls.
lito.lorenzana@cdpi.asia
